

Do No Harm Trainer's Manual

December 2018

Based on the Manual's edition June 2002 published by



Revised by

Jochen Neumann
Wolfgang Heinrich

Published by

KURVE Wustrow
Centre for Training and Networking in Nonviolent Action
www.kurviewustrow.org

About the Authors:

Wolfgang Heinrich has a background of 30 years of development work with non-governmental organisations. From 1996 to 2001 he was a member of Mary B. Anderson's international team for the „Local Capacities for Peace Project“, which facilitated the development of the Do no harm-Approach. He is a Do no harm-Trainer and engaged in implementing, testing and developing as well as disseminating it. Since 2016 he is a freelance consultant and accompanies local non-governmental organisations in South Asia and the Horn of Africa.

Jochen Neumann is a trainer in nonviolent conflict transformation and the Do no harm-Approach. He worked on mediation and reconciliation in South Africa. From 2001 to 2004 he coordinated the implementation of Do no harm at Peace Brigades International, a human rights organisation which offers protective accompaniment to local human rights defenders. Since October 2004 he is the director of KURVE Wustrow.

IMPRESSUM

Published by:

KURVE Wustrow
Centre for Training and Networking in Nonviolent Action

Kirchstr. 14
29462 Wustrow
Germany
Tel: +49-(0)5843-9871-0
info@kurviewustrow.org
www.kurviewustrow.org

Donation Account:


IBAN : DE50 4306 0967 2041 6468 00
BIC: GENODEM1GLS

Authors / Editors: Wolfgang Heinrich, Jochen Neumann

Proofreading: Christiane Weichsel

Layout: Gregor Zielke www.pikomu.com

Date of Publication: December 2018



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License (CC BY-SA 4.0)
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode>

Icons used:



Case Study



Handout



Role Play



Internet Resources

Contents

IMPRESSUM.....	III
FOREWORD.....	VII
INTRODUCTION	IX
This Trainer's Manual and the Local Capacities for Peace Project	IX
SECTION I – BEFORE THE EVENT	1
How to Plan a Local Capacities for Peace Workshop	1
The Contents of a Workshop.....	2
How to organise an “Application Exercise”	3
Issues Covered in a Standard Do No Harm Workshop	4
Background and History of the LCP Project.....	5
Useful Clarifications at the Beginning of a Workshop.....	5
Preparing for Follow-up	7
Sample Schedules for Do No Harm Workshops	9
SECTION II – ELEMENTS OF A LOCAL CAPACITIES FOR PEACE WORKSHOP	1
Discovering the Learning from the LCP Project – Case Study Exercise.....	1
Case Studies for Introductory Workshops	4
Facilitation Notes “Food for Work for Rebuilding War-Damaged Homes in Tajikistan”	5
Facilitation Notes “Mediation Training in Townships, South Africa”	11
Facilitation Notes “Social Integration of Former Child Soldiers in Mozambique”	15
Facilitation Notes “Kampong Svay Area Development Programme, Cambodia”	21
Case Studies for Application Exercises.....	27
Facilitation Notes: “Assisting Displaced People from Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan”	29
Facilitation Notes “Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Sri Lanka”	33
The “Framework for Considering a Project's Effects on Conflict”	39
STEP 1: Understanding the Context of Conflict	43
Linking Conflict Analysis and Do No Harm	43
STEP 2: Identifying Dividers, Tensions and Capacities for War.....	45
STEP 3: Identifying Connectors and Local Capacities for Peace	49
STEP 4: Unpacking A Project	53
STEP 5: Effects through “Resource Transfers” and “Implicit Ethical Messages”	55
The Effects through Resource Transfers.....	56
Effects through “Implicit Ethical Messages”.....	59
STEP 6: Generating Options.....	65
A) Initiating Creative Thinking.....	65
B) Options Game.....	66
C) Generating Options to Avoid Unintended Negative Effects	68
STEP 7: Redesigning the Project	71
Session: Background and History of the Local Capacities for Peace Project	73
The LCP Project in a Nutshell	73
Background of the LCP Project	73
Timeline of the LCP Project.....	74

The “Seven Lessons” of the Local Capacities for Peace Project	76
SECTION III – GENERAL METHODOLOGY	1
Facilitator’s Role	1
Facilitating Small Group Work	2
Facilitating a Case Study Exercise	4
How to Lead Role Plays	7
SECTION IV – FURTHER MATERIAL AND RESOURCES	1
Materials I	1
Patterns, Categories, Effects – Key Terms Used in Do No Harm Workshops	1
Notes on Using the Framework and its Elements	1
Disaggregate Complexity – or Using the Categories of DNH Context Analysis for Unpacking Complex Things	4
Applying the Framework	6
Material II	7
Vignettes: Examples from the Field	7
Illustrating the Fact That There Are Always Programming Options to Avoid Doing Harm	10
Material III	17
“Indications” for Assessing Aid’s Impacts on Conflict	19
Donors and Do No Harm	23
Do No Harm and Peacebuilding: Five Lessons	27
Peacebuilding and DNH	33
Three Key Lessons and their Implications for Training	37
General Principles for Adapting Do no harm Training for Different Audiences	39
Being Engaged in Situations of Conflict – Learning from Experience	41
SECTION V – CASE STUDIES AND HANDOUTS	1
Case Studies for Introduction Workshops	1
Case Study “Food For Work for Rebuilding War-Damaged Homes in Tajikistan”	3
Case Study “Mediation Training in South Africa”	7
Supplement to the Case Study „Mediation Training in South Africa“	11
Case Study “Social Integration of Former Child Soldiers in Mozambique”	13
Case Study Kampong Svay Area Development Programme, in Svay Rieng Province	19
Case Studies for Application Exercises	27
Case Study “Assisting Displaced People From Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan”	29
Case Study “Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Sri Lanka”	33
Handouts	39
The Do No Harm Framework	41
The “Conceptual Map” of Do No Harm	43
Do No Harm and Project Cycle Management	44
The Seven Lessons of the Do No Harm-Approach	45
The Seven Steps of the Do No Harm-Approach	46
Effects through Resource Transfers	47
Effects through Implicit Ethical Messages: The R-A-F-T-Principle	48
Effects through Implicit Ethical Messages: List of Messages	50
Roles Plays on Implicit Ethical Messages	52
The Timeline of the LCP Project and Beyond	59
The DNH Workbook (revised 2001)	60
Useful Links	66

FOREWORD

This Manual is a revised version of CDA's original Trainer's Manual of 2002. It is based on the experiences of numerous trainers conducting different types of trainings and workshops for different types of audiences in very different situations since 2001. Particularly, this Manual incorporates some of the experiences of peacebuilding organisations working with Do No Harm.

While conducting Do No Harm trainings and workshops during the past more than 16 years we learned much about the difficulties of “mainstreaming” Do No Harm into an organisation’s procedures and mode of operation. Part of those difficulties we concluded is also the type of process that is suggested in the 2002 Trainer’s Manual. That process of learning was designed to allow participants to discover themselves the key lessons of the Local Capacities for Peace (LCP) Project. That was important in the early years so that participants could discover for themselves the importance and relevance of systematically analysing potential unintended negative effects. Today, the Do No Harm language has become almost as established as Gender language. It is widely accepted that project interventions in any situation may have – and often do have – unintended negative effects. Workshop participants today are more interested in “how do you do it?”.

Therefore, we decided to design a manual for trainings and workshops that address first and foremost this question. Our experience has shown that the “Seven Steps of the Do No Harm-Approach” provide a very practical and useful sequence of steps that allow participants to experience during a workshop how Do No Harm programming (or monitoring) can be done. That additional experience (apart from learning the content matter of Do No Harm) we hope will encourage participants to develop ideas how to integrate Do No Harm in what they do and how they do it.

This manual is structured along the Seven Steps. It presents the LCP project’s findings and the tool developed as participants are following these Steps. Each unit includes suggestions for trainers about how to organise a workshop session so that participants engage with the ideas. The material and the options provided for how to conduct sessions have all been tested in different workshop settings by various trainers and have been found to be useful. However, there are many other ways of organising and conducting sessions. Thus, the suggested options are just that: suggestions.

We thank CDA Collaborative Learning Projects for allowing trainers to work with and adapt the 2002 Trainer's Manual. We thank our trainer colleagues particularly in Africa and South Asia for contributing their suggestions and ideas. And we thank participants of various workshops we conducted over the last three years for allowing us to experiment with elements of this revised manual and for giving us honest and helpful feedback.

Though this revision again was a collaborative project, errors and faults are definitely our responsibility. We appreciate suggestions for improvement.

Jochen Neumann / jneumann@kurviewustrow.org

Wolfgang Heinrich / wkh.heinrich@gmail.com

Wustrow / Bad Herrenalb December 2018

INTRODUCTION

This Trainer's Manual and the Local Capacities for Peace Project

This Trainer's Manual is based on the Do No Harm Trainer's Manual produced by the Collaborative for Development Action (CDA)¹ in 2002. In this review we have incorporated the lessons learnt from countless trainings conducted in many countries. We included new materials which we developed ourselves and which were contributed by other trainers.

The main motivation for this review, however, is our observation that the basic condition for Do No Harm workshops is different today. In the beginning of this century when the first Do No Harm workshops were conducted it was important to build an awareness that well planned and professionally implemented projects also have unintended negative effects that may exacerbate conflict and escalate or prolong violence. Once this awareness had been created people primarily wanted to understand how these effects come about.

Today, the fact that projects have unintended negative effects is widely accepted. There is a common understanding that projects have to be planned and implemented with a high level of sensitivity for the specific conditions of the context in which they interact with people. Today, participants in Do No Harm trainings are primarily interested in discovering what they can do in order to avoid unintended negative effects.

The Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCP Project) was a collaborative effort of local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international agencies and donor governments that provided humanitarian or development assistance in areas where there was violent inter-group conflict. The purpose of the LCP Project was to learn from the broad experience of these many agencies how humanitarian or development assistance may be given in conflict settings so that, rather than exacerbating and prolonging conflict, it helps local people disengage from violence and begin to establish alternatives for addressing the problems that underlie the conflict.

Starting in late 1994, the LCP Project conducted fifteen case studies in fourteen conflict zones around the world² and, from these, identified common patterns in the relationships between external assistance and conflict that emerged in the varied contexts of the case studies. Then, from late 1996 through early 1998, the LCP Project conducted over twenty-five feedback workshops in many other conflict zones and in cities where NGOs have their headquarters. These workshops provided a forum for other humanitarian and development practitioners to "test" the lessons learned in the case studies against their own experiences and to add to and improve them. The learning from both case studies and workshops was published in a book entitled *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War*³ in January 1999.

Between 1997 and October 2000 twelve international assistance organisations introduced the "Do

¹ Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) was reorganized into a non-profit organization and renamed as CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (<http://cdacollaborative.org/>).

² The areas where cases have been conducted include: Afghanistan, Burundi, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Jerusalem, Lebanon, Mozambique, Pakistan, Somalia (two cases) and Tajikistan.

³ The full reference is: Mary Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

No Harm"-approach to their field staff in twelve different conflict setting and into their planning and implementation in order to test the usefulness of the tool. The learnings from this phase were gathered in a booklet published by CDA in January 2001: *"Options For Aid in Conflict. Lessons from Field Experience"*⁴.

Section I of this manual offers some guidance for designing, planning and organising a training. This includes issues to consider in terms of location, timing and logistics. Also some sample schedules are provided which were developed by trainers in the past to adjust the communication about Do No Harm to the time available.

As participants in Do No Harm trainings today are primarily interested in finding out how to avoid unintended negative effects the sequence of units presented in Section II follows the "Seven Steps of Do No Harm-Approach". It follows the sequence of systematically gathering the data needed to be able to systematically assess the effects – both positive as well as unintended negative – of project interventions on the context in which the project is implemented. For step 1 "Understanding the Context of Conflict" it has been found useful to work with case studies. Case studies make it possible that all participants of a training begin to work with the same set of information. In section II trainers will find the facilitation notes for a number of tested cases studies. This section also provides detailed guidance and background information for steps 2 to 7 of the Do No Harm-Approach.

Section III provides some general guidance on those training and facilitation methods that have been found particularly useful for Do No Harm trainings.

Section IV provides further background material and material for further reading. It also includes some papers published by CDA on lessons learnt for Do no harm training as well as for Do no harm and peacebuilding.

Finally, Section V includes the case studies and additional useful material that can be used as handouts. The case studies were designed and thoroughly tested by trainers and were found useful for Do No Harm trainings. Four case studies are best to use in an introductory workshop while two other case studies are best to use in an application exercise. The layout of this section allows trainers to copy the respective pages to use as handout for their training session.

⁴ Mary B. Anderson (ed.): Options for Aid in Conflict. Lessons from Field Experience. Cambridge 2001. <http://cdacollaborative.org/publication/options-for-aid-in-conflict-lessons-from-field-experience/>

SECTION I – BEFORE THE EVENT

How to Plan a Local Capacities for Peace Workshop

Workshops are usually organised in close collaboration with agencies working in a given setting. They may involve a few staff from a variety of agencies or be arranged for a larger number of staff from one agency. In the former, discussions tend to be broader; in the latter, deeper. Both have real merit! An ideal number of participants is from twenty to thirty people. Workshops may address issues of primary concern to field-level and operations staff or to headquarters policy people and decision-makers or they may be organised to cover some of both.

The length of workshops will vary depending on:

1. the site and how far people have to travel to attend;
2. the urgency surrounding the work and how much time people can spare from daily activities; and
3. the judgement of the planners about what is needed for full and thoughtful discussion of the issues. In some workshops, it may be important to provide time for on-site information gathering and more in-depth discussion of local realities.

Experience has shown that a one day workshop will provide participants with an overview of what Do No Harm is about. For participants to gain a good understanding of Do No Harm in order to make an informed judgement whether it is useful for their purposes, a workshop of two to three days is advisable. For participants to gain sufficient in-depth understanding of the tool and the various ways of its use, at least three to five days will be required.

Venue and Logistics

Planners of Workshops must be sure they have arranged:

1. A venue that is convenient and sufficiently large for the expected group. In most cases one large room for meeting in plenary and several smaller rooms for small group sessions will be required. Planning must also include overnight accommodations for trainers and, if necessary for participants.
2. Transport to the venue or clear instructions how to get there.
3. Provision of training materials and equipment, including
 - Flipcharts or boards,
 - Markers for flipcharts and/ or white-boards (watch the difference!) or chalk,
 - Electronic equipment (projector, computer, extension cables etc.) if circumstances allow and facilitators intend to use presentations,
 - Name tags for participants, and
 - Notebooks and pens for participants to take notes (if appropriate or necessary),
 - Sufficient number of copies of training material and handouts.
4. A “list of participants” or a form for participants to fill out (a simple blank page may do but does not look very professional).
4. Coffee / tea breaks, lunches, and any other “free time” support,

5. Invitations that includes some method of confirming participation,
6. Workshop facilitation, including a clear agreement on who will do what, when, and how facilitators will work together,
7. Provisions to provide technical assistance (reconfirmation of flight tickets, making copies of documents brought by participants, running errands),
8. Follow-up to the workshop (what kind of documentation and who will do it, after workshop communication etc)

The Contents of a Workshop

Every workshop should include:

1. A brief introduction to the “Local Capacities for Peace (LCP) Project” in order for people to know where the ideas and materials of Do No Harms have come from and, therefore, what they can expect in terms of their appropriateness to their given local circumstances;
2. Sessions on the contents/lessons learned through the LCP project that inform participants about Do No Harm and also allow participants to relate this to their own experience;
3. Sessions that allow participants to apply what has been covered;
4. An opportunity for participants to reflect about steps that need to be taken in order for the staff of an organisation to be able to use the tool in their daily practice.
5. A closing session that evaluates the learning at the workshop and sets an agenda for the future.

Inviting for a Workshop

It is always good to know in advance, who is participating in the workshop. As a trainer you would like to know in advance

- because it helps you to fine tune your training
- it helps you to prepare yourself for potentially difficult group dynamics.

Fine Tuning

Knowing that the majority of the participants in a training are programme officers or desk officers a trainer could focus much more on the practical use of the DNH tool and engage participants in a discussion about programming experience, requirements etc. On the other hand, if participants represent higher or senior management, press- and information officers, other issues would have to be emphasised or worked on in more detail.

Group Dynamics

It is useful if the inviting/ hosting agency and the trainers /facilitators can develop and agree on a set of criteria according to which people will be invited. In many cases, trainers have little influence on decisions about who participates. However, trainers will often negotiate details of the planned workshop with the organising / hosting organisation and thereby can advise the hosting agency

and take some influence on the decisions.

Group dynamics can be difficult for example when a sizeable number of participants come from one specific background with a strong group identity. Such groupings sometimes attempt to 'hijack' the agenda and the process. Trainers can limit their ability to do so by arranging where participants get to sit.

What do you have to know in advance?

- Potential language issues (find out as early as possible!)
- Which organisations (in case of an inter-agency workshop) or which unit / department do people come from?
- What are people's roles in their organisation (programming / reviewing applications; fund-raising; marketing / public relations)?

What would you want to know?

- Professional background and field experience?
- Position(s) within the organisation (status / hierarchy differences – i.e. mixing management / leadership and staff level – will have an impact on the workshop dynamic)
- What prior exposure to DNH do they have?
- What are the inter-agency relationships (in case of an inter-agency workshop)?
- What will participants do after the workshop?

Making the Learning More Effective

Experience has shown that learning the new tool is much more effective when participants are given the opportunity to apply the tool to their own work. Usually, this will only be possible if the time available for a training is sufficient for

- a thorough introduction of the DNH approach and tool (minimal 1,5 to 2 days)
- sufficient time to "practice" the tool on own projects (minimal 4 to 6 hours)
- sufficient time for debriefing (approximately 2 to 3 hours)

The layout of the DNH training provides a good opportunity for such an "application exercise" during the small group work in "Options" (see STEP 6).

How to organise an "Application Exercise"

In most cases, people coming to a two to three day workshop will not have (or believe to have) time to do additional work to prepare for the workshop. Therefore, asking participants to write up brief project descriptions before the workshop in most cases is a futile exercise.

(Note: not asking participants to do extra work in preparation also has the positive effect that during a rigorous DNH analysis people discover that they actually know more than they expected.)

In several cases, CDA trainers received a good response when they asked participants just to bring relevant documents on one project which they would like to work on. This can be a project which is giving – or has given – them problems; it can be a project which they feel was a particularly “successful” intervention.

If an organisation is sending several participants you can ask them as a group to bring one project on which they will be working in a small group session. If you are running an internal agency workshop and different units / departments send several participants, you can ask each department / unit to bring one project. Asking groups of participants to select a project before the workshop usually initiates some form of discussion – and thereby preparation – before the event.

If trainers decide to provide this opportunity, invitations should be sent early together with instructions concerning the kind of data and information that should be included in the project information. If invitations have been sent several weeks before the event trainers /facilitators should make sure there is some follow-up communication to remind participants.

Working on own projects will require well prepared detailed and specific instructions for group work, usually more time for group discussions, and trainers /facilitators must allow for more time for group reports and feedback. During group reporting it is not only important to discuss the group’s findings but also to have sufficient time to discuss issues or problems that came up during the application exercise (see below for Sample Schedules for Do No Harm Workshops including a sample schedule for an application workshop).

Issues Covered in a Standard Do No Harm Workshop

The objective of a standard Do No Harm workshop is to familiarise participants with the Do No Harm Framework and the different elements of its tool. Experience has shown that a three-day workshop provides sufficient time for participants to have a good understanding of the Do No Harm approach and to experiment with the tool using a case study specifically designed for training purposes. Working on one of their own projects participants will need more time depending on their prior knowledge of or exposure to Do No Harm.

Standard elements covered in a Do No Harm workshop are:

Understanding the Context of Conflict for Project Programming

- Case study
- Conflict analysis (DNH Step 1)
- Dividers and Sources of Tensions (DNH Step 2)
- Connectors or Local Capacities For Peace (DNH Step 3)
- “Unpacking” a project – Making the Details Explicit (DNH Step 4)

The DNH Framework for Programming Options

- brief presentation, questions for clarification

Understanding a Project’s Effects on the Context of Conflict

- Effects through Resource Transfers (RT) and Implicit Ethical Messages (IEM) (DNH Step 5)

- Case Study work: identifying impact of a project on conflict through RT and/or IEM

Developing Programming Options and Redesigning

- The Options game
- presentation “what we know about generating options”
- exercise “Generating Options” (DNH Step 6) and “Testing and Redesigning” (DNH Step 7): Opportunity to apply the Framework for Programming Options either in small group work on case study material or individual or group work on own projects; Lessons learned by applying the framework; feedback from small group work; first experiences with using the tool

Background and History of the LCP Project

In most Do No Harm trainings at some point it may be useful to inform participant where “Do No Harm” comes from. When Do No Harm was first introduced this was an essential element often at the beginning of a training or workshop.

Today however, it is widely accepted that well intended and professionally planned and implemented projects often do have unintended negative effects. It is also accepted that the Do No Harm approach and the Do No Harm tool offer an effective method to assess a project’s effects, to discover potentially unintended negative effects and to develop programming options.

For details about the history and background of the LCP Project see Section II, Session: Background and History, and Section V, Handouts.

Useful Clarifications at the Beginning of a Workshop

- Do No Harm is based on the understanding that “conflict” is not by definition negative. Conflict is a natural and inevitable part of human relations. Conflict is what often makes people change things, develop improved techniques, new concepts and outlooks. BUT in this manual – and, hence, in the workshop – the word “conflict” will be used as shorthand to refer to negative, destructive, often violent, group interactions. It does not refer to the variety of inter-group disagreements and other forms of constructive struggle by which social change occurs.
- Also, in this manual and in the context of LCP workshops “project” or “programme” is a shorthand to refer to the various forms of activities by local and international non-governmental as well as governmental and international organisations. The use of the term “aid” in the previous manual and LCP project documents has led to various misunderstandings. For example, many people assumed that the use of the term “aid” signals that the empirical evidence of the LCP project came only from the context of humanitarian or emergency aid – and therefore the tool was relevant only for programming humanitarian emergency interventions. In fact, experience of agencies working in development cooperation has contributed to the learning process throughout the entire project. Development organisations have been part of process all the time. Since 2001 organisations working in the field of conflict transformation as well as a number of

organisations working on human rights are using Do No Harm. We have tried to incorporate some of their experiences in this manual.

- Thus, the thrust of the workshop’s “message” of how projects interact with conflict is to push for agencies not to worsen destructive conflict. However, this does not imply that constructive inter-group struggles or social change should be avoided – or that agencies should attempt to prevent constructive inter-group struggles from happening. Clearly, in all societies in the world, injustice continues to exist and we must be continuously engaged in working for greater, inclusive justice. The focus here is on how we can be aware of – and avoid – unintentionally worsening destructive interactions that do not serve to promote and strengthen justice.
- In addition, this workshop is not directed toward urging agencies to change or add to their mandates. Rather, we argue that agencies should continue doing what they can do best and, at the same time, ensure that their activities do not exacerbate tensions or feed into violence but rather help local people find options and alternatives to violent conflict.
- And last, but not least: we are convinced that nobody makes someone else's peace. Therefore, for actors external to the conflict the focus should be to find and implement options that allow and support local actors to find their best options for reducing and avoiding violence and handle inevitable conflicts in constructive, nonviolent ways.
- Finally, the facilitator should emphasise that the Do No Harm “Framework” for considering the effects of projects on situations of conflict was not intended and designed to be a peacebuilding tool. Humanitarian and development organisations are also not expected to add peacebuilding to their mandate.

Rather, the tool intends to help organisations improve doing what they are mandated to do by being sensitive to the fact that there may be unintended effects that may exacerbate or prolong violent inter-group conflict and by deliberately searching for programming options to avoid such unintended impacts. Agencies are, therefore, encouraged to integrate the LCP-tool into their existing planning and implementation procedures. Several agencies are also using the tool for programming work on conflict. Since its publication, an increasing number of organisations working on conflict and peacebuilding have tested the Framework and found it useful for their work.

Preparing for Follow-up

Learning processes take time. A training workshop lasts a comparatively short period of time – way too short to complete a learning process. For learning to be effective, i.e. resulting in sustainable and significant changes in the level of knowledge, awareness and ultimately changes in behaviour, the trainer not only needs to design a good workshop but also a sound follow-up to the workshop. Thus, when preparing a training workshop the trainer should already prepare for follow-up.

During a training workshop the trainer can support a sustainable learning process by encouraging:

- reflection about the participants' own (work) context
 - e.g. small group work to find examples from their own context for certain elements of the Do No Harm-Approach
- adaptation to their own (work) context
 - e.g. small group work to find gaps in tools that are used in their own (work) context and how parts of the Do No Harm-Approach could fill these gaps
- continuing their own learning process by understanding and researching more about the Do No Harm-Approach
 - e.g. handouts, photo protocol, background material and links to study in their own time
- continuing their own learning process by reflecting, adapting and finally at least partially applying the Do No Harm-Approach in their own (work) context
 - e.g. individual action plans¹ to be filled in at the end of the training workshop

For specific workshop formats on the Do No Harm-Approach the trainers may also suggest relevant homework to participants:

For introductory workshops

- Reading a background article on the Do No Harm-Approach
- Writing a workshop report and sharing it with their colleagues and/or other participants
- Presenting their insights into the Do No Harm-Approach to their colleagues
- Attending an application workshop on the Do No Harm-Approach

For an application exercise

- Writing a report about their findings and sharing it with their colleagues and superiors in particular
- Completing the Do No Harm analysis on their own projects in cooperation with their colleagues
- Redesigning their own project accordingly
- Updating their Do No Harm analysis, at least the context analysis on a regular basis

¹ In an action plan participants enter individually which are the next steps they want to make right after the training. A template should be distributed to participants at the end of the training to fill in a table with columns for the steps/tasks that they are planning (some three tasks should be described in detail) as well as columns for the expected amount of time needed for the tasks, for other resources that are needed to complete the task as well as for a reward once the task has been accomplished. More sophisticated versions might include columns for constraints that could inhibit accomplishing the task or other details.

The filled in action plan remains with the participant. However, trainers could opt for an exchange about the action plans in plenary and/or for making a copy in order to be able to check in detail with participants if they manage to work on their individual tasks.

For a training of trainers

- Noting examples for all key elements of the Do No Harm-Approach (e.g. categories of dividers and connectors, resource transfer effects and implicit ethical messages) from their own experiences
- Conducting a complete Do No Harm analysis for a project they know well enough
- Developing their own case study for training purposes
- Facilitating themselves introductory workshops or application exercises

After the training workshop the trainer can support the ongoing learning process by:

- Offering more background information to study
- Asking participants if they have specific questions on the Do No Harm-Approach or if they face challenges in adapting and/or applying it in their own (work) context
- Reminding participants of their action plan
- Reminding participants of homework that is specific to the workshop format they attended

The means and timeframe for such follow-up communication should be agreed upon between trainer and participants at the end of the training. It is advisable to not wait too long after the training. Email might be the preferred means of communication or other media like skype calls or conferences. If circumstances allow follow-up meetings with individual or groups of participants can be very effective.

Sample Schedules for Do No Harm Workshops

It is always advisable to give participants a “road map” for the workshop. If the workshop extends over several days, trainers may want to provide an overall schedule and for each day a detailed schedule. Prepare the schedules on a sheet of paper in advance and/or distribute copies of it. You can also write the schedule on flipchart and begin the day by highlighting the main things to come.

Consider carefully how much detail you put into the schedule. Too much detail may limit the trainer's flexibility in adjusting the content to the flow of the workshop.

The trainer will need to adapt the workshop to the situation. Do not be afraid to alter the schedule in the middle of a workshop if you need to. Therefore in writing the schedule make sure you provide a sufficient amount of information to participants while making sure you retain sufficient scope for adapting as the workshop moves on. Remember: as a trainer, you are the only one in the hall who knows how it should have been...

The following schedules are meant as suggestions only primarily to give trainers an idea how much time should be allocated to individual sessions depending on the overall time available.

Short Introduction

30 Minutes	Introduction to Session with “Seven Lessons of the LCP Project”
15 Minutes	Presentation of the Framework
45 Minutes	Elements of the Framework (illustrating elements with examples of use from own experience or from the vignettes (see Section VI, Material II.))

One Day Exposure Workshop

9:00 – 9:30	Welcome and Introduction of participants
9:30 – 10:00	Introduction to Workshop with “Seven Lessons of LCP Project”
10:00 – 10:30	Case Study: introduction and reading
10:30 – 11:00	break
11:00 – 12:00	Case Study continued
12:00 – 12:30	wrap-up and questions
12:30 – 1:30	lunch
1:30 – 1:50	STEP 1: identifying the space and STEP 2: Dividers
1:50 – 2:10	STEP 3: Connectors
2:10 – 2:30	STEP 4: Unpacking Project/ Programme
2:30 – 3:15	STEP 5: Effects through Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages
3:15 – 3:45	break
3:45 – 4:15	Presentation of Framework STEP 6 and STEP 7: brief explanation on how to do it
4:15 – 5:00	wrap-up and questions

Two Day Introduction Workshop (Option 1)**1st Day**

9:00 – 9:30	Welcome and Introduction of participants
9:30 – 10:00	Introduction to Workshop with “Seven Lessons of LCP Project”
10:00 – 10:30	Case Study: introduction and reading
10:30 – 11:00	break
11:00 – 12:00	Case Study continued
12:00 – 12:30	wrap-up and questions
12:30 – 1:30	lunch
1:30 – 1:50	STEP 1: identifying the space and STEP 2: Dividers
1:50– 2:10	STEP 3: Connectors
2:10 – 2:40	small groups (identifying Dividers and Connectors from own experience/context)
2:40 – 3:00	plenary
3:00 – 3:30	break
3:30 – 3:50	STEP 4: Unpacking Project/ Programme
3:50 – 4:30	directed discussion and analysis (case study as example, also own experience)
4:30 – 5:00	Presentation of Framework
5:00 – 5:30	Conclusion of Day

2nd Day

8:30 – 8:45	Recap Day 1 and introduction to Day 2
8:45 – 9:05	STEP 5: Effects through Resource Transfers
9:05 – 9:25	STEP 5: Effects through Implicit Ethical Messages
9:25 – 10:30	small groups (using own experience or/and case study, identify effects)
10:30 – 11:00	break
11:00 – 11:30	Options Game
11:30 – 11:40	STEP 6: Generating Options session Introduction (using Framework arrows)
11:40 – 11:55	STEP 6: Options brainstorm on case study
11:55 – 12:30	STEP 6: Options using own programme
12:30 – 1:30	lunch
1:30 – 3:00	continue Options
3:00 – 3:30	break
3:30 – 4:15	plenary STEP 7: Redesign Project (brief explanation referring to cross-checking arrows in Framework)
4:15 – 4:50	Question and answer session
4:50 – 5:00	Conclusion of Workshop

Two Day Introduction Workshop (Option 2)**1st Day**

9:00 – 9:30	Welcome and Introduction of participants
9:30 – 10:00	Introduction to Workshop with “Seven Lessons of LCP Project”
10:00 – 10:30	Case Study: introduction and reading
10:30 – 11:00	break
11:00 – 12:00	Case Study (demonstrating “how to do” STEPs 1 to 4, brief discussion of effects (STEP 5))
12:00 – 12:30	wrap-up and questions
12:30 – 1:30	lunch
1:30 – 1:50	STEP 5: introducing Effects through Resource Transfers
1:50– 2:10	STEP 5: introducing Effects through Implicit Ethical Messages
2:10 – 2:40	small groups (identifying from own experience/context, identify effects)
2:40 – 3:00	plenary
3:00 – 3:30	break
3:30 – 3:50	STEP 4: Unpacking Project/ Programme (emphasis why this is important)
3:50 – 4:30	directed discussion and analysis (case study example, also own experience)
4:30 – 5:00	Presentation of Framework
5:00 – 5:30	Conclusion of Day

2nd Day

9:00 – 9:15	Recap Day 1 and introduction to Day 2
9:15 – 10:40	Practical exercise STEP 5: Effects through Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages in the case study
10:40 – 11:10	break
11:10 – 12:10	small group discussion: relating learning from practical exercise to own experience/context
12:10 – 12:30	plenary discussion
12:30 – 1:30	lunch
1:30 – 2:00	Options Game
2:00 – 2:10	STEP 6: Generating Options (session introduced by referring to the Framework)
2:10 – 2:25	STEP 6: Options brainstorm on case study
2:25 – 3:00	STEP 6: Options using own programme in small groups
3:00 – 3:30	break
3:30 – 4:15	plenary
4:15 – 4:50	STEP 7: brief reminder about how to redesign referring to the cross-check arrows in the Framework, illustrating with own experience or from vignettes Question and answer session
4:50 – 5:00	Conclusion of Workshop

Three Day Workshop “Training for Application”**1st Day**

9:00 – 9:30	Welcome and Introduction of participants
9:30 – 10:00	Introduction to Workshop with “Seven Lessons of LCP Project”
10:00 – 10:30	Case Study: introduction and reading
10:30 – 11:00	break
11:00 – 12:00	Case Study continued
12:00 – 12:30	wrap-up and questions
12:30 – 1:30	lunch
1:30 – 1:50	STEP 2: introducing Dividers
1:50– 2:10	STEP 3: introducing Connectors
2:10 – 2:40	small groups (identifying from own experience/context)
2:40 – 3:00	plenary
3:00 – 3:30	break
3:30 – 3:50	STEP 4: Unpacking Project/ Programme
3:50 – 4:30	directed discussion and analysis (case study example, also own experience)
4:30 – 5:00	Presentation of Framework
5:00 – 5:30	Conclusion of Day

2nd Day

9:00 – 9:15	Recap Day 1 and introduction to Day 2
9:15 – 10:30	STEPS 1 to 3: Practical exercise Context Analysis using Dividers and Connectors
10:30 – 11:00	break
11:00 – 12:30	continue Context Analysis in small groups
12:30 – 1:30	lunch
1:30 – 3:00	continue Context Analysis in small groups with focus on categories
3:00 – 3:30	break
3:30 – 4:50	plenary with gallery
4:50 – 5:00	Conclusion of Day 2

3rd Day

9:00 – 9:15	Recap Day 2 (perhaps also main lessons of Day 1), introduction to Day 3
9:15 – 9:35	STEP 5: Introducing Effects through Resource Transfers
9:35 – 9:55	STEP 5: Introducing Effects through Implicit Ethical Messages
9:55 – 10:30	small groups using Context Analysis from Day 2
10:30 – 11:00	break
11:00 – 11:30	Options Game
11:30 – 11:40	STEP 6: Options session Introduction (using Framework arrows)
11:40 – 11:55	STEP 6: Options brainstorm on case study
11:55 – 12:30	STEP 6: practical exercise: generating Options for own programme
12:30 – 1:30	lunch
1:30 – 3:00	STEP 6: practical exercise continued
3:00 – 3:30	break
3:30 – 4:15	STEP 6: reporting in plenary
4:15 – 4:50	STEP 7: brief explanation how to do STEP 7 referring to cross-checking arrows in Framework Question and answer session
4:50 – 5:00	Conclusion of Workshop

Nine Day Workshop “Training of Trainers”1st Day

Evening	Welcome and Introduction of participants
---------	--

2nd Day

All day	One Day Introduction Workshop
---------	--------------------------------------

3rd Day

All day	Adult Learning
---------	----------------

4th Day

Morning	Adult Learning
Afternoon	Introduction to Trainers' Manual and preparation for practical exercises

5th Day

All day	Practical exercises (of all units)
---------	------------------------------------

6th Day

All day	Practical exercises (of all units)
---------	------------------------------------

7th Day

All day	Preparation for real life One Day Introduction Workshop conducted by participants
---------	--

8th Day

All day	Real life One Day Introduction Workshop conducted by participants
---------	--

9th Day

Morning	Self-reflection and feedback on real life One Day Introduction Workshop conducted by participants
Afternoon	Open questions and closure of training of trainers

SECTION II – ELEMENTS OF A LOCAL CAPACITIES FOR PEACE WORKSHOP

Discovering the Learning from the LCP Project – Case Study Exercise

Experience has shown that an introductory workshop should begin with a case study to get people thinking about the various relationships of project or programme activities with a context that is comparatively rich in conflicts. Trainers should use a case from “a distant setting”, a place that most participants do not know. This is because such a case can get participants to grapple with issues without being threatened by what they may perceive as “outsider (trainers’) criticism” of their own circumstances. If you use a case that is familiar to many participants, they will certainly spend much of their time arguing whether or not the case is “accurately” describing the situation.

Introduction

To introduce this session, the trainer might note that we will move directly into a case study, based on a project in another region of the world, as a way of using others’ experience to get into the discussion about the participants’ local situation.

The trainer should indicate that people often criticise case studies as not having sufficient information. However, we answer this by noting: “That’s life!” In our kind of work, we always have too little information, but we also always have to make the best programming decisions we can based on whatever information we have. In this way, use of a case study is a way of simulating real circumstances and helping participants develop the skills to use information well and to identify clearly what else they need to know.

In addition, discussants will be surprised at how much information actually is in what appears to be a very short case. They should be advised to read it very carefully because there is more there than they may think.

The trainer should then hand out the case study and give an appropriate amount of time for participants to read it. Be sure to be clear about how much time they have. It is always a good idea to give the participants some “study questions” to guide their reading of the case. These are suggested in the facilitation notes below. Depending on the time available, the participants and the atmosphere in the workshop trainers may want to allow participants to discuss the study questions in small groups first before collecting the findings in plenary.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Small Group Discussion and Reporting on Case Study

Using a case study allows the facilitator to guide participants on a journey of discovering for themselves some of the key learnings from the Do No Harm process. By asking questions the facilitator guides the process while at the same time maintaining control of the process of discovery.

Small group discussions, in contrast, permit participants to take full control of both the content and the process for a defined part of the workshop's flow. Different forms of group reporting are usually used to tie these phases back into the entire workshop process. In the early stages of gathering facts on a case study it is not advisable to have small groups noting down and reporting written results in plenary. In fact experience has shown that it may even turn out to be counter-productive to the entire workshop process. But still there may be reasons for trainers to provide

participants an opportunity to have a group discussion before facilitating the gathering of facts in plenary. Such reasons could be

- Some participants may have language difficulties and may need to converse about the case study in their own language,
- Some participants may be shy and reluctant to articulate themselves in a plenary setting,
- There may be strong differences of status and hierarchy among participants and lower ranking participants may be hesitant to speak out in the presence of superiors,
- With a large number of participants it may be appropriate to allow for an opportunity for some closer interaction among participants in small groups. This may be useful particularly if participants are from very diverse backgrounds and have not interacted before.

In such cases small-group discussion could be a method to maintain attention and active engagement of all participants. The study questions provided in the facilitation notes may be used to focus the groups' discussion. In the instructions for the small group session, however, trainers must be very clear that the group discussion is meant to prepare for the following plenary discussion. Groups are not expected to take notes or to prepare a report. The groups' work is meant to allow participants to gain a deeper understanding of the case presented so that it is easier for them to respond to the questions the facilitator will ask in the plenary session.

Gathering the Facts

Gathering the facts about the context and unpacking the project should be a collective exercise in plenary. The trainer facilitates this by asking questions. [See Section III, Facilitating a Case Study Exercise] As the case study usually is one of the first sessions of the workshop the way how this session is conducted will set the tone for most of the workshop. Thus, the facilitator should:

- only ask for facts that are actually in the case study and can be detected by the participants
- begin the session by asking questions to elicit facts that can be easily found
- be highly appreciative, welcoming and acknowledging participants' contributions
- never argue whether a participant's response is “correct” or not. In such cases s/he should rather ask follow-up questions in order to sharpen the participant's thinking.

It is advised to begin collecting facts about the context by reminding participants that BEFORE looking at the project it is essential to collect as many factual pieces of information about the situation in which the project is implemented.

Types of Case Studies and How They Can Be Used

This manual includes two types of case studies. Four case studies are designed for training purposes. They allow participants to discover themselves the key lessons learned from the Local Capacities for Peace project. They consist of a condensed description of the context and details of a project that has been implemented. The purpose of these case studies is for participants to analyse the context (usually facilitated by the trainer in a case study exercise), to unpack the project, to assess the effects (both intended and unintended as well as positive and negative) of the project on the context, to generate options avoiding unintended negative effects discovered in

the analysis, to test the options and to redesign the project. These case studies allow trainers to take participants through all of the Seven Steps of the Do No Harm-Approach.

Two other case studies are more appropriate for application exercises. They include a description of a given context. One (Sri Lanka) also has information about a rough project idea, the other (Sudan) does not include any project. These case studies can be used for a planning exercise with a focus on Steps 1 to 5 of the Do No Harm tool. The trainer can use the case studies to request participants to design a project that responds to the situation described. This requires a rigorous Do No Harm context analysis, the design of a project in detail and using the Resource Transfer and Implicit Ethical Messages mechanisms to search for potential unintended negative impact.

If participants are staff of an organisation they may be requested to design a project based on their organisation's mandate and mode of operation. Trainers can also provide participants with an organisation's mandate and operating principles to allow for more freedom and creativity.

CAVEAT: the manual does not include such organisational profiles and operating principles. Trainers must spell these out carefully for a handout as part of the instructions for the exercise.

All the case studies are found in Section V.

Case Studies for Introductory Workshops

The following four case studies have proven to be useful for Do No Harm introduction workshops. They contain sufficient information about the context, an implemented project and its interaction with context. In particular, some unintended negative effects of the project on dividers or connectors can be identified.

Learning Objectives

1. To analyse systematically the relationships between a project and the context of conflict
2. To assess how the project may have negative and positive effects on the context of conflict
3. To raise awareness that projects implemented in a very professional manner may still produce unintended effects that negatively affect the context of conflict
4. To set the tone for both challenging and inquiring discussion in which all ideas and experiences are valued while rigorous analysis is expected

Facilitation Notes “Food for Work for Rebuilding War-Damaged Homes in Tajikistan”¹ (Save the Children Federation)

Note: For general information how to conduct a Do No Harm-Case Study see the chapter “Discovering the Learning from the LCP Project – Case Study Exercise” in this section.

For specific learning objectives for this case study see the chapter “Case Studies for Introductory Workshops” in this section.

Facilitation Plan

This case study may be taught in five parts after an initial Opening and with some Closing Remarks.

Opening

For the reading of the case study the trainer should offer the following study questions on flipchart:

1. What do you identify as the divisions and sources of tension in Khatlon Province?
2. What do you identify as the things in Khatlon Province that connect people to each other?
3. What do you think is the effect of the SCF programme on the factors that divide people or are sources of tension divisions and on the factors that connect people?

To set the stage for the plenary discussion, the trainer might say: “We are in Khatlon Province in southern Tajikistan and the civil war has recently ended. We are the staff of an international agency and we have been providing housing reconstruction assistance in the post-war setting. Here we are in a staff meeting looking back to see how we have done. To be able to assess our effects, we need to look at what we know about how things were before we began to work here.

“As we always must do when analysing a situation, let’s start with the facts. What do we know about the situation in Khatlon Province before we started our programme?”

Part 1: Analysing Sources of Tensions and Dividers

As the trainer begins this introduction, s/he may write on the board or flipchart, “THE CONFLICT SETTING” and, underneath this to the left write “TENSIONS/DIVISIONS” (see the table at the end of the Facilitation Notes for the case study from Cambodia for suggested board layout). Then s/he could say: “Let’s start by looking at the tensions in the situation. What do we know about the tensions and things that divided people in southern Tajikistan?”

¹ This case study was compiled by Mary B. Anderson. It is based on one of the original studies conducted by the Local Capacities for Peace Project in 1994/95. Save the Children Federation permitted this case study to be used for teaching purposes in the context of Do No Harm workshops.

The participants will offer a number of ideas about the tensions and divisions. These might include:

- ideological differences between communists and “opposition”
- change in the political system / struggle for leadership
- failed economy
- high unemployment rate
- destroyed infrastructure
- competition for scarce goods and resources
- two distinct groups: Garmi and Kulyabi
- shortages of food
- previous reliance on mono-culture
- destruction of houses (20.000 in total; not exclusively, but mainly Garmi houses)
- occupation of Garmi houses by Kulyabi
- displacement / refugee experience
- repatriation of one group
- two groups live in separate villages (3/4 of villages mono-ethnic)

If participants have difficulty getting started, the trainer may prompt responses with questions such as: “Were there any sources of tension before the war began? What tensions were prompted or increased by the war?” To be sure that the group really thinks about these tensions, the trainer should give enough time.

For adequate analysis, the list should include at a minimum:

- issues of economic hardship
- the changing political system and struggle for new leadership
- the fact that there are two distinct groups
- the pattern of living separately in the 75% of villages
- experience of a rampage with systematic destruction of Garmi villages by Kulyabi (with support by Russian troops)

Part 2: Discovering Local Capacities for Peace and Connectors

The trainer should then note that there are factors in all war situations that also bind people together, that connect them. Writing a heading on the right of the board (“CONNECTORS”), the trainer should ask the group to identify these from the case study. The question might be: “What kinds of things do you see that connected people in Khatlon Province before our programme?”

The group might list:

- ¼ villages ethnically mixed
- experience of Garmi and Kulyabi working together in state enterprises

- two groups lived in area / worked together a long time
- intermarriages between two groups (mainly in urban areas)
- same language: Farsi
- same religion: Muslims / Mosque respected by both groups
- same culture (e.g. traditional welcome with bread and salt)
- shared schools, clinics, social services in the past
- the experiences of war and war weariness / common people “don’t want war”
- both are suffering from threats from gangs
- self-appointed elders committees to settle housing disputes

Again, the trainer should be sure that this list is complete enough to point out respective effects on these connectors at a later stage.

Part 3: Unpacking the Project

The trainer should now turn the group’s attention to the programme of SCF. Writing “Project” or “Programme” between the list of dividers and of connectors, s/he should note that it is into this context that SCF brought assistance. Also, noting that programmes are multi-layered and involve many decisions, the trainer should get the group, quickly, to identify the elements of the programme as described. Questions could follow the programming elements as follows:

- Why did SCF do this programme? What were its mandated goals? (Responses include: Reconstruction to encourage repatriation as a precondition for reconciliation)
- What did SCF provide? (organisation to encourage rebuilding destroyed houses; Food for Work (FFW))
- Who did SCF define as the target group? (villagers with destroyed houses (mostly Garhi); mostly returnees; about 15,000 people were helped; anyone who “wanted to work” who lived in the villages where the damage was)
- Who were SCF’s staff? (>80 local staff; interviewed in way to ensure no prejudice; some expatriate staff)
- How did SCF plan and implement this programme? (surveys by SCF to assess damage, contracts with villages, materials for building, village-based brigades)

Then the trainer should step back from the board and ask the participants to evaluate the project by asking: “What were the needs identified which SCF wanted to meet? How did the project's elements address these needs? What were the stated objectives of SCF’s project? What did they achieve? Do you think that this is a successful project?”

Part 4: Identifying Effects

Then, the trainer should note that it is now time to consider whether and how the SCF programme

affected what existed before it began.

S/he should ask the group:

“What do you think were the effects of our programme (reminding the group that we are acting as if we are the SCF staff looking back)?”

Referring to the lists on the board, the trainer should encourage the group to analyse the project's effects, noting participants' responses by drawing arrows from the column “Project” toward the left to “DIVIDERS/ Sources of Tension” and toward the right to “CONNECTORS”.

Questions might include:

Which dividers and tensions do you think the programme increased or worsened? How? Why?

Did we reduce any divisions? How? Why? What connectors did we support? Did we miss any? Did we undermine any? How? Why?

In each case, the participants should be asked to cite the facts from the case that they use to support their analysis. That is, in this section of the discussion, people should be urged to explain their thinking rather than giving one-word or short answers.

Ideas that will come out include:

- The programme's target on rebuilding the most damaged houses favoured the group who suffered the most destruction (i.e. Garmi over Kulyabi), thus possibly worsening intergroup tensions.
- Linking of the FFW programme to house reconstruction, and placing both of these in the villages (75% of which were mono-ethnic) meant that more Garmi than Kulyabi also were able to get employment and food.
- Since “anyone who wanted to work” could do so, families may have had more than one family member involved in brigades. Because every worker received about 80% of a family's food requirement, and since most would have been Garmi, Garmi families could have had surplus food when Kulyabi families still were experiencing food shortages. This could also increase and exacerbate intergroup tensions.
- If Garmi families shared the food, this could reduce intergroup tensions. If they sold it, this could either encourage intergroup trade (and reduce tensions and support connectors) or seem exploitative and reinforce tensions. If they hoarded the extra food, this could worsen tensions.
- Housing is a privately owned asset and, therefore, only one family at a time benefits. This puts people in competition with each other. If community-based buildings or other assets had been reconstructed, this might have reinforced connections. Some of these existed in terms of schools, clinics, irrigation ditches, etc.
- In civil wars, programmes that concentrate on need might well focus on only one group. In this case, the most housing was destroyed and malnutrition was worst in Garmi villages.
- By encouraging repatriation, SCF's programme was essentially a peace-building programme. People have to return to the area, if they are to be able to think about a joint future.

- The self-appointed elders committees that resolved housing disputes could have been included in the programme in some way, thus reinforcing existing connectors. This also might have lessened tensions that arose from competition among people for having their houses rebuilt.

The trainer may draw lines among the various ideas to show the relationships being highlighted by the discussion. The trainer might not record all the ideas being offered at this point. To do this would slow the discussion down and take a lot of time. The point here is to signal that we are using the information generated on the board (the facts) to do our thinking. Drawing lines will reinforce the importance of using real information to do analysis and to make judgements (rather than simply theorising in general terms), but will not slow down the thinking process.

As a closing remark the trainer should always emphasise that SCF's decisions were professional and correct decisions on a general level (e.g. on targeting: organisations will never have sufficient resources to meet everyone's needs and have to make choices. Therefore, targeting the most severely affected population is a perfectly legitimate decision) - but put into context some of these decisions had negative effects. The case demonstrates that a project which is successful on its own terms may inadvertently have side effects that exacerbate tensions and feed into violent conflict.

Part 5 (Optional): Redesigning the Project

If there is sufficient time, trainers may challenge participants to review SCF's project and come up with some programming options to deal with one (or several) of the negative effects discovered in the previous session. The trainer could ask:

"How could SCF have avoided these negative effects? How could they have encouraged positive effects? What programming options can you identify for SCF that would have been better?"

Again, the trainer must push the participants to justify their ideas from the facts they have (not ideas from the sky!).

Ideas may include:

- Rebuilding jointly held assets (irrigation, clinics, schools)
- Concentrating in mixed villages; learning from them how to ensure mixed brigades
- Paying in cash rather than food in order to ensure a greater market multiplier effect benefitting people in the area more broadly
- Involving the elders committees or mosques in deciding priorities

For each option suggested, the trainer should ask the group to consider whether it may have some other adverse, or positive, effect as well. Again, using facts to support analysis is what the trainer is pushing the group to do.

Closing Remarks

The trainer should make sure to close the case by summarising a few key points of the discussion. Essential to closing are the following:

1. Noting that all projects may have unintended negative as well as positive effects on conflict even while it is doing a good job under its mandate (which the SCF programme clearly did by building so many destroyed houses).
2. Noting that it is never an entire project that has a negative effect. It is always individual elements, individual decisions taken in the course of project planning and implementation. Therefore: “projects” must be unpackaged in order to understand the interaction of projects with conflict.
3. Noting that recognition of this fact allows us, as project planners, to predict where effects might be negative and think of options to avoid this and to predict where divisions may be lessened or connectors be supported.

It is always good, at the end of a case, to congratulate the participants on their energy, ideas and analysis.

Facilitation Notes “Mediation Training in Townships, South Africa”²

(Quaker Peace Centre)

Note: For general information how to conduct a Do No Harm-Case Study see the chapter “Discovering the Learning from the LCP Project – Case Study Exercise” in this section.

For specific learning objectives for this case study see the chapter “Case Studies for Introductory Workshops” in this section.

Facilitation Plan

This case study may be taught in five parts after an initial Opening and with some Closing Remarks.

Opening

For the reading of the case study the trainer should offer the following study questions on flipchart:

1. What are the factors that divide people in the region around Cape Town?
2. What are the factors that connect people in the Cape Town region?
3. Which interactions between the QPC project and these dividing and connecting factors can be observed?

To frame the case study the trainers need to explain that this case study is about a non-governmental organisation from South Africa which focusses on conflict transformation.

S/he might say: “We are in the Cape Town region in South Africa. The Apartheid system has ended some few years ago in 1994. We are the staff of a local non-governmental organisation called Quaker Peace Centre. We have conducted a project on mediation training in the townships around Cape Town. To assess our effects we need to look back how the situation was before we started our project. Let’s start with the facts: What do we know about the context at that time?”

After the reading of the case study provide an opportunity for participants to ask questions of clarification. Make sure only questions of clarification are asked.

² This case study and the facilitation notes were compiled by Jochen Neumann who was a programme associate at the Quaker Peace Centre (QPC) in 1999/2000 and conducted an internal evaluation. QPC graciously permitted this case study to be used in Do No Harm workshops. For purposes of training this case study only captures a small part of the work done by QPC and also of the programme. It reflects on the state of the programme at that point in time. More details about the work can be found in a research report of the author that has been published by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in May 2001 (www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papneum.htm). Some selected details on the programme and its further development are included in a handout that supplements this case study.

Part 1: Analysing Dividing Factors and Sources of Tension

The trainer will ask which are dividers and sources of tensions in the case study. The trainer poses a range of questions in order to stimulate participants to become as specific as possible about the various details of the context. The trainer collects the refined factors on a flipchart which carries the headline “Dividing Factors & Sources of Tension”.

At a minimum the following aspects of the context of conflict should be collected:

- History of being divided into four different races under the Apartheid system, namely Whites, Blacks, Indians and Coloureds
- History of divide and rule by the Apartheid regime that enforced the identification as supposedly nine different ethnic groups amongst the Blacks
- Correlation of party alliances with ethnic divisions (e.g. Zulus forming the Inkatha Freedom Party)
- Vast diversity of languages makes communication across ethnic divisions complicated
- Extreme socio-economic disparities between Whites and Non-Whites (e.g. poor infrastructure for Non-Whites like housing, electricity, water and sanitation)
- High unemployment rate among Non-Whites
- Spatial segregation of Whites and Non-Whites still given
- Lack of trust in state institutions (e.g. police, justice system and schools)
- Power struggles between the officially elected authorities and the unofficial self-administration structures and within these two parallel structures

Part 2: Analysing Connecting Factors and Local Capacities for Peace

Once the list of dividers has been filled with enough details the trainers should move on to the connectors.

On a new flipchart with the respective headline at least the following aspects should be listed:

- Experience of a negotiated settlement that brought about the end of Apartheid
- Free and fair elections that lead to a new government, also on the local level
- Experience of the nonviolent resistance in the Apartheid era and of using nonviolent means (e.g. demonstrations, boycotts, etc.) among Non-Whites and Whites
- Strong civic engagement of people in the townships (still today in self-administration structures)
- Recognition of eleven official languages
- Shared concern about deeply rooted conflicts, high crime rate and daily violence

Part 3: Analysing the Project

In order to collect the details of the project design the trainer will ask participants for the vision of QPC, the objectives of this project, the staff, partners, beneficiaries, the location, the timeframe as well as the activities and other important details of the approach.

Organisation	Quaker Peace Centre (QPC)
Objective	Constructive resolution of conflicts in townships
Duration	1996-2000 2 five-months courses / year
Location	Townships surrounding Cape Town
Activities	Training in community mediation 1) 1-Day workshop every two weeks 2) Practical work as mediators in townships 3) Supervision by trainers on mediation cases
Staff	1 female director 2 male trainers • All from townships • All Christians • Speaking English, Afrikaans and African mother tongue (= all Blacks)
Beneficiaries	25 participants / course (= 200 trained community mediators since 1996) Selection Criteria in written and oral application process: • Recommendation by street committee • Engaged in community • Unemployed • Gender balance • More than one person from one township, but groups from different townships
Approach	• Stipend paid during five-months course (which is a welcome contribution to family income) • Language of instruction is English • Certificate issued upon completion of course

These key elements of the project design are listed on a new flipchart with the respective headline. The flipcharts produced during the last three steps should be displayed on the board in a way so that they form the three columns in the centre of the Do No Harm-framework.

Part 4: Analysing the Effects of the Project

The trainer will ask participants about their assessment if the QPC has achieved its stated objectives. The trainer facilitates an in-depth discussion with further questions how the project affects the dividers and connectors. Eventually even some specific dividers or connectors from the flipcharts could be singled out for further discussion about the project's effect on this aspect of the context of conflict.

To indicate a positive or negative effect on a divider or connector the trainer should use red or green arrows – in the sense that a positive effect is visualised with a green arrow, enforcing a factor with an arrow up and weakening a factor with an arrow pointing down.

Some negative effects should be highlighted:

- Many of the trained mediators are finding jobs after the training which leads to them being less active in the community and conducting less mediation.
- The officially elected authorities like city councils, the transformed police and judiciary are not integrated in the project which leads to those feeling excluding and losing legitimacy.

It is very important at this point also to stress that the project was systematically designed and produced also some positive effects, e.g. the participants gain important skills and can proof them to employers through the certificate so that they manage to find a job much more easily which leads to some decrease of the high unemployment rate.

Part 5 (Optional): Generating Options

Usually participants come up with some suggestions how to improve the project. The trainer could decide to dedicate some time to collect some ideas from participants either by brainstorming in plenary or by small group work with a focus on specific critical issues of the project design.

Options that might be generated include:

- Cooperation with officially elected authorities, police and/or judiciary in order to strengthen rather than weaken the transformed and democratically legitimised institutions of the new South Africa.
- Hiring staff from a coloured township with a Muslim background in order to reach out to those townships.

Concluding Remarks

At the end of this session some important lessons from the Local Capacities for Peace Project should be stressed by the trainer:

- An intervention always has positive as well as unintended negative effects on the context of conflict.
- It is never the whole project that goes wrong or is a complete failure. It is always some details of the project design that cause unintended negative effect. Therefore, it is possible to re-design the project in order to reduce the negative effects and enhance the positive ones.

Facilitation Notes “Social Integration of Former Child Soldiers in Mozambique”³

Note: For general information how to conduct a Do No Harm-Case Study see the chapter “Discovering the Learning from the LCP Project – Case Study Exercise” in this section.

For specific learning objectives for this case study see the chapter “Case Studies for Introductory Workshops” in this section.

Note: This case study offers an additional focus on the involvement of foreign staff, i.e. in the framework of the German [Civil Peace Service Programme](#).

Facilitation Plan

The case study may be taught in five parts after an initial opening and with some closing remarks.

Opening

For the reading of the case study the trainer should offer the following study questions on flipchart:

1. What sources of tensions and dividers do you recognise in the local community on Ilha Josina Machel?
2. What factors that connect people in the local community can you detect?
3. Which interactions between the project and these dividing and connecting factors can be observed?

To set the stage the trainer might say: “We are on Ilha Josina Machel, an island some 130 km north of Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. The civil war has ended recently and many child soldiers are to be re-integrated into society. We are a Maputo-based NGO that has been assisting child soldiers in this rural area.

To assess our effects, we need to look back how the situation was before we came to this region. Let’s start with the facts. What do we know about the context before we started the project?

³ This fictional case study was developed by Peter Steudtner and is based on research into the conflicts between traditional internal mechanisms of integration of former child soldiers and the “modern” (NGO) external integration activities by the NGO Rebuilding Hope. More details about his research can be found in Peter Steudtner (2001): Die soziale Eingliederung von Kindersoldaten: Konzepte und Erfahrungen aus Mosambik (The Social Integration of Child soldiers: Concepts and Experiences from Mozambique) - German language only (Abstract in English available), Berghof Report No. 6, Berlin, <http://image.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Reports/br6d.pdf>

Part 1: Analysing Dividers and Sources of Tension

Based on the information on the general as well as the local context given in the case study the following dividers and sources of tension may be collected from participants on a flipchart in plenary:

- Long history of colonial rule of Portuguese
- History of civil war with many victims (more than 1 Million deaths) between government (FRELIMO) and opposition (RENAMO)
- Competition of colonial language (Portuguese) vs. traditional Mozambican languages
- Tension and mistrust between population and warring parties
- High number of internally displaced people (around 4 Million) and refugees to neighboring countries (1.5 Million)
- Infrastructure and industries heavily destroyed due to war
- High level of poverty
- Food scarcity
- No official recognition of child soldiers (estimated number between 2.300 and 10.000 during the war) by any of the parties to the conflict
- High level of suffering and traumatised among all children (not only as child soldiers but also as direct victims and witnesses)
- Focus of post-war demobilisation and rehabilitation programmes solely on adult soldiers

Part 2: Analysing the Connectors and Local Capacities for Peace

The following connectors and local capacities for peace may be collected from the participants:

- History of a negotiated peace agreement without military victory of one side
- Shared experience of suffering of all families in the community
- Ceremonies for the re-integration of child soldiers and other returnees on community level conducted by traditional healers and churches
- Strong desire for peace and harmony in the local community
- Sense of community among child soldiers

Part 3: Unpacking the project

The following information about the project can be derived from the text:

Organisation	Rebuilding Hope
Objective	Empowering former child soldiers
Timeframe	1994-1999
Location	Ilha Josina Machel, island some 130 km north of capital Maputo
Staff	Staff coming from Maputo:

	• 3 psychologists trained by the Pedagogical University in Maputo • 2 arts educators / therapists • 1 Logistic • 2 Drivers Staff from local community: • 4 guards • 2 cooks / house keepers • 2 tractorists • 1 secretary Volunteers from local community (receiving small stipend): • 20 trained Activistas
Beneficiaries	More than 150 former child soldiers aged between 14 to 25 years
Activities	• Psycho-social support through individual therapy • Social-economic support through income-generation by farming and fishing • Lobby and advocacy through a campaign to raise awareness for the formal recognition of child soldiers
Approach	• Focus on individual therapy

Optional: Additional information on the project

This case study provides an opportunity to have participants reflect about the role of foreign staff. If used, the following info about the project design should be extracted from the additional information on the project:

Staff	Staff from abroad: • 1 Civil Peace Service (CPS) consultant: German, 30 years old, sent by one of the funding organisations of the project; main tasks include: research on local integration strategies of former child soldiers, consultancy and training in forms of trauma-counselling for community representatives, like teachers, local authorities, Activistas
-------	---

Part 4: Assessing the effects of the project on the context of conflict

The trainer will ask participants about their assessment if the NGO Rebuilding Hope has achieved its stated objectives. The trainer stimulates a discussion with further questions how the project affects the dividers and connectors. The relevant dividers or connectors can be highlighted on the flipcharts. To indicate a positive or negative effect on a divider or connector the trainer should use red or green arrows respectively. A positive effect is visualised with a green arrow, a negative one with a red one. A factor that is enforced can be indicated with an arrow up and weakening a factor with an arrow pointing down.

Some negative effects that might be uncovered with the participants are:

- Non-cooperation with traditional healers and churches could lead to tensions with them and might weaken their position in the community
- Disregard of traditional ceremonies and the concept of taboo as well as introducing a focus on individual psychotherapy could devalue traditional and group-based approaches
- Bringing in resources like funds and material for the youngsters and Activistas could increase competition within the community
- Focus on child soldiers, which are seen as trouble-makers, could stigmatise them further and could increase tensions in the community and might devalue age and social hierarchies

It is very important at this point also to stress that the project was systematically designed and produced also some positive effects, e.g. the increased recognition of former child soldiers on the local and national level.

Optional: Additional information on the project

If used, from the additional information on the project some effects of the deployment of a so-called Civil Peace Service consultant in this project may be detected:

- Focus on Portuguese language will increase as CPS consultant does not speak local languages
- Bringing in an expert from Germany could be perceived as valuing Western European approaches higher than local traditional ones
- Bringing in an expert from Germany who earns a higher salary (even than the director of the NGO) could increase jealousy and tensions concerning any question of the remuneration for staff

Part 5 (Optional): Generating options

If time allows you should motivate the participants to generate options / alternatives to the existing programme activities and approaches, which they found harmful. At this stage, it is not really necessary to go in depth through generating a lot of options. Already the insight: “there are alternatives possible” gives a good impression on how the Do No Harm framework functions.

Some of the options that can be collected through brainstorming might be:

- inclusion of traditional actors in the design of new project phases
- social / community therapy forms instead of single one-on-one therapy settings
- inclusive community development approaches instead of focusing on youngsters only when it comes to income generating activities
- inclusion of other groups of youngster to avoid stigmatising the former child soldiers

Concluding Remarks

At the end of this module some important lessons from the Local Capacities for Peace Project should be stressed:

- An intervention always has positive as well as negative effects on the context of conflict.
- It is never the whole project that goes wrong or is a complete failure. It is always some details of the project design that cause unintended negative effect. Therefore, it is possible to redesign the project in order to reduce the negative effects and enhance the positive ones.

Finally it is good practice to thank the participants for their energy and valuable contributions.

Facilitation Notes “Kampong Svay Area Development Programme, Cambodia”⁴

(World Vision)

Note: For general information how to conduct a Do No Harm-Case Study see the chapter “Discovering the Learning from the LCP Project – Case Study Exercise” in this section.

For specific learning objectives for this case study see the chapter “Case Studies for Introductory Workshops” in this section.

Facilitation Plan

This case study may be taught in five parts after an initial Opening and with some Closing Remarks.

Opening

For the reading of the case study the trainer should offer the following study questions on flipchart:

1. What do you identify as sources of division or tension among people in Kampong Svay ADP?
2. What do you identify as things that connect people in Kampong Svay ADP?
3. What do you think is the effect of the ADP on these dividers and on the connectors?
4. What suggestions, if any, do you have for other ways that the ADP could design its programme to have a better effect on local relationships?

Part 1: Analysing Dividing Factors and Sources of Tension

In plenary begin reflection by asking: “Which groups are divided? What is causing the division?” Write responses on flipchart. Note that the corruption of the Village Chief is causing the community to be divided into favoured and unfavoured groups. You may also discuss how this environment of jealousy and competition prevents the community from taking unified steps to counter corruption and build a stronger whole community.

Brainstorm first Dividers in plenary and write them on flipcharts. Make sure to gather some key points relating to the power abuse by village chief and corruption/ favouritism by local authorities

⁴ This case study was written by Bill Forbes. Bill Lowrey revised and tested the case study and the facilitation notes. We thank World Vision for granting the permission to use the case study for teaching the concept and use of Do No Harm. The people, locations, and actions in this case study are fictional. However, the case study is based on real situations and programmes that WVC has observed during Conflict and Violence Assessments in 2004.

Many trainers have found that this case study works best as a second case in a three-day DNH Training Workshop, after using the Tajikistan or another case study to introduce the concepts. Also, in some contexts it may be important to ensure that participants have had some introduction to the concept of latent conflict or structural violence. If participants have not had exposure to structural violence before, the ABC Triangle can be a relatively simple introduction method.

and how this is dividing the village into those who receive favours from the authorities and those who do not.

Part 2: Analysing Connecting Factors and Local Capacities for Peace

Continue to collect Connectors from the group and list these on flipcharts.

[See table below for possible responses]

Part 3: Analysing the Project

Work in plenary to analyse the Assistance Programme. Record answers on a flipchart posted between the Divider and Connectors.

Part 4: Analysing the Effects of the Project

The trainer should review the following key points about analysing the effects of the assistance on the context of conflict:

Emphasise that specific aspects of any programme can interact with existing or potential conflicts, or tensions. It is never the whole programme which does so. Each decision about implementation can affect how the programme interacts with the context of conflict. For example, if (as in Tajikistan) the targeting of assistance to the most needy causes one group involved in a conflict to gain more benefits from assistance than others, this can worsen intergroup tensions.

Or if staff are hired through a specific institution (such as a local university), and historically only one group in the society has attended this school, the assistance programme may favour one group over another in a way that exacerbates group tensions.

So we need to trace each part of the programme (the details!) to see if it interacts with any of the specific Dividers and Connectors.

Ask participants to now turn and talk to a partner about their ideas of how the assistance programme in the case study affects the context of conflict. Afterwards, brainstorm effects of the assistance on the context of conflict in plenary. Draw corresponding arrows on the flipcharts (arrows from the detail of the programme implemented to the specific divider or connector affected, and arrow indicating if the divider or connector is strengthened or weakened).

The trainer could refer directly to the “Implicit Ethical Messages” or “Resource Transfer” patterns which are in the case study—such as the obvious Resource Transfer effect of “Legitimisation” in how the process interacts with the abusive Village Chief. There also may be Implicit Ethical Messages such as whether the fact that all the paid staff are college graduates from Phnom Penh presents an ethical message relating to “Different Values for Different Lives.” Some participants have also suggested that reduced staff time in the village relates to “Assistance Workers and Impunity.”

Part 5 (Optional): Generating Options

If time permits the trainer should remind participants that after analysing the context of conflict (including Dividers and Connectors), and analysing the assistance programme, they next identified ways in which elements of the programme negatively affected the context of conflict. Now the next step is to identify “Options”. The trainer should refer back to the lesson learned that there are always options!

One way of developing options is to select a specific element of the programme which affects the context negatively, and brainstorm alternatives for that element. Then cross-check whether the option found to avoid an unintended negative effect may not create a different one itself by selecting the possible best options and then seeing what further effects they may have on other Connectors or Dividers.

Another important step is to look at the Connectors and see if there are any which the ADP is missing, which could be incorporated into project implementation.

This part could be done with some brainstorming in plenary or in a small group. In previous trainings the following options for redesign have been suggested:

- Form an election committee to run the VDC elections. The committee should represent all major ethnic communities and political parties, both majority and minority, and have gender balance. Also include Monks and elders.
- Election committee should develop the VDC criteria (not the ADP).
- Let the election committee manage the candidate list, instead of the Village Chief.
- The committee should disband after the election (not try to prolong their influence).
- Have election observers and/or counters from different ethnic communities & political parties.
- Hold the counting in a public building (such as a school), not in the ADP office.
- Conduct counting immediately after voting, in public.
- Allow additional nominations of candidates to be submitted to WV staff or pagoda leader, and not only to the Village Chief.
- Discuss benefits and principles of VDC election in open meetings with villagers before the election takes place.
- Conduct strategic capacity building for newly elected leaders.
- Advocate for implementation of a just land titling system.
- Advocate for the election of village chiefs.

Concluding Remarks

Finally, the trainer should point out how the ADP staff have recognised systemic power abuse to some extent, and have already taken some actions to limit the power of the Village Chief. It is important to affirm that the effect of the VDC election on the context of conflict is actually both positive and negative. The challenge is to recognise and affirm those things which are having a positive effect, while also identifying and working on new options for those which are having a

negative effect.

Many training participants emphasise that the VDC's existence as an elected body contributes to an incremental balancing of power formerly held exclusively by the village chief. This is positive! Nonetheless some details of the election process do feed unintentionally and significantly into the abuse of power, so these negative effects should certainly be improved. This affirms the long-term challenge to change systems of abusive power relations, which often has to be done incrementally. The should remind participants that all projects are a work in progress, including Kampong Svay ADP, with things which are working well, and others which need changing.

Overview of Potential Responses to Case Study Analysis

Context of Conflict Power Abuse by the local authorities; Dividing the community into favoured and unfavoured groups		
Dividers What is dividing people?	Project	Connectors What is connecting people?
<u>Systems and Institutions</u> - Appointment process of village chiefs—CPP - Personal relationships between Commune Chief and V Chief - Power abuse by the village chief and commune chief - Lack of accountability/ transparency by the village chief <u>Attitudes and Actions</u> - Land grabbing by V/C Chiefs - Villagers don't help each other when the authorities grab their land - Corruption with land titling - Favouritism by political party by the authorities (family and political party) - Fear of CPP—killing in Phnom Village - Targeting new families <u>Different Values and Interests</u> - Village Chief interested in helping himself / Villagers interested in legal protection, justice and fairness <u>Different Experiences</u> - Experience of having power vs. not having power - Getting benefits vs. not getting them - Fear of the authorities grabbing land <u>Symbols and Occasions</u> - Parties	<u>Mandate</u> : “All Cambodians live in peace, justice and prosperity.” <u>Fund Raising</u> : WV United Kingdom <u>HQ Organisation</u> : ADP makes plans quite independently <u>Project VDC Elections</u> : <u>Why?</u> - Promote democracy - Independence from politics - Under Ministry of Rural Development - Build local capacity - Sustainability <u>Where?</u> - Home of Village Chief <u>What?</u> - Election of VDC Members <u>When?</u> - Every Three years <u>With Whom?</u> - Villagers, Village Chief <u>By Whom?</u> - Villagers <u>How?</u> - Criteria set by WV staff, after consulting with community - Village Chief nominates candidates - Announcement of candidates' names - Invitation for others to talk to the village Chief if they want to nominate/be candidates - Village Chief and staff reminded people of election - Election open at village chief's home 2 votes, one pink (woman), one white (man) - Village Chief, 2 volunteers from the village, and 2 WVC staff were present to count votes	<u>Systems and Institutions</u> - Peaceful elections - From the same village <u>Attitudes and Actions</u> - Respecting each other - Helping each other after corruption - Helping during harvest <u>Shared Values and Interests</u> - Elders used to provide wise and unbiased support during conflicts - Agreement that corruption causes suffering for the powerless - Commitment to development <u>Common Experiences</u> - Shared struggles of being poor - Shared struggles of living under corruption - Voting together <u>Symbols and Institutions</u> - Elections - Pagoda (although must be careful about potential divisiveness)

Case Studies for Application Exercises

The following two case studies have proven to be less useful for Do No Harm introduction workshops. They do not contain sufficient project information. Therefore, it will not be possible to demonstrate any unintended negative effects of the project on dividers or connectors identified.

They are, however, useful for simulating a planning situation in a Do No Harm introduction workshop provided, however, there is sufficient time. Approximately a full day will be needed for a rigorous context analysis, planning a project in detail and assessing potential effects.

They can be used as material in an application exercise if participants already have good knowledge of Do No Harm and trainers wish to introduce the planning exercise by first working on a “distant case” or if participants are reluctant to bring their own projects for such an application workshop.

Learning Objectives

- To analyse systematically the context of conflict
- To design a project in a conflict sensitive way based on a systematic analysis of the context of conflict
- To systematically analyse how the project potentially has unintended negative effects if implemented

Facilitation Notes: “Assisting Displaced People from Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan”¹

Note: For general information how to conduct a Do No Harm-Case Study see the chapter “Discovering the Learning from the LCP Project – Case Study Exercise” in this section.

For specific learning objectives for this case study see the chapter “Case Studies for Application Exercises” in this section.

Facilitation Plan

This case study may be taught in four parts after an initial Opening and with some Closing Remarks.

Opening

For the reading of the case study the trainer should offer the following study questions on flipchart:

1. What do you identify as the divisions and sources of tensions between the displaced Dinka people and the people in the Yambio county area where they immigrated?
2. What do you identify as the things that connect them?

To start the discussion, the trainer should note that we are facing an emergency, with displaced people arriving in our area and some of them are clearly in need of food. “We need to respond in an appropriate way. Yet we know the area is one affected by war, and we know that these influences need to be factored into our project approaches.

“To think about how to provide appropriate assistance, let us analyse the situation and see how that might influence our decisions.”

“Let us start by gathering the facts we know of the situation.”

Part 1: Analysing Dividing Factors and Sources of Tension

As the trainer begins this introduction, s/he may write on the board, “CONTEXT OF CONFLICT” and to the left write “TENSIONS/DIVISIONS”. S/he could then ask: “What do you identify as the sources of tensions between the new arrivals in Yambio county and the people who lived there? What things divide them?”

Participants will offer a number of ideas like:

- distinctly different ethnic groups (Dinka = Nilotic; Zande = Bantu)
- different cultures
- different languages

¹ This case study was compiled by Wolfgang Jamann, programme coordinator of World Vision Germany in Sudan in the end of the 1990ies.

- history of factional fighting on different sides in the war
- different economic system (Dinka = agro-pastoralists; Zande = agriculturalists)
- Tsetse fly kept them apart
- for some Zande arrival of Dinka unwelcome (“should return”)
- history of raids and occasional violence in the past
- Dinka's tradition of “sharing” experienced as “theft” by Zande
- some Zande harbour prejudice (witchcraft, “eating children”)
- suspicion: Why are they here? Are they spies?
- different degrees of food insecurity
- insufficient water supply
- chiefs not speaking to each other

The trainer should be sure that the group generates a good and complete list and that they come to some agreement on these issues.

When a list is complete, the trainer should ask the group to consider which of these seem to be of greatest importance in terms of the likelihood for intergroup violence. This discussion could take five minutes and people will have different opinions. There is no need for the group to agree on this at this point.

Part 2: Analysing Connecting Factors and Local Capacities for Peace

The trainer should then ask: “What things do you identify that connect the two groups in the region?” S/he should write “CONNECTORS” on the board to the right.

The list that the participants come up with will include such things as:

- both groups suffering from war
- Christians in both groups, both attend Sunday services
- working easily together, Zande hire Dinka
- shared value of hospitality
- Zande think of Dinka as “humans just like us”
- history of trade, mutually dependent on different types of produce
- shared history of migration

Part 3: Designing a Project

In this part of the discussion, the trainer will invite the group to consider programming options and opportunities and to assess the ways in which different approaches interact with the Divisions/Tensions and with the Connectors.

To begin, the trainer should note that the NGOs assessment is that people need food to survive.

Noting this, s/he should write on a separate board “NEED: FOOD”.

Then the trainer should provide the following study questions and ask participants to begin designing a project that addresses the need identified and takes into account the facts identified about the context.

1. How would you provide emergency aid in this setting?
2. Would you provide longer-term assistance? If so, what would you do and why? If not, why not and what would be the likely outcomes of your decision?

Allow some time for individual reflection.

Then, pointing out that programmes have many elements, s/he should write “Project” or “Programme” in the centre of the board (see layout) and under it write:

- Why ?
- When ? For How Long?
- Where ?
- What ?
- For Whom ? (beneficiaries)
- By Whom ? (staff)
- With Whom ? (partners/ contractors)
- How ?

As s/he writes these, the trainer should note that agencies make many decisions as they put together a programme. These decisions involve whether and why to provide assistance; where to provide it; when and for how long; what to provide; who should benefit; how to staff the programme; and finally, how to get the things they are going to provide to the people they decide to help.

The trainer should then assign the group to plan a programme that takes account of the settings as we have described it on the board (under DIVISIONS/TENSIONS and CONNECTORS). They should decide what is needed and how to provide it.

This could be done in small groups, or ten minutes could be provided to the group to divide up into team of two, each turning to a person sitting next to him/her, to do this programming.

Part 4: Analysing the Effects of the Project

After the groups have worked on this assignment, the trainer should lead a discussion that prompts the group consider the implications of each of their programming decisions. To do this, the trainer should invite one group to describe their project plan.

The trainer should record the ideas under the headings above having to do with WHY, WHERE, WHAT, FOR WHOM, STAFF, HOW, etc. When the group has laid out their ideas, the trainer should then ask all the participants to consider the effects of this programme on the groups.

To do this, s/he could begin by asking:

“How do you think this plan will affect the divisions between the groups and/or the tensions that divide them?”

When someone gives an answer, the trainer should always ask “Why do you think that?” The point would be to help people consider carefully how each choice may affect the various divisions and tensions they have identified.

The trainer should constantly refer back to the list of DIVISIONS and tensions. S/he could ask such things as “How would your decision to do that affect this division the group identified?”

When divisions and tensions have been considered, the trainer should also ask “What do you think will be the effect of your plan on the connectors?”

Again each answer should be explored and discussed by the whole group.

After one group has made its presentation, the trainer should encourage the other groups to put in the ideas they had for ways to reduce tensions and reinforce connectors.

If time permits, the trainer could ask the group to think of other programming options to correct problems that have been identified through this discussion.

Concluding Remarks

When the group has systematically discussed the effects of their programming ideas on both divisions/tensions and connectors, the trainer could close by reminding the group that it is important to plan project activities in ways that achieve three goals. These are:

1. to meet needs
2. not to worsen intergroup tensions
3. to reinforce the connectors between people in the project area.

The rest of the workshop will deal with each of these issues in turn.

The trainer should compliment the group on its good work and thinking. S/he should point out that we are adding new criteria for the judgement of effective programmes and that this requires that we consider the side-effects of our programmes on the conflicts that exist in the areas where we engage ourselves with projects. This case has introduced these ideas. Now we will turn to a thorough examination of all aspects of these issues.

Facilitation Notes “Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Sri Lanka” ²

Note: For general information how to conduct a Do No Harm-Case Study see the chapter “Discovering the Learning from the LCP Project – Case Study Exercise” in this section.

For specific learning objectives for this case study see the chapter “Case Studies for Application Exercises” in this section.

Facilitation Plan

This case study may be taught in four parts after an initial Opening and with some Closing Remarks.

Opening

For the reading of the case study the trainer should offer the following study questions on flipchart:

- What do we know about the tensions and things that divided people in Puttalam District?
- What do we know about the de-escalation potentials or things that connected people to each other in Puttalam District?

After the reading of the case study provide an opportunity for participants to ask questions of clarification.

Part 1: Analysing Dividing Factors and Sources of Tension

The role of the trainer should be to stimulate the deepening of the discussion through questions. S/he writes on a big board “Dividers/sources of tension” and collects the refined statements from participants underneath this heading.

The participants usually find a number of tensions and divisions. These might include:

- History of violent conflict between LTTE and its armed wing, the Tamil Tigers, and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and its army
- Muslims caught in the crossfire between the dominant conflict parties without being adequately involved politically, especially in peace negotiations
- High numbers of refugees and even higher numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs)
- Ethnic, political and religious tensions between the Tamils, the Sinhalese and the Moors (Muslims)
- Poverty and competition over limited resources (e.g. land, employment, assistance) between the IDPs and the ‘host communities’

² This case study was compiled by Karen Johne in consultation with the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA). It was designed specifically for application workshops.

- Significant demographic changes and socio-economic challenges in Puttalam due to the presence of IDPs
- Favouritism of the IDPs through the donors instead of also paying attention to the situation of the poor locals
- Tensions between the 'host communities' and the IDPs quickly escalate
- Corruption on the local government level
- The exploitation of the local conflicts by politicians
- Several reasons preventing IDPs from returning (e.g. security, ethnic violence, occupied land and homes)
- The ambivalent situation for the local institutions (providing basic infrastructure vs. making it more difficult to convince the IDPs to return)
- Lack of water hampers the agricultural sector
- Tsunami-related pull out of formerly engaged international NGOs

Part 2: Analysing Connecting Factors and Local Capacities for Peace

When a good list has been generated, the trainer should then note that there are factors in all war situations that also bind people together and connect them. The trainer should ask the group to identify these from the case study. S/he writes on the right side of the board "Connectors/Local Capacities for Peace".

The participants usually offer a number of ideas about the Connectors and Local Capacities for Peace. These might include:

- Shared suffering from war effects
- Muslims being multi-lingual
- History of Puttalam as a multi-ethnic district
- The IDPs receiving assistance at all
- Common needs for generating income
- Potential for brick-making
- Good soil for agriculture
- 16 irrigation projects being carried out
- An estimated 50-60% of the IDPs want to return
- The opportunity for returnees due to the MoU
- There are different capacities for mediating conflicts between the communities (e.g. District Secretariat, Pradeshiya Sabha members, police, civil society actors like NGOs and CBOs,) and 'Peace committees' are formed for this purpose
- Some development organisations still working in the area (e.g. CARE, WVI)

Part 3: Designing a Project

After the context analysis the trainer might invite the participants to take part in a simulated planning process for a development or peacebuilding project that should be implemented in Puttalam District:

“We are in Puttalam District in the western part of Sri Lanka. You take part in a project planning workshop facilitated by a local NGO. This NGO has been established in 1991, when larger numbers IDPs began to come to Puttalam District. Today (February 2005), it has called together a meeting with two representatives from a donor organisation. Together you want to design a project for the next three years.”

The trainer should ask the participants, who of them wants to act in the role of the two donor representatives. Participants should feel free to represent their own organisations.

(An optional version might ask all of the participants to define their roles more detailed.)

Identifying the core problem and an overall objective

Now the trainer should ask the group what in their opinion might be the core problem in Puttalam District. S/he may ask the participants to give reasons for their opinions.

Optional: S/he should mention that many tools for analysis are comprehensive, but do not help identify which factors are the most important ones. As a result, they do not help practitioners to identify priorities. S/he might encourage the participants to discuss which of the ‘connectors’ and ‘dividers’ are able to strongly influence the situation in Puttalam District to get better from a development or peacebuilding perspective. Those ‘dividers’ and ‘connectors’ might be marked in a special way (e.g. drawing a red frame around these factors).

After agreeing upon one core problem, the participants should define an overall objective for the project. The trainer might ask: “What change(s) should occur?” S/he asks the participants to express the objective in a S.M.A.R.T. way (S.M.A.R.T. stands for Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Timely).

Identifying the interests and needs of the actors involved

When the overall objective has been formulated, the trainer encourages the participants to identify actors, their assumed interests and needs as well as their possible contribution for change with the specific objective(s) in mind. S/he draws the following table on the board:

Actor	Assumed interests and needs	Possible contribution for change

Then s/he encourages the participants to fill in the list. She reminds participants to not forget to reflect upon the interests of the NGO and the donors.

Once the participants have finished the actor analysis, the trainer might ask the group:

- Which of these actors are “key actors” relating to the core problem or the changes we want to see? ³
- Are there any actors who are able to reinforce the conflict?
- Are there any actors who are able to reduce the conflict?

Collecting ideas for the project

The challenge for the trainer in this part of the workshop will be to create a creative atmosphere. - S/he may use icebreakers and/or other methods which stimulate the flow of ideas.

Then the trainer should note that it might be hard to collect ideas for the project in a DNH setting because some of the participants may have fears to suggest ‘bad’, non-sensitive or inefficient ideas. S/he should note how important and useful it is to “think out of the box”, especially in conflict contexts.

The trainer could collect ideas using brainstorming in plenary. It is also an option to run a competition by dividing the participants into teams of two. S/he should set out the problem as follows: “What shall we do in Puttalam District? Please list as many ideas as you can think of. No ideas are disallowed. Write every single idea on one card. The top team who thinks of the most ideas will win a prize.”

The trainer should specify a relatively short timeframe (e.g. seven minutes) to do this job. S/he should not give too much time; the point is to get people to generate many ideas in a short amount of time.

At the end of the appointed time, the trainer should ask all teams who listed more than ten ideas to raise their hands. Then to ask those with more than eleven to do so, until the team with the most ideas has been identified. If two or more teams have the same top number, ask one to read their list first; then ask the other team to add ideas that have not been mentioned by the first team. When the winning team has read out their ideas, other teams should be asked to add ideas they had that were different. The trainer should collect all cards, preferably on the board and between the dividers and connectors collected earlier.

Then the prize should be given. Preferably, it should be a box of candy. For sure, the winning team will share!

Designing a project

After collecting a lot of ideas, the trainer might mention that now is the time to select some ideas for the project design. Writing the heading “Project” between the lists of “Dividers” and “Connectors”, s/he should explain that the project will interact with this context once implemented.

The trainer should mention that the categories of the organisational structure (mandate, headquarters organisation, fundraising policies) are left out in this workshop setting, although they are really important for designing real projects.

³ Key actors are people or groups who have significant influence on decisions whose outcome may either favourably or unfavourably affect the achievement of the overall objective.

The trainer encourages the former teams of two to choose three favourite ideas. S/he should raise participants' awareness on questions like: "Is there a close connection between the core problem we identified and the overall objective and the project?" or "Are there the key actors involved in any way?"

The trainer should ask the teams to use the following questions to complete a rough project design:

- Why?
- What?
- Where?
- When?/How long?
- For whom? (beneficiaries)
- With whom? (partners)
- By whom? (staff)
- How?

Optional: Upon completion, the trainer could ask the participants: What is the theory of change their project design is based upon? Could you identify any indicators for the changes that should occur?

Part 4: Analysing the Effects of the Project

Next, the trainer should note that it is important to consider whether and how the planned project would affect the context of conflict. S/he may ask the group:

- "What do you think the effects of the project are?"
- "Which dividers and sources of tension might be increased or worsened by the project?"

S/he might note responses by drawing upward-pointing arrows next to those "Connectors" or "Dividers" which were reinforced, or downward-pointing arrows next to those which were reduced.

The trainer should also ask for indications of positive effect (i.e. lessening tensions and/or supporting local capacities for peace) by asking questions like:

- Have you actively sought to identify things in the conflict area that cross boundaries and connect people on different sides? Have you designed the project to relate to these connectors?
- Is the project delivered in ways that reinforce a local sense of inclusiveness and intergroup fairness? Is the project designed to bring people together? Is it designed so that for any group to gain, all groups must gain?
- Is the project delivered in ways that reinforce, rather than undermine, attitudes of acceptance, understanding and empathy between groups?
- Is the project delivered in ways that provide opportunities for people to act and speak in constructive ways? Does the project provide opportunities for its local staff to cross lines

and work with people from the “other” side?

- Does the project respect and reinforce local leaders as they take on responsibility for civilian governance? Does it provide rewards for individuals, groups and communities that undertake inter-group initiatives?

Finally, the trainer should ask if there are any effects through Resource Transfers or Implicit Ethical Messages. The trainer should invite the group to a plenary discussion regarding possible negative effects through Resource Transfer and Implicit Ethical Messages. S/he should emphasise that project staff do in fact do good and certainly they are attempting to do so. Therefore, possible negative effects should not be a source of feelings of shame.

Part 5 (Optional): Generating Options

The trainer may invite participants to review the planned project and come up with some programming options to deal with one (or several) of the negative effects discovered in the previous part. The trainer could ask:

- “How could we avoid these negative effects?”
- “How could we encourage positive effects?”
- “How could we better involve key actors?”

To broaden one’s capacities for finding options the trainer could encourage participants to think about ideas, which might be suggested by other actors, such as a women who heads an IDP household, a local three-wheeler, the imam of a camp, etc.

For each option suggested, the trainer should ask the group to consider whether that option is likely to reduce “dividers” and support “connectors” in the context of conflict, or whether it may have some adverse (or other positive) effects as well.

Concluding Remarks

The trainer should close the case by summarising a few key points of the discussion and programming decisions. S/he should ask the participants to leave their roles and come back from Puttalam. It is always good, at the end of a case, to congratulate the participants on their energy, ideas, creativity and analysis.

The “Framework for Considering a Project's Effects on Conflict”

This session can either follow immediately after a case study or, in a shorter workshop or briefing, become the opening session.

Learning Objectives

- To provide a tool to systematise information (facts) about a situation of conflict;
- To identify those facts that are relevant for project planning;
- To help practitioners see how programmes affect conflict;
- To provide a tool for planning better programmes in the future.

Facilitation Plan

A full explanation of the Framework requires a lecture type presentation. If it follows the Tajikistan (or any other) Case Study, the trainer should begin by referring to the fact that the participants have already seen the Framework in use in that discussion.

S/he should go on to note that the lessons learned through the LCP project have been captured in a picture or graph which is the Framework.

[The trainer should hand out the Framework chart either at the beginning or end of this presentation. If handing it out before, the trainer should still use a board, drawing the columns and labelling them and drawing the arrows, etc. as s/he introduces the various parts. A danger of handing it out before drawing it is that people will not listen as carefully to the presentation. If English is a problem, however, it may be advisable to give each person a sheet of paper to refer to.]

The Lessons Learned through the Local Capacities for Peace Project

First, the Context of Conflict is characterised by two sets of things: The Divisions and Tensions between groups and what might be called “War Interests” or “Capacities for War” that we all know exist in conflict settings. Surprising, however, and far more interesting is the fact that the context of conflict is also characterised by things that connect the sides at war and by what can be called Local Capacities for Peace. The reason this is important (and this should be clearly emphasised) is because we all expect conflicts to have divisions and tensions and war interests, but we do not expect to find connections and peace capacities. Thus, very often, as we provide assistance in conflict settings, we direct the assistance so that it reinforces the divisions and, because it is unaware of them, undermines connections. If we are aware of this, then we can think more clearly about how to design programmes.

Secondly, when assistance is given in the context of conflict, it becomes a part of that context and, as such, either reinforces and exacerbates the divisions and tensions or supports and strengthens the connectors/capacities for peace.

Board Layout: The Basic Framework

At this point, the trainer may go to a Board and draw the beginning of the Framework. Across the top, s/he should write “CONTEXT OF CONFLICT” and below that, to the left of centre, write “Divisions/Tensions/War Capacities” and, to the right of centre, write “Connectors/Capacities for Peace”.

As s/he does this, s/he should note that the heading for the whole Board is “Context of Conflict.” The empirical finding of the Local Capacities for Peace project is that both dividing things, and connecting things, exist in the context of conflict. All conflict situations have these two realities in them. Thus, when a project is implemented in a context of (violent) conflict, one way or the other it affects what is already there. Thus, it affects what divides people as well what connects them.

Drawing an arrow up on the left side under “Divisions/Tensions” and an arrow down on the “Connectors/LCPs” side, the trainer should note that humanitarian and development projects can worsen war in two ways: either by feeding into and exacerbating divisions/tensions or by ignoring and undermining connectors/LCPs.

Drawing an arrow down on the left (D/T) and an arrow up on the right C/LCPs), s/he should go on to say that projects can have a positive influence in two ways as well: by reducing intergroup divisions and tensions on the one hand or by supporting and strengthening connectors/LCPs on the other.

In this sense, humanitarian and development projects can never have a neutral effect on conflict. It may be entirely neutral with regard to the contending parties, but experience shows that, given these characteristics of conflict, interventions always affects them either up or down.

This is the fundamental Framework.

Adding More Detail

1 The Elements of a Project or Programme

The trainer should note that projects and programmes are multi-layered. Involved in the “package” of programmes are headquarters, policy makers and field activities. Programmes reflect an agency’s mandate, its head quarter's arrangements and styles, and its fund-raising approaches and successes (or failures). In addition, a programme involves decisions about whether and why to intervene in a given situation; about when and for how long to do so; about where to work; with whom to work; what kind of staff to hire and how; and finally, about how to carry out the programme. Each of these decisions has its own effects on the Divisions/Tensions and Connectors/LCPs.

[The Trainer may write the words underlined above into the centre column of the chart as s/he talks about these aspects of programming so that the Framework is being developed in front of the workshop participants.]

2 How Project Activities Affect Conflict

From looking at many different projects in many different settings, it has been possible to identify clear predictable patterns of how project activities affect conflict. There are two basic ways this occurs:

- through Resource Transfers: projects always involve provision of resources and these can become a part of the conflict as groups vie for their share or try to keep others from getting access to them.
- through Implicit Ethical Messages: project activities carry the explicit message of caring about suffering. By the ways in which it is given and the actions of staff, it also carries several implicit or tacit messages and these can affect the context of conflict.

To visualise his/her explanation the trainer may draw a horizontal arrow pointing to the left and

right from the centre PROGRAMME or PROJECT column and label it “Resources Transfers/IEMs” to add this aspect to the chart.

More can be said about Resource Transfers at this point, or this can be postponed until a later session depending on the length and plan for the particular workshop. (See below for the ideas to include under this section.)

More can be said about Implicit Ethical Messages at this point, or this can be postponed until a later session also depending on the length and plan for the workshop. (See below for the ideas to include under this section.)

3 Programming Options

Before leaving this presentation about the Framework, the trainer should always note that, when the effects of humanitarian and development projects on conflict become clear, if some of these are negative (i.e. worsen divisions or weaken connectors), then there are always programming options that can be tried to avoid having these effects. Or, if the programme seems to be missing opportunities to have a positive effect (i.e. reducing divisions or supporting connectors), there are always options to improve effects.

Adding the two additional columns on each side of the chart, the trainer should point out that experience shows options do exist and that creative programmers have, in fact, developed many of these that improve projects in context. However, while the patterns by which projects interact with conflict are predictable and show up across different contexts, the options for ensuring that the effects are positive rather than negative always must be designed by taking the specific, local circumstances into account. Thus, it is impossible to generalise about “what works.” Using the ideas and clarification of relationships that the LCP project has gathered, project staff can apply them to any local situation and come up with a relevant and appropriate set of ideas for their own circumstances.

The trainer must also add the extra arrows across the bottom of the chart to emphasise that any option found to reduce a negative effect or to enhance a positive one must be checked, again, against the other side of the chart. The process of programme design and redesign is a dynamic, rather than static (once and for all), process. It is also important to remind participants that conflict, itself, is dynamic so that a “divider” today may be a “connector” tomorrow and vice versa. The tool can and should be used iteratively and repeatedly as a check on programme effects.

Use of Illustrations

It can be helpful to provide examples from project experiences to illustrate the points being made in this presentation. Section VI, Material II provides a number of vignettes from actual field level programming experience that trainers can use to illustrate various points. Be sure to look through them and select some to strengthen and spice up your presentation. Or, better still, use examples that come from your own experience. However, if you have worked in only one or two places, it is always wise to add some examples through the course of a workshop from other places. Participants begin to feel uncomfortable if all examples come from only one or two other locations.

Closing

After this presentation and some discussion, the trainers should note that the remainder of the workshop will involve looking at the components of the Framework in more detail and using the steps of the Framework to analyse a project or programme with which participants are personally

familiar.

STEP 1: Understanding the Context of Conflict

Purpose

The purpose of this session is

- to set the tone for the workshop,
- to allow participants to work with tools they are familiar with
- to emphasise the lessons learned,
- to inform participants about what they can expect from the workshop, and
- to provide some background about the overall LCP project if the facilitator feels this to be useful and time permits.

The Tone

Do No Harm has been developed in a process that was designed to ensure broad active involvement of NGOs, donors and field-level practitioners and recipients. Workshops should also be designed with the intention to provide another opportunity for more people to become involved and add their own experiences and understanding to the learning. Therefore, the tone of the opening session should be relaxed, serious, friendly, open, inquiring and inviting. In addition, it should convey the idea that the participants' experience and knowledge is as critical for the discussions and for the learning that will take place as are the materials brought by the trainers. Opening sentences should, therefore, make clear that the workshop will:

- Be highly participatory
- Be open and exploratory
- Deal with real-world problems encountered daily by practitioners in many parts of the world.

Part of this process, therefore, will be to invite participants to introduce themselves, saying a few words about their own experiences in development or humanitarian work in conflict settings and their concerns for how the workshop can be helpful in their work.

Following participant introductions, the workshop facilitators should also introduce themselves.

Linking Conflict Analysis and Do No Harm

Organisations working in situations where inter-group conflict is “hot” and has escalated to a level of violent confrontation have developed many practical and useful tools for conflict analysis. Most of these tools help to make perceptions, observations and assumptions about the conflict explicit. Very often these tools visualise what people perceive and how they assess a situation. Making these explicit is important for two reasons:

1. Once they are spelled out and visualised others can relate to the analysis and it is possible to engage in a meaningful conversation.
2. A well-documented and visualised conflict analysis makes it easier to refer back to it later in time and trace changes in the situation.

Most of the conflict analysis tools are most productive if used in an interactive participatory manner.

The Do No Harm approach does not intend to substitute for these tools. In fact, we believe organisations should systematically use such tested tools for a well-founded conflict analysis. The Do No Harm tool adds elements to a conflict analysis based on the empirical evidence of the LCP project which are essential for a systematic context analysis.

The DNH tool is not intended to be used as a “stand alone” tool. On the contrary, experience has shown that it can be – and is best – used in combination with other tools of conflict analysis. Organisations are using a wide variety of conflict analysis tools. They have trained their staff, they have integrated the use of certain tools they find helpful and they feel comfortable with into their procedures. Do No Harm, therefore, does not prescribe the use of any specific set of conflict analysis tools.

In STEP 1 Do No Harm recommends organisations to use the conflict analysis tools they are used to working with in order to describe in as much detail as possible the context in the location(s) where project activities interact with groups and individuals. This analysis of the social and geographic space in which interaction takes place will provide the foundation of the following steps of a rigorous Do No Harm analysis.

STEP 2: Identifying Dividers, Tensions and Capacities for War

Introducing the Categories for a Systematic Analysis

Learning Objectives

- To expose participants to the possible categories for understanding dividers, sources of tension and war capacities.
- To enable participants to apply these steps of the Framework to their own circumstances and, thus, to understand them better.

Facilitation Plan

This session may be run on its own or combined with the session on connectors and local capacities for peace if time is limited. The trainer should set the tone with a few opening remarks. If the focus is only on Dividers, Tensions and War Capacities, these should include:

- A reminder that, in the presentation of the Framework, we noted that the context of conflict is characterised by two sets of things--divisions, tensions and capacities for war on the one hand and connectors and local capacities for peace on the other hand.
- At this point, we are going to turn to more detail about how to identify and understand the divisions, tensions and war capacities.

Beginning a Do No Harm Analysis

A first important step before going into a Dividers and Connectors Analysis is to focus (zoom in) on the social and geographic space in which the project is implemented. Questions to ask at this stage are e.g.:

- Where is all this happening?
- When is it happening?
- What is the conflict about?
- Who in particular is divided in the area where the project is implemented?

At this stage the facilitator may point out that in all places at all times, there are a number of intergroup or interpersonal tensions and differences. In most situations people and societies are able to handle such tensions in nonviolent constructive ways. This is fine. When planning and implementing projects we are not equally interested in all of the tensions. Many represent healthy pluralism and differences. But, what we must pay attention to are those divisions and intergroup tensions that either have in the past, or might in the future, turn into destructive intergroup conflict or intergroup violence. (Very often in workshops, groups will list endless conflicts including localised family feuds, arguments between siblings, etc. These may be negative and destructive also but do not usually result in intergroup warfare.) The point here is to identify those divisions, tensions and their sources that are important both in terms of the type of destruction they can produce and in terms of the numbers of people who are involved.

Do No Harm Analysis

After the specific social and geographic space that is relevant to the project has been identified

and described the facilitator may now move to STEP 2 of the Do No Harm Analysis. S/he may open this reflection by pointing out that once the relevant context has been identified it is important to consider systematically what the sources of tension and division between these groups are, how and why are they divided, how do the divisions and tensions show up between them.

In addition, very often there are people who have an interest in warfare and who gain from it. There are structures and systems that represent capacities for dividing people. These are the War Capacities that we refer to. Groups should be alert to these and try to identify them in context as well.

When these introductory comments are made, the facilitator may request the group to identify WHO is/was in conflict in a setting they are familiar with. In some situations, it will be easy and obvious. In others, there will be discussion about where the important divisions are in a society. For example, if there has been an open war between two groups, it will be fairly straight-forward to name these two as divided. In such situations, however, it may also be worthwhile for the group to consider whether there are other issues that are also likely to erupt into violence and draw in other actors.

Once the groups have identified the actors that are in, or could potentially be in conflict, then facilitator should change the focus to understanding the divisions, sources of tensions and war interests.

At this point, the trainer may note that the LCP Project found some categories useful for analysing a given context in a more systematic way. These include:

Systems and Institutions

For example, the ways in which fighters are organised. Militia structures might be formed in situations where the central government is weak. Police departments can be organised to use one group to police another. Legal systems can discriminate against the rights of one group. Wells and energy supply systems can be controlled by one side of a conflict.

Attitudes and Actions

For example the violent acts that daily maintain the tensions in a society such as terrorism, like grenade attacks or bombs in marketplaces. Or the acts that explicitly target one group. These can be the police stopping one group at a checkpoint while letting another group go through. Racism can also.

Different Values and Interests

For example, agriculturalists and pastoralists treat land use very differently. Also, religious values can be used to promote dividers, such as religious laws that are imposed even on people not of that religion.

Different Experiences

For example, history can be interpreted and selectively used to highlight the times when groups were fighting one another rather than referring to times when they cooperated. Conflicts can also arise out of situations where groups have very different lifestyles, whether those differences are cultural, religious, economic, etc.

Symbols and Occasions

For example, one group can impose their holidays on the other. Or, alternately, they can

prevent a holiday from being observed. Monuments might be destroyed or boundaries crossed.

These five categories are illustrated in many of the vignettes in Section VI, Material II or one could refer back to the case study and give respective examples for each category.

Small Group Work

After the presentation of the categories it is advised that participants are given an opportunity to apply them to their own experience. If all participants are working in the same area, they may do the identification of local dividers/tensions/war capacities in their work area. If many different areas are represented, small groups should be formed of people who are working in the same area. If participants feel insecure they may be asked to go through the case study material in a systematic way using these categories.

The task for the group(s) is to list things that divide the groups, the sources of tension between them, and to identify whose interests would be served by intergroup conflict. As they do this, or subsequently, they should identify which of these are the most important for their situation.

If time is short the facilitator could continue with the next unit on Connectors and then have group work done on finding examples for dividers and connectors at the same time.

Reporting Back

If everyone has worked on the same area, the reporting back session should be given sufficient time for small groups to share their thinking and for the whole group to come to agreement on a complete, categorised list.

If many areas are represented, a report back session cannot go into full detail of each area. Thus, people should be encouraged to tell whether they found the exercise useful, what were the difficulties they encountered, what they discovered they needed to go back and find out, etc. That is, the plenary discussion should focus on how to use the tool, rather than go into specifics of any one situation.

Closing

The trainer should bring this session to a close by summarising both the conclusions of the group and pointing out the importance of continuing to consider the dynamics of conflict situations. S/he could end by noting that this list is a complete and useful one for now; it will be important to continue to reflect on these categories as we go through the other aspects of the Framework because we may want to add or change some elements when we see them in a new light.

STEP 3: Identifying Connectors and Local Capacities for Peace

Introducing the Other Reality: Connectors and “Local Capacities for Peace”

Learning Objectives

- To emphasise the fact that factors that connect people and local capacities for peace exist in every conflict situation;
- To expose participants to the possible categories for understanding connectors and local capacities for peace.
- To enable participants to apply this step of the Framework to their own circumstances and, thus, to understand them better.

Facilitation Plan

Opening

The trainer may refer back to the discussion of the case study and remind participants that a context of conflict is characterised by two realities: the reality of divisions, tensions and violence which is immediately obvious, but also the reality of “Connectors” and “Local Capacities for Peace” which is often less obvious.

“It is important, always, to remember that:

- More countries do not go to war than do;
- More people, even in war zones, do not fight than do;
- More people do not kill their neighbours than do;
- More would-be leaders try to excite people to intergroup violence than succeed in doing so.”

“Non-war attitudes and actions, non-war factors are, apparently, much more common and more “natural” than war. There are many ways that people manage differences, disagreements, suspicions, etc. other than through destructive or violent conflict.”

“However, we should not be naive or romantic about capacities for peace or connectors. In a society where open conflict does erupt, the non-war factors are clearly not strong enough or effective enough to prevent violence. They have failed by definition. Nonetheless, they have existed and some continue to exist even where we don’t see them; they provide a base on which future non-war or peace can be constructed.”

What Are Local Capacities for Peace?

Every society has both individuals and many other factors that prevent every disagreement from breaking out into war and that help contain and move away from violence if it begins. These include justice and legal systems, police forces, implicit codes of conduct, elders groups, church or civic leaders, etc. The roles of conflict prevention and mediation are assigned to some people and institutions in every society. These are what we mean by capacities for peace.

NOTE: The trainer should caution the group against “easy” identification of connectors or peace capacities. For example, many people assume that “women’s groups” are connectors or peace capacities. But experience shows that women’s groups can either be connectors or deeply

committed dividers. Similarly, churches can serve to connect groups or they can serve to divide. One must always look, in context, for who is being connected and who is being divided and how this is occurring in order to do this analysis accurately. If people within one group are being effectively “connected” in order to oppose other groups with greater strength, it would be a mistake to identify this connection as one that is promoting intergroup harmony.

What Do We Mean By Connectors or Local Capacities for Peace?

In the midst of warfare, especially in situations of civil war where former fellow-citizens are fighting each other, there continue to exist a whole series of things that connect - or can connect - people who are fighting. These include:

Systems and Institutions

For example, in all societies where civil war breaks out, markets continue to connect people across the lines of fighting. Sometimes these involve formal inter-enemy trade; sometimes they involve women meeting at the market by the river-side one morning a week. Communications systems can provide linkages (for example, we have been told by many people that they value the BBC because they know that everyone on all sides of a war can hear the same information about what is happening); in some cases, irrigation systems, bridges, roads and electrical grids connect people in spite of war (in some cases, they are destroyed by warriors intent on separating people).

Attitudes and Actions

For example in the midst of war, one finds individuals and groups who continue to express attitudes of tolerance, acceptance, even love or appreciation for people on the “other side.” One finds people who act in non-war ways, doing things that the war would dictate were wrong such as adopting abandoned children of the “other side,” linking across lines to continue a professional association or journal, setting up new associations of people opposed to the war. They do these things because they seem “normal” or “right.” Often, they do not think of them as extraordinary or, even, as non-war.

Shared Values and Interests

For example, the common value placed on children’s health has been the basis for UNICEF’s success in negotiating days of tranquility for inoculations against childhood diseases. Sometimes a common religion can bring people together.

Common Experiences

For example, war itself can provide linkages among different sides. Citing the experience of war and suffering as “common to all sides,” people sometimes create new anti-war alliances across boundaries.

Symbols and Occasions

For example, stories abound of the soldiers in the trenches in WWII who, on Christmas eve began to sing “Silent Night” together, and then, they returned to war. National art, music, historical anniversaries, national holidays, monuments can bring people together or link them across differences.

These five categories are illustrated in many of the vignettes in Section VI, Material II.

NOTE: The categories are not meant to be conceptually tight and mutually exclusive; rather, they are meant to open up our minds so that we actually see how many things do continue to connect people even in warfare. To be able to recognise these and support them offers options for humanitarian and development programmers in conflict settings.

Small Group Work

Once the idea of “Connectors and Local Capacities” has been introduced, the group may work either as a plenary or in small groups (see options for small group work in session on Dividers) to identify some in the contexts in which participants work.

Reporting Back/Plenary

As was true with Dividers/Tensions, this session can focus on substance if all participants are familiar and working with the same area, or on the process of using the tool for analysis if people are working in different areas.

Closing

As in the Dividers discussion, it is always important to bring a session to closure both to keep the group aware of its progress and to encourage continuing hard work. It also provides the chance to remind people that conflict environments are dynamic; thus they need to keep doing and re-doing their analysis of any given situation if they wish to stay alert about how their project is interacting with the conflict.

In this session, one could also point ahead to the what comes next – namely, a close look at each of the programmes that participants are involved in, as the next step of the Framework.

Illustrations for Connectors

The categories to unpack and understand things that connect people in spite of tensions and conflict are not scientifically defined. Experience has shown that it is difficult to “explain” these categories. It is easier to understand when trainers provide little “illustrations” or stories that describe what a system, an institution or shared value was in a given situation.

The following illustrations were shared by a participant from Palestine. With his permission we have included them here. We encourage trainers to search for such illustrating little stories in their own experience.

Systems & Institutions

Even during the recent wars between Israel and Gaza and even though the President of the Palestinian Authorities, Mahmoud Abbas, recognised the right of the Hamas to resist the Israeli siege of Gaza, he never stopped to cooperate with the Israeli government in the so called “Security Coordination Committee”. This committee exchanges intelligence information on possible terror attacks and coordinates the border control in the occupied territories.

Attitudes & Actions

During the whole conflict one could observe “non-war” attitudes on both sides, which were demonstrated in concrete anti-war actions like protests and demonstrations. Sometimes they even took place simultaneously and were coordinated between Palestinian and Israeli

protesters.

„Shared“ Values & Interests

Due to the extensive use of water, the Dead Sea is drying out. As the Dead Sea is half in Palestine and half in Israel both sides have a common vital economic interest in stopping this. Therefore they signed together with Jordan a contract to build a canal from the Red Sea to secure a sustainable water intake.


„Shared“ Experiences

Both sides of the conflict share the experience of insecurity, wounded and traumatised people and tragic losses due to the violent conflict.

Symbols & Occasions

Due to this shared experience especially organisations of mothers, who suffered the loss of their children evolved on both sides. As a symbolic action they express their condolences to mothers on the other side of the wall in the occasion of a war-related death. They even published a statement together demanding the end of violence and stating that each dead person is one too much.

Different ways to visualise the Dividers / Connectors presentation



Occasionally, participants may find the presentation of the details of the Do No Harm framework boring. In one workshop participants used this graph:

The circle visualises the wholeness of human relations and interactions, the “pie”, as they called it. The different pieces of the pie, the different categories of the Do No Harm Dividers and Connectors analysis, represent the elements that constitute the “complexity” of the context.

We encourage trainers to be creative in how they visualise their presentation.

STEP 4: Unpacking A Project

Making the Details of a Project Explicit

Learning Objectives

- To highlight all of the elements that, together, make up a field level project.
- To encourage participants to look carefully at all the aspects of their own projects as a step toward analysing their effects on the context.

Facilitation Plan

Opening

The trainer may open this session by reminding people of the words put on the board in the Case Study Discussion under the column of “PROGRAMME” or “PROJECT”. In doing so, s/he can outline the multiple elements:

Mandate
Fund-raising & Donor Relations
Headquarters organisation / decision making
Why
Where
What
When/How Long
For Whom (beneficiaries)
With Whom (partners)
By Whom (staff)
How

S/he should note that every one of these involves decisions made at headquarters and/or field levels and that each decision has the potential to affect whether and how the programme interacts with the context of conflict.

Some illustrations may be given. For example, if (as in Tajikistan) the targeting of assistance to the most needy causes one group to gain more benefits from assistance than others, this can worsen intergroup tensions. Or, if staff are hired through a given institution (such as the local agricultural college or because they speak English), and historically only one group in the society has attended this school or acquired this skill, the programme may favour one group over another in a way that exacerbates intergroup tensions.

For this reason, it is important to trace each of the elements of a programme in this context to determine how it might be interacting with the realities in this context.

The reason why the first three elements are put in a box is to emphasise that these factors limit - or facilitate – making choices and better programming decisions at field level. They are part and

parcel of the programming procedure but often can not be directly changed by field staff. Other levels of the organisational structure (apart from the field staff) come into focus here. When explaining this trainers must choose their wording carefully. Don't say “can not be changed” as this may unintentionally communicate the implicit message of powerlessness”

The Workbook (see Section V, Handouts) can be handed out to participants and they should be given the task of outlining, in full, the details of their own programme. They may do this individually or in small groups if enough people are familiar with and involved in the same programme.

If people are working on different programmes, this may be given as an overnight homework assignment because it is not necessary that everyone knows the details of everyone else's programme. If everyone is involved in the same programme, this assignment should be done as a group and everyone should thoroughly agree on the description of the programme components.

Group Work

If time permits this may be an opportunity to ask participants to discuss in small groups how these questions reflect in the project planning procedures established in their organisations. In most cases they will discover that project planning, monitoring and evaluation procedures address these questions. Participants may be requested to note on posters what procedures are being used in their organisations and where and how (what wording) these questions are addressed.

Reporting Back

For reporting in plenary groups may be asked to put up their posters for other participants to study during the workshop. Discussion / reflection in plenary should focus on whether the Do No Harm Framework is compatible with existing planning, monitoring and evaluations concepts and how it can complement existing tools.

Closing

In closing the facilitator may remind participants that the Do No Harm framework was developed by practitioners for practitioners. It therefore reflects tested and established tools that are familiar to practitioners. However, it aims at adding additional elements that assist in identifying and monitoring unintended negative effect.

STEP 5: Effects through “Resource Transfers” and “Implicit Ethical Messages”

This part may be covered in either one or two sessions depending on time. It is presented here as one session. The basis for this unit is Chapters 4 and 5 of the book, Do No Harm.

This session involves a brief lecture that describes and illustrates the patterns by which a project affects the context of conflict. When this has been done, participants may divide into small groups and discuss their own experiences, examining the ways that they have seen programmes interact with conflict. These discussions will increase the participants’ “ownership” of the ideas as they use their own experience to illustrate the patterns identified through the LCP project.

Learning Objectives

- To inform the participants about the patterns by which projects interact with conflict.
- To enable participants to anticipate and analyse the effects of their projects on the contexts in which they work.

Facilitation Plan

Opening

The LCP project’s work with agencies providing assistance in conflict has found very clear patterns in the ways that projects interact with conflict. Rather than being discouraged by the repetitiveness of these patterns, we are heartened, because if we can identify patterns of relationships, then we can anticipate them in different settings. If we can anticipate how the details of our project may affect conflict, then we can think of ways to avoid the negative, reinforcing effects and encourage the positive, violence-reducing effects. This is what this session is about.

Project Activities interact with the context of conflict through two mechanisms:

Resource Transfers

All projects and programmes involve the transfer of some resources. These may be material such as food items, building material, medicines or non-material such as health care, training, skills etc. Experience shows that when outside resources are introduced into a resource-scarce environment where people are in conflict with each other, the local people see these resources as representing power and wealth and, thus, they become a part of the conflict. People in conflict attempt to control and use such resources to support their side of the conflict and to weaken the other side.

Implicit [Ethical] Messages

Additionally, by the ways in which things are done, project activities carry a series of implicit messages that, also, have an effect on conflict. These messages are not explicitly stated but rather communicated non-verbally by the way people or a project relates to the local context. However, these messages are perceived. If it carries an ethical message that is counterproductive for the project it is considered a negative effect.

The trainer should outline these two categories briefly and then will have participants divide into small groups to reflect on examples of each of the patterns that come from their own experience.

The Effects through Resource Transfers

Learning Objectives

- To sensitise participants about the effects of any project through the transfer of material and non-material resources

Facilitation Plan

Opening: Resource Transfers

The trainer should begin this session by asking participants to list what comes to their mind when they hear “resources of a project”. What resources are common in the projects they are involved in? S/he should note on a flipchart what participants say. In most instances the list will include material items such as money, building material, food, etc. as well as non-material items such as knowledge, skills, etc. If the list does not include non-material resources the trainer must challenge participants by asking appropriate questions. The trainer should emphasise that non-material resources are equally important and have effects on the context through the same patterns as material resources.

Once a list is compiled the facilitator moves on to explain the effects which were detected by the Local Capacities for peace project that come about through the transfer of resources by a project into a given context.

There are five effects by which the transfer of resources may feed into, prolong and worsen conflict. These include:

Distribution Effects

In the course of a project, decisions have to be made on the question who is supposed to be supplied with resources. It is of utmost importance to take into consideration that the selection of beneficiaries does not exacerbate conflicts. If groups that benefit from the project exactly (or even partially) overlap with the divisions represented in the conflict, the distribution of resources can reinforce and exacerbate conflict.

If more than one party to the conflict benefits, or if these conflicting parties are even brought together by the way resources are distributed, a positive effect on the context of conflict can be expected.

Market Effects

The introduction of resources to a local context will affect prices, wages and profits on the local market. These effects can either reinforce the war economy (enriching activities and people that are war-related) or the peace economy (reinforcing “normal” civilian production, consumption and exchange).

Substitution Effects

Resources that are transferred through a project can potentially substitute and replace local resources and their sources. If a project assumes responsibility for the supply of basic goods and/or services for the population it can have the effect that local authorities who should be responsible are not taking over this role – potentially using their resources for other purposes like waging war.

However, it can also have a positive effect to transfer knowledge, skills and/or awareness about malpractice (e.g. in the health sector or in dealing with conflicts) that leads to more positive behaviour.

Diversion Effects

Through theft, corruption or mismanagement resource can get into the wrong hands. If a project's resources are diverted this can feed the conflict, literally feed the dividers. For example, food provisions may be stolen by members of the warring parties to support the war effort either directly (as when food is stolen to feed fighters), or indirectly (as when food is stolen and sold in order to raise money to buy weapons).

Legitimisation Effects

The transfer of resources can benefit the receiving groups not only in a material way but also in increasing or decreasing their reputation or legitimacy. It can support either those people and actions that pursue war, or those that pursue and maintain peace. For example, a local actor that cooperates with and/or receives resources from a project will witness an effect on their perception by the local population. Non-cooperation with local actors equally can have an effect on their legitimacy. If the standing of the local actor is weakened or strengthened depends on the reputation of the project and/or the organisation implementing it.

After introducing these effects the facilitator should emphasise that except for the “Diversion Effect” all other patterns also have positive effects on the context of conflict. Therefore, they are intentionally used in the context of project planning. For example, an income generation project intends to have a positive market effect. Or supporting human rights defenders intends to legitimise human rights and those activists who are struggling for the respect and implementation of human rights. S/he must, however, point out that the fact, that these effects may also have unintended negative effect is usually not sufficiently taken into account in the course of project planning.

Small Group Work

After the presentation of the five effects of Resource Transfers, the trainer should divide participants into small groups to discuss these. The assignment could be: Go around the room so that each person in your small group tells at least one story of a programme that he or she is familiar with where at least one of the effects described can be seen. It is best if these come from personal experience.

The trainer should note that the purpose of this approach and of going around the room so that each person tells at least one story is to help the participants see these categories as not merely theoretical. The atmosphere should be easy and “safe” so it is possible to talk about errors of the past without shame. Such outcomes have been common in all our experience. No one should deny them; our task is to identify them and, then, find ways (in the unit on STEP 7, redesigning the project) to prevent them.

Sending the participants into small groups, the trainers may leave the discussion open so that anyone can describe events in any category, or s/he may give each small group as assignment to illustrate one (or two) specific categories only. The trainer should hand out a sheet on which each

of the effects is described (see Section V, Handouts) to help the participants in these discussions.

Another option for small group work is to ask participants to refer back to the case study used earlier on. The assignment would be: Find at least one example for each of the five effects of resource transfers. It might make sense to have participants first list all material and non-material resources transferred by the project portrayed in the case study. It is advisable that the trainer stresses that not only negative effects of the project are discussed.

Plenary Discussion

When participants come back from small group work, the trainer should invite people to tell some of the most interesting, and/or, poignant stories they heard. The mood should, again, be easy, open, inquiring and “safe” for people to consider even the worst things they have been involved in.

Effects through “Implicit Ethical Messages”

Learning Objectives

- To sensitise participants about the fact that not only WHAT we do affects the context but also HOW we do things. The way we do things always also sends messages which we often are not aware of. They are not explicit but have an important ethical connotation.

Facilitation Plan

Opening: Implicit Ethical Messages

The second mechanism by which our activities have effects on a context of conflict is through the messages that go together with our behaviour. In every human interaction the way we do things also sends messages. Often, we are not aware of them. This is why in the context of Do No Harm they are called “implicit messages”. But experience has shown that people we interact with are very much aware of such implicit messages. I may be listening to someone telling me a story. But my facial expression or my body language may tell him or her that I am not really interested. Even if I pretend to be interested there may be signals sent by my body language that belie my action.

The way we behave sends messages about our values and intentions. Often people trust their observation of our behaviour more as an indicator for our intentions than our words. So, especially working in a context that is culturally, politically, socially and economically different from our own context we must be aware that we are always sending messages through the way we act and interact, and others are always receiving and reading these messages. Just as WHAT we do also HOW we do things has effects on the context. These effects can be positive – or unintentionally negative. They may reinforce the moods and modes of destructive conflict, or they can promote values and ethics that strengthen peaceful coexistence.

The LCP-Project and practitioners using Do No Harm since its introduction have identified several types of negative “Implicit Ethical Messages” (IEM). The trainer should note that, while the effects of projects through Resources Transfers are quite evident and relevant in the context of conflict, the effects through “Implicit Ethical Messages” are much less clear. However, the realisation of effects through IEM is based on practitioners’ experience who have found them to be important. Thus, it is useful or even essential to consider carefully how the way we do things may trigger effects on the context of conflict. Trainers should also point out

- that the list of IEM – in contrast to the Resource Transfer effects – is not exhaustive. Particularly organisations working in the peacebuilding field have identified other relevant IEM;
- that one can also think of and formulate “positive IEM” in order to initiate constructive reflections of the implicit messages that one may want to communicate by the project activities.

Opening this session it can be useful to again emphasise that project staff do in fact do good, they often are aware of the social and cultural context and they are attempting to also send positive messages.

Introducing IEM with the “R-A-F-T Principle”

This model for introducing the fact we need to reflect about the messages that go along with HOW we do things – the “implicit (ethical) messages” – is based on the observation that the messages we send pertain to four dimensions of human relationships:

RESPECT**A**CCOUNTABILITY**F**AIRNESS**T**RANSPARENCY**Respect**

Respectful interactions with local people often are collaborative, trusting, calm and sensitive to local people and their concerns. Disrespectful interactions often show that we are suspicious of the people we interact with, they communicate indifference, belligerence or dismissiveness. Respectful interactions are two-way communications, open to and encouraging feedback. Disrespectful interactions are one-way communications, giving information or instructions without showing willingness to pay attention to comments or feedback.

Accountability

Institutionalised accountability is focused upward, to headquarters and organisational hierarchies, or donors. Here, however, accountability refers to local people and responsiveness to local concerns. Organisations and staff display accountability for their actions and decisions by taking action when things don't work as expected, rather than blaming mistakes on others or ignoring problems. If staff refuse to accept responsibility for their errors, or do not take action when action is required, local people will lose trust in the organisation as a whole to respond to their needs.

Fairness

Patterns of behaviour that are fair recognise the value of input of all members of a community and are responsive to the expressed needs and goals of the community they work in. Fairness is displayed when we do not only listen to those with voice, power and influence but pay attention also to the silent, weak and marginalised people. It is important to be sensitive for definitions of fair treatment, access and distribution in the local community.

Transparency

Being clear and open about an intervention and its aims, inviting local people to participate in the process, to give their feedback and to share their concerns communicates the value of transparency. This reinforces positive patterns of behaviour. However, being vague about our intentions and plans, shielding from criticism from outsiders leads to perceptions that an organisation does not respect or trust local people, is not willing to be held accountable for their actions.

Clearly, messages we send do not affect only one of these dimensions. Very often they have effects in more than one. Disrespectful behaviour will affect also the perception of fairness, transparency and accountability. It is important to be aware of the R-A-F-T dimensions and to consciously consider how the way we interact with people affects the perception of respectfulness, accountability, fairness and transparency.

After introducing and explaining the R-A-F-T dimensions the trainer may request participants to reflect their own experiences of interaction and to list what signals they read in certain situations. These may be positive messages, demonstrating respect, fairness, transparency or accountability, or negative messages.

The trainer may ask participants to share some stories of own experiences and ask participants to place the pattern of behaviour into the respective field of the table below. You may get something like this:

Behaviour sending negative message		Behaviour sending positive message
competitive behaviour behaviour displays suspicion, anger aggressive tone, posture behaviour displays lack of interest, indifference behaviour displays fear telling people, instructing, not listening ...	RESPECT	behaviour invites cooperation and collaboration encouraging behaviour displays trust relaxed and calm active listening, displaying interest in other people behaviour displays sensitivity
claiming not to be responsible, blaming others behaviour displays sense of impunity, rules are for others ...	ACCOUNTABILITY	claiming responsibility and taking positive Action adhering to rules and standards ...
treating people differently, discriminating ignoring rule unfair treatment refusing to explain ...	FAIRNESS	following rules being inclusive explaining own perceptions
keeping decision making closed hiding, withholding important information ...	TRANSPARENCY	Inviting feedback and criticism sharing information explaining decisions and making processes transparent

The trainer may want to continue describing (some of) the IEM identified by the LCP Project and practitioners using Do No Harm. S/he may then ask participants to place the IEM into the R-A-F-T-table. As the list contains only negative IEM this exercise may trigger a discussion about the desirable “positive” IEM.

These are the most relevant implicit ethical messages that were identified and described by practitioners from various areas of work ⁴:

Arms and Power

When agencies hire armed guards to protect their goods from theft or their workers from harm, the implicit ethical message perceived by those in the context is that it is legitimate for arms to determine who gets access to food and medical supplies and that security and safety derive from weapons.

Disrespect, Mistrust, Competition among Agencies

When agencies refuse to cooperate with each other, and even worse “bad-mouth” each other (saying things such as “we don’t work the way they work; we are better and they get it wrong”), the message received by those in the area is that it is unnecessary to cooperate with anyone with whom one does not agree. Further, you don’t have to respect or work with people you don’t like.

Project Staff and Impunity

When project staff use the goods and support systems provided as assistance to people who suffer for their own pleasures and purposes (as when they take the vehicle to the mountains for a weekend holiday even though petrol is scarce), the message is that if one has control over resources, it is permissible to use them for personal benefit without being accountable to anyone else who may have a claim on these resources.

Different Values for Different Lives

When agency policies allow for evacuation of expatriate staff if danger occurs but not for care of local staff, or even worse, when plans call for removal of vehicles, radios and expatriates while local staff, food and other supplies are left behind, the message is that some lives (and even some goods) are more valuable than other lives.

Powerlessness

When field-based agency staff disclaim responsibility for the effects of their programmes, saying things such as “You can’t hold me accountable for what happens here; it is my headquarters, or the donor, or these terrible warlords who make my work have negative effects,” the message received is that individuals in complex circumstances cannot have much power and, thus, they do not have to take responsibility for what they do or how they do it. And, of course, this is what is also heard from people involved in civil wars - i.e. “I can’t help what I do; someone else makes me do it.”

⁴ Since the list of Implicit Ethical Messages was first published organizations have pointed out other IEM which they have found relevant in their context of working. Some of those were later confirmed by other organizations. We have, therefore, decided to include those in the following list. It thus differs from lists you may find in other Do No Harm publications.

Belligerence, Tension, Suspicion

When project workers are nervous about conflict and worried for their own safety to such an extent that they approach every situation with suspicions and belligerence, believing for example that these soldiers at the checkpoint “only understand power” and “can’t be trusted to be human,” their interactions with people in war zones very often reinforce the modes and moods of warfare. The message received is that power is, indeed, the broker of human interactions and it is normal to approach everyone with suspicion and belligerence.

Demonisation and Victimisation (through Publicity)

When NGO headquarters in their publicity use pictures that emphasise the gruesomeness of warfare and the victimisation of parties, they can reinforce the demonisation of one side in a war and, thus, reinforce the sense that all people on that side are evil while everyone on another side is an innocent sufferer. This is seldom the case and undermines the humanitarian principle. This, too, can reinforce the modes and moods of warfare rather than helping the public, or the agency’s own staff, find an even-handed way to respond to those on all sides who seek and want peace.

Cultural Characteristics

Foreign experts are coming from a different culture whose characteristics will show up in the daily project work. Certain cultural habits and values will be modelled by external staff members and possibly become implicitly standard.

Standard of Living

Foreign staff can often be distinguished from local staff and population by their style and standard of living. They often live in comparatively big and luxurious houses that could be perceived as a contradiction to the overall goals of a project and approach of an organisation.

The trainer could present the Implicit Ethical Messages listed above to participants. S/he may want to use more illustrations of these kinds of effects. If so, the trainer could refer to her/his own experiences or to chapters 5 in the “blue book”. However, since the next step of this exercise is to get participants to think of their own examples, the trainer might want to limit illustrations from other places to a minimum at this point and only use some of them later if people have trouble coming up with any examples of their own.

Introducing IEM through Role Plays (optional)

Role plays have proven to be a good method to introduce IEM and to get people reflecting the observations and their feelings triggered. Instead of explaining the above mentioned Implicit Ethical Messages and/or relating some illustrations the trainer could either act out some role plays themselves or have participants prepare role plays and act those out in plenary.

The trainer may develop their own role play scenarios or use those developed and scripted by other trainers from different backgrounds (see Section V, Handouts).

NOTE: Preparing and using role plays needs enough time as it involves several steps:

- creating the atmosphere

- select the scenario
- cast roles
- prepare
 - the role players
 - the observers
 - the scene
- run the role play
- “cut” – end the scene
- de-brief the scene
- closing

If you have not used role plays before we advise to read Peter Woodrow's instructions carefully (see Section III).

Small Group Work

After the presentation of Implicit Ethical Messages, or after the role plays if time permits, the trainer should divide participants into small groups to discuss these. The assignment should be: Go around the room so that each person in your small group tells at least one story of a project that he or she is familiar with in which at least one of the effects through Implicit Ethical Messages can be seen. It is best if these come from personal experience.

As for the small group work on effects from Resource Transfers the trainer should note that the purpose of this approach is to help the participants see these categories as not merely theoretical. Again, the atmosphere should be easy and “safe” so it is possible to talk about errors of the past without shame. The trainer should supply participants with the handout on IEM (see Section V, Handouts).

Plenary Discussion

When participants come back from small group discussions, the trainer should invite people to tell some of the most interesting, and/or, poignant stories they heard. The mood should, again, be easy, open, inquiring and “safe” for people to consider even the worst things they have been involved in.

Closing

At the end of this session, the trainer should reiterate how common these patterns (effects through resource transfers and implicit ethical messages) are and how the point is not to become depressed or to feel ashamed. Instead, in the next session, we will now move into examining these patterns and what options exist for breaking out of them and avoiding negative, improving positive effects.

STEP 6: Generating Options

A) Initiating Creative Thinking

Background

Experience shows that practitioners are usually very able to take the Do No Harm tool and use it to analyse their situation, and the positive and negative effects of their project on conflict. However, very often, even with this awareness, they have difficulty thinking of programming options. There is a strong tendency to think that there is only one way to do things or to assume that the way that projects have been conceived and planned cannot be altered. The purpose of this session is to move people out of such “traps” and to provide participants an opportunity to discover that they can generate a wide range of options using their creativity and imagination.


Learning Objectives

- To provide an opportunity to “think outside the box” in a non-threatening context;
- To illustrate that programming options always exist.

Facilitation Plan

Opening

To initiate thinking “outside the box” trainers can use the “5 dot exercise”. You need a plain flipchart and markers of 4 to 6 colours. S/he should place 5 dots at the centre of a flipchart in the following way:




S/he should then ask participants: “Take a careful look. What do you see?” and allow one or two minutes in silence for participants to reflect. Then s/he should ask participants to tell what they see. Participants will offer various perceptions: a house, a star, a person with hands and legs spread out, etc.

All options are possible. The trainer should trace the shape participants perceived with her/his finger so other participants can follow and also “see” the shape.

Then the trainer gives the following instruction (in writing): “Please connect these 5 dots with 4 straight lines in such a way that you get a closed shape and all dots are connected.” Allow for some time to reflect even when a participant offers a solution immediately.

S/he should then give a marker to one participant to draw her/his option. Then s/he should ask other participants to offer other options and mark them on the flipchart with a different colour. You usually get four to six ways of solving the problem.

Possible solutions are:



In a closing remark the trainer should point out that often we look for familiar patterns in what we see. Once we have discovered such a pattern it easily becomes a “box” that limits our creativity. It is therefore necessary to break out of these boxes, to “think outside the box” to make good use of our creativity.

B) Options Game

If there is sufficient time it is advisable to continue with a little not so serious exercise that challenges participants to generate many ideas to solve a given “problem”.

The trainer should remind participants of the “five dot exercise” and people very often have difficulty thinking of programming options because our “traditional ways” of programming also become little boxes. We all get trapped into believing that the way things have been done so far is the only way to do them. This session will help us break out of this assumption.

The trainer should then pose a problem that needs to be solved. The problem should not be too complex and there should be many possible ways of solving it. Trainers have developed quite many of such exercises for creative thinking. The important thing about this exercise is that the situation described in the problem should not be too serious and allow also for not so serious, playful and creative solutions.

Medical Treatment is urgently needed

Then the trainer should set out the problem. Below is one example:

“Medical Treatment is urgently needed:

There are two hills divided by a deep gorge with a wild river rushing over big boulders. The two hills are connected by a simple rope bridge that can carry a load of maximum 70 KG.

On one hill there is a pharmacy. On the other hill a small village is spread. One day a farmer working in the field is bitten by a snake. Medicine for treatment has to be brought very quickly to save his life.

The pharmacy has the medicine on stock. It consists of several parts that need to be used together. The whole package weighs 7 KG. The messenger who has to run and pick up the medicine weighs 65 KG.

How do you get the medicine to the patient in the shortest time possible?”

Then, telling the group to break into teams of two, keeping them sitting around the table where they are, the trainer should give them this assignment:

“List as many ways of getting medical treatment as you can think of. The top team who thinks of the most options will win a prize.”

The trainer should emphasise that at this stage not the quality but the number of options matters. S/he should specify that the teams have five (or ten if that seems better) minutes only to do this job. Do not give too much time; the point is to get people to generate many ideas in a short amount of time.

At the end of the appointed time, the trainer should ask all teams who listed more than ten options to raise their hands. Then to ask those with more than eleven to do so, until the team with the most ideas has been identified. (If two teams have the same top number, ask one to read their list first; then ask the other team to add ideas they had not mentioned by the first team.) No ideas are disallowed.

When the winning team has read out their ideas, other teams should be asked to add options they had that were different. The trainer should record all ideas briefly on the board so the whole group sees a long list growing.

Then the prize should be given. Preferably, it should be a box of candy. It should be open and it should have to travel from the participant farthest away from the winning team past all other participants to the winning team. This creates a wonderful sense of fun, and illustrates how people feel if food goes past them. At this point, the trainer should pull out another box of candy and pass it around to the whole group, illustrating that one option may be to provide enough for everyone.

This entire exercise should take only twenty minutes from beginning to end. It is an effective one to use just after lunch since it is lively and engaging of the entire group.

Closing

The trainer should close the session by complimenting the group on its creativity and, pointing to the list on the board, note that what can seem like a problem with limited options often turns out to have many options. S/he should remind the group that some of the options they thought of would not work; others might. Once a range of options is generated, the next job is to assess them against the reality and to analyse what will work, and not work, and why. This is, of course, what the whole framework allows us to do.

C) Generating Options to Avoid Unintended Negative Effects

Learning Objectives

- To provide experience in imagining a wide range of options for achieving a specific programming purpose;
- To demonstrate that the more people involved in thinking of programming options, the greater the number, and the more creative, the options are
- To model the hypothetical testing of programming options if they have only positive effects or also unintended negative effects.

Facilitation Plan

Opening

Whether you have used the first part on creative thinking or not, it is important to demonstrate to the workshop's participants that the Do No Harm approach does not stop by telling people what kind of harm they might cause. In fact, the approach paves the way for improving the project by finding and testing options for redesigning those details that trigger unintended negative effects.

It may be useful to open this session with a full, but brief recap of the entire Framework, reminding participants that the real gain in using the Framework is in the generation and testing of practical options.

Small Group Work

If there is sufficient time for a “serious exercise” (roughly 1 hour) trainers may invite participants to continue working with the case study or in case they have worked on their own project in the previous sessions.

When introducing the task, it is important to remind the group that the effects of project on the context of conflict is determined by details of the project. It is never an entire project that causes unintended negative effects. Unintended negative effects can be traced back to certain details of the project. This is good news as it allows to look for alternatives for those details and adjust the project so that it can be implemented to achieve the desired (positive) outcomes and impacts but avoiding unintended negative effects.

The trainer may put up the posters from those sessions again or provide a handout with the essential details and findings. The assignment for small group work at this point must be precise and appropriate to the time allowed for group work.

An assignment could be

- Choose x number of the project's unintended negative effects on the context of conflict which we have identified in the previous sessions.
- Identify which detail(s) of the project have triggered this unintended effect and by which patterns (RTs and IEMs).
- Generate, by individual brainstorming and taking notes, as many ideas as you can for “programming options” – that is different ways of doing what the project is mandated to do but avoiding that negative effect.
- Share all your ideas in your group – no discussion until all ideas have been read out.

- Discuss and identify those options which you think will best avoid the unintended negative effect. Cross-check whether it may also have unintended negative effects on dividers or connectors.
- Present the best options (which form a redesign package) and give reasons why you think those are an improvement.

The trainer may assign the same task to all groups or invite groups to work on different negative effects.

During a workshop session participants will not be able to do this on all unintended effects they identified in STEP 5. Doing this exercise in a rigorous manner for one unintended negative effect will result in a good learning experience that allows participants to gain an understanding of this step.

Closing

In closing the plenary, the trainer should highlight one or two of the most creative and promising ideas and, at the same time, acknowledge the range of ideas that arose from the groups. The purpose of this session, and of the closing, is to enliven people's senses that there really are options and that many of them are realistic and doable.

STEP 7: Redesigning the Project

This session immediately follows the previous session on STEP 6. Trainers /facilitators may choose to merge both STEPs into one session. (Then the assignment for group work needs to be adjusted accordingly.) If time permits we recommend to separate the steps into two sessions to bring home the point that redesigning the project needs the same amount of systematic effort as the STEP 1 to STEP 6.

If trainers choose to separate the sessions on STEP 6 and STEP 7 the reporting from group discussion on STEP 6 would be a list of realistic options to change those details of a project that have been found to trigger unintended negative effects.

The assignment for STEP 7 could then be:

Look at the list of options you identified in STEP 6.

- Choose those options which you think are most realistic to implement and which allow you to avoid the unintended negative effect(s) you identified.
- Redesign the project using those options
- Check whether and to what extent the original mandate and intended outcomes and effects of the project will be affected through these changes.

The presentation in plenary could be a simulation of a board meeting in which trainers (chair of board) and participants who are not from the group presenting could question and finally decide about the proposed redesign options/packages. This scenario makes the exercise livelier. However, make sure (as chair of the board) that all options are appreciated and competition is limited as the proposal of more than one group could be approved by the board.

Session: Background and History of the Local Capacities for Peace Project

This session is optional. As mentioned in the Introduction of this manual, when Do No Harm was first introduced some decades ago this contents was an essential part, often at the beginning of a workshop. Still today, the trainer might want participants to understand better how the Do No Harm-Approach was developed.

If trainers decide to provide the background and history of Do No Harm they should not overload the presentation with too much historical detail. Rather, it may be important to highlight and illustrate three key points:

Do No Harm was developed

- by practitioners for practitioners
- on the basis of experiences and empirical evidence
- through a collaborative learning process.

We have found that it is helpful to point out these three points because practitioners today often feel overwhelmed with new tools and concepts introduced and sometimes prescribed in high frequency. Many practitioners have become sceptical that such new tools and approaches – often developed by researchers and consultants – make life easier for them.

The LCP Project in a Nutshell

The objective of the “Local Capacity for Peace Project”

1. to study in a systematic way the effects of projects or programmes (relief and development) by local and outside agencies on situations of violent, destructive conflict;
2. to identify patterns how assistance interacts with conflict;
3. and to learn lessons for future programming.

Its approach

- collaborative learning,
- based on the experience of practitioners,
- firmly based on field evidence.

The process

- 15 case studies in 14 conflict situations (different types of conflict; different types of interventions; different types of actors) 1994-1996.
- 25 feedback workshops (more than 500 persons with experience of working in conflict situations) 1996/1997.
- 12 cases of up to 3 year implementation (practical testing) 1997-2000.
- “Mainstreaming” Phase since 2001.

Background of the LCP Project

In late 1994 the Local Capacity for Peace (LCP) Project was launched to answer the question: How may assistance be provided in conflict settings in ways that, rather than feeding into and

exacerbating the conflict, help local people disengage from the violence that surrounds them and begin to develop alternative systems for addressing the problems that underlie the conflict?

The LCP Project was a collaborative effort, organised by the Collaborative for Development Action in Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, involving a number of donor agencies (DANIDA, Sida, CIDA, UNHCR, DHA, OCHA, German EZE and AG/KED, Foreign Ministry of Norway, OFDA of USAID with more being added all the time), international NGOs (over fifty of them) and local assistance workers.

The approach taken by the LCP Project was inductive, learning from local field experiences. Thus, fifteen case studies were conducted in fourteen conflict zones to examine the interactions of humanitarian and development assistance and conflict.

From the cases, lessons-to-date were compiled in a booklet entitled *Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace through Aid* (published by CDA in 1996). This booklet represented the knowledge at that stage and it formed the basis for over twenty-five feedback workshops carried out with assistance workers in a number of countries in which practitioners “tested” the lessons against their own experience, added to and amended them and, thus, improved them. The learning from the entire effort was then published in a book entitled *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1999). The 1996 booklet was then outdated, it represented “work in progress” and the state of discussion at that stage. CDA no longer stands behind all the statements. The 1996 booklet should no longer be quoted or used in workshops.

On the basis of the lessons learned from the case studies and the responses of more than 700 practitioners working in humanitarian relief and development assistance in areas affected by violent destructive conflict a planning tool – the “Framework for Considering the Impact of Aid on Conflict” was developed. 12 organisations tested this planning tool over a period of up to three years in projects implemented in conflict areas. The learnings from this testing phase were documented in the booklet “Options For Aid in Conflict. Lessons from Field Experience” (Mary B. Anderson (ed.), published by CDA, Cambridge 2000)

The LCP Project then engaged in an ongoing dissemination effort. In addition, the LCP Project works with operational NGOs that are carrying out projects in conflict areas to apply the lessons in “real time and space.” CDA staff and volunteers work with NGO field and headquarters staff to use the methods and approaches of the LCP Project to analyse the interactions between their assistance programmes and the conflicts where they work and, then, to make appropriate adjustments to projects in order to ensure that assistance does not do harm but supports local efforts toward non-war.

Timeline of the LCP Project

The timeline of the LCP Project may be useful to illustrate the key message.

Practitioners from different types of organisations working in different types of conflict settings implementing different type of projects identified shared a fundamental common concern: **How can we provide assistance in a conflict setting without exacerbating the conflict?**

Phase I: Case Studies (1994 - 1996)

15 case studies from 14 conflict zones; ranging from large international NGOs to small, local NGOs; dealing with different types of conflict, from “hot” war to post-conflict situations to situations of low-scale, but endemic social violence; asking the question in the context of relief and in the context of development.

→ Booklet: *Do No Harm* (called the “red and black” book)

Phase II: Feedback Workshops (1996 - 1997)

25 feedback workshops, held in the field and in organisation headquarters; over 100 organisations represented and over 400 practitioners tested the lessons of the booklet

→ Book: *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War* (called the “blue” book) with the final version of the Framework.

Phase III: Implementation (1997 - 2000)

12 organisations operating in conflict zones implemented the use of the Framework in project analysis, project design and redesign and project planning.

→ Book: *Options for Aid in Conflict* (called the “Options Book”)

Phase IV: Mainstreaming (Since 2001)

Many organisations are engaged in an ongoing process of learning through the dissemination of the Do No Harm principles and approach through workshops and wider implementation of the use of the Framework.

Optional Information⁵

Collaborative Learning, Second Cycle (2006-2012)

In 2006, DNH stepped back from mainstreaming and took up a new cycle of collaborative learning around the Framework and concepts of DNH. This began with a series of case studies looking at organisations and locations where DNH had been trained and used. The goal was to find out the current state of knowledge of DNH and if it had made any difference in the way assistance workers did their work.

The case studies were performed in a similar way to the cases of the previous learning cycle, with case writers visiting locations and interviewing a wide range of people from many organisations, as well as beneficiary and community representatives.

Feedback sessions were arranged to delve into the findings emerging from the case studies even before the full set of cases was complete. This change in the methodology was felt to provide an opportunity to explore some emerging lessons to two interesting ends. First, it gave additional, formal insight to issues that could be explored intentionally in subsequent cases. Second, it provided new lessons for practitioners to take up and test as quickly as possible.

⁵ This information was retrieved from the CDA Collaborative Learning Projects' website (<http://www.cdacollaborative.org/programs/do-no-harm/dnh-program-history/>). We have added it here as background information only as trainers may be asked whether there was any follow-up after the mainstreaming phase.

This cycle of case studies was not dedicated to learning something new. Rather, it was dedicated to learning about the use, both individual and organisational, of the previous learning. Therefore, the process' structure could provide good, evidence-based lessons to practitioners in an immediate fashion.

The case study process combined with real feedback sessions gave DNH an opportunity to engage in ongoing action research, where findings from early cases shaped what could be looked at in the later ones.

Consultations were again held to bring practitioners together to explore in more depth the emerging lessons and ideas.

The trainer might distribute the handout on the Background and History of the Local Capacities for Peace Project and Beyond (see Section V, Handouts).

The “Seven Lessons” of the Local Capacities for Peace Project

The „Seven Lessons“ may be introduced at the beginning of the workshop to already emphasise the main points of the workshop. At the same time the Seven Lessons highlight why a rigorous Do No Harm should be done while planning and designing a project.

The Seven Lessons

Following is a brief summary of the lessons learned through the Local Capacities for Peace Project and the later use of the Do No Harm approach and tool developed by the project.

Lesson # 1

When international actors engage in the context of a violent conflict, the activities become part of that context of conflict. Although organisations tend to be impartial in relation to the parties in a conflict, the actual effects of their activities are never neutral regarding whether conflict worsens or abates. In settings of violent conflict, experience has shown that project interventions can – and often do – reinforce, exacerbate and prolong violent conflict. However, experience has also shown that project interventions can also help to reduce intergroup divisions and support people's capacities to find peaceful options for solving problems.

Lesson # 2

Conflicts are characterised by two „realities“:

- **Dividers/Tensions:** Conflicts are always characterised by contradictions, divisions and tensions. This is, in fact, what we believe conflict to be. Conflict is not always violent. But there is a possibility of conflict escalating into violent confrontation. This is what we should be concerned about when planning an intervention of any kind.
- **Connectors or Local Capacities for Peace:** More surprising for most people and most important for agencies, conflicts are also characterised by a number of things that connect people even though they are divided about an issue. This is especially true of conflicts that occur within

societies, where people recently lived and worked (and worshipped) side-by-side; went to school together and, in some cases, intermarried.

Lesson # 3

When projects are implemented in the context of (violent) conflict, they inevitably affect both “realities” – the Dividers/Tensions and the Connectors/Local Capacities for Peace that exist in the context in various ways. What is delivered through a project and how it is being delivered either feeds into and worsens intergroup tensions and divisions – or it may reduce them. Similarly, project implementation may ignore or bypass existing connectors and local peace capacities and, thus, weaken and undermine them – or it may support them and thus reinforce the community’s capability to handle conflict in nonviolent ways.

Lesson #4

Resources transferred by agencies through their projects into areas where violent conflict is going on affect conflict in five predictable patterns. Practical use of Do No Harm since 2001 has confirmed these five patterns.

Lesson #5

At the same time project implementation also delivers “messages” as well as resources. How resources are provided, how staff interact with local people, how protection is arranged and the like – all of these project details convey messages that may either reinforce the modes of violent conflict or reduce them. All of these messages affect four dimensions of inter-group relationships: Respect, Accountability, Fairness and Transparency. Nine patterns of these "Implicit Ethical Messages" have been described so far.

Lesson # 6

It is never an entire project that causes certain positive or negative effects. It is the details of a programme or project that cause the effects.

Lesson # 7

There are always options! It has been found that there are always options to redesign those details of a project that have been found to cause unintended negative effects. Or – in the process of planning and designing a project – a rigorous context analysis and detailed scrutiny of the intended project may show that certain details may probably cause some negative effect and they can be redesigned before going into implementation.

“Seven Lessons” in a Nutshell

1. Project activities in a situation of violent conflict become part and parcel of that conflict.
2. The context of conflict is always characterised by two types of factors / two realities:
 - Dividers and Sources of Tension
 - Connectors and Local Capacities for Peace.
3. Project activities interact with both types of factors / both realities in a positive or in a negative way.
4. Transfer of Resources through projects constitutes one way by which projects affect conflict.
5. Implicit Ethical Messages are another set of mechanisms through which projects interact with conflict.
6. It is the details of a project which determine the project's effects on conflict.
7. Experience has shown that there are always options!

SECTION III – GENERAL METHODOLOGY

Facilitator's Role

I Gathering Facts

- Do not give answers, only ask questions
- Emphasise facts: What do we know?
- Speed: quantity generates quality! - do not look for consensus!
- Do not interpret or allow interpretation of facts before you have them
- Substantiate facts with evidence: How do you / we know?
- Disaggregate complexity! No easy answers! Challenge participants to “unpack”!
- No assumptions! Make the implicit explicit!

II Analysis of Facts

- Ask about relationships between facts: How is that related to...?
- Allow interpretation of facts and relationships - do not allow interpretation of abstractions!
- Substantiate relationships with evidence: How does that come about? How does that affect ...?
- Focus analysis on potential for change; discuss relevance and focus on relevance of facts for programming
- Do not be afraid to work with incomplete information! You will never have complete information.

III Generating Options

- No limitations! Tell participants: You are creative!
- Quantity generates quality! The more options you have generated, the more good options you will have.
- Be specific! The details make the differences. Disaggregate complex issues.
- Test options! Risks / rewards? Qui bono?

General

- Give people opportunity to speak in their own language, using their own terms
- You can plan your questions
- Draw on experience - yours and your colleagues / participants
- Acknowledge the experience in the room
- Everyone knows more than they think they do! Rigorous and systematic analysis brings out more information than one expects!
- Work systematically: brainstorm → categorise → check/verify → choose → decide
- Use all your tools - have your colleagues use theirs
- Accept “I don't know” - but commit to follow-up

Facilitating Small Group Work

Why Use Small Groups?

Small groups

- create a constructive environment for discussion
- allow everyone to speak
- increase the amount of participation by every participant
- allow a broader range of experience to be shared
- provide opportunities for participants to use their own language

Small Group Composition

Do not initiate a discussion about group composition! You can direct the participants into groups. Experience shows that people do appreciate guidance.

You can predetermine who will be in which group. Try not to put people who know each other into the same group. Unless the group is a working group.

Generally, four to six people make a small group. Four allows everyone to speak in a twenty minute session. However, you may not want to have too many groups. Three groups allow for a more thorough reporting process – no one falls asleep!

Sending the Participants into the Groups

Instructions for Small Group Work must include at least 4 elements:

1. What are we doing?

Be specific, make sure the task is appropriate to the time allotted; if the task involves going through a series of steps spell out these steps and propose time to be spent on each step

2. Why are we doing it?

Explain why this is being done and how it fits into the context.

3. How long will it take us?

Inform the groups about the exact time they have. If groups are supposed to work on different issues tell them how much time to spend on each task.

4. What results will we share with the group when we return to plenary?

Tell the groups what they are expected to report about and how they are expected to report.

While Participants are in Groups

Walk around to the groups early in the process to make sure they are on the right track. Walk around about mid-way through the time, but don't say anything unless necessary. Walk around with five minutes left to inform them of the time. Bring them back.

Group Reporting

There are many different ways of "reporting". Use them. However, there are some general issues to keep in mind:

- Remember your instructions to the groups! Follow them.

- Make sure every group has a chance to report.
- Keep control of time. Make sure all groups have same reporting time. Do not squeeze time for later groups! Keep tight time management when allowing discussion after each report.
- Summarise the major lessons at the end of the reporting. Acknowledge participants' work.

Different ways of reporting

- formal group reports
- role plays
- posters capturing major group findings, one person from each group explaining the poster(s).
- “exhibition”: posters are put up in different spaces, one person from each group stays to explain, participants move around to study posters, ask questions and discuss. Group members should take turns explaining “their” posters so that everyone has an opportunity to read the other groups’ posters. (This is a good technique especially if you have more than 5 groups and at the end of a long working day.)
- instead of individual group reports you can have a plenary discussion about the issues the groups worked on, opening the discussion of each issue by inviting one member from each group for a summary of the group’s discussions

Space for Small Groups

Prior to the workshop, make sure there is space for breaking into groups. Make sure there are materials (flipcharts, pens, white-boards, etc.) available in the break-out spaces.

Facilitating a Case Study Exercise

One of the key elements and methods of a Do No Harm Training is facilitating a case study exercise. First of all this method allows to demonstrate that the Do No Harm concept and tool were in fact derived from practitioners' experiences. This method also provides opportunities for participants to address a sensitive issue in a non-threatening way.

Why use a case study in a Do No Harm workshop?

- To engage participants in an active manner,
- to allow participants to discover for themselves → “eye opener” / “aha” moment,
- to allow participants to use their own experiences,
- to allow participants to follow their own learning speed.

Conditions for facilitating a case study

- The case study material has to be tailored to the learning objectives,
- it must contain all relevant information for the training purpose and avoid too much distracting detail but
- it must be realistic (“constructed” case material did not really work well).

How to teach a case study in the context of a Do No Harm workshop

- The facilitator only asks questions,
- s/he never provides additional information (that is not in the case study) and
- s/he never provides answers (rather challenges participants to search for answers themselves by asking follow-up questions),
- s/he documents participants' findings in a systematic way (→ board work!).

How to use small group work in facilitating a case study

- The facilitator may use small group work for participants to digest and discuss information (e.g. dividers and connectors) given by the case study before collecting and documenting findings in plenary;
- it is advised not to have small groups reporting back in writing about their findings as these are most probably not as specific enough (see lists of detailed aspect needed with regard to dividers and connectors in facilitation notes of each case study). Written presentations were to be corrected by the facilitator which would discourage participants.

9 Steps for Preparing to Teach a Case Study

1. Read the case study carefully!
2. Read the facilitation notes carefully as well!
3. Define your learning objective. Write it on a piece of paper.
4. Identify the facts in the case study you need to have on the board to bring home your message. Mark them!
5. Design a question plan! Write down the first set of questions that must trigger quick responses but also must build confidence of participants.

6. Read the case study!
7. Test your question plan.
8. Read the case study again. Memorise or note down the “must have” information.
9. Design/ prepare your board work/ visualisation

Types of questions used in a Do No Harm workshop

- seeking facts → quick, brainstorming type, collecting facts participants identified in the case study (e.g.: “Who is in conflict?” “Where is this happening?” “How many people affected?”)
- clarifying → question to encourage participants to elaborate a statement (e.g. “What exactly do you mean by...?”)
- affirming → questions to get an explicit affirmative – or correcting – feedback from participants whether the points noted on the board correctly reflect a participant's statement (e.g. “Does everyone agree that ...?” “What does the group think of ...?”)
- interpreting → questions to challenge participants to look for the interrelationship between several facts and to interpret the facts (e.g. [on the Tajikistan Case Study]: “We have found SCF is applying a needs-based approach. From what we have found where destruction has happened and how it has happened: what could be the effect of a strict needs-based approach in this project?”)
- analysing → slowing down; asking participants to “unpack” complex issues they have listed in the first part (e.g.: “How is land actually dividing people?” “How do we know this experience is relevant for people?”)

NOTE: When designing your question plan for the seeking facts questions make sure the information you are asking for is actually in the case study material handed out to participants.

Excerpt of a Question Plan: Case Study “Mediation Training in Townships, South Africa”

- 1) Questions for opening the case study exercise that are easy to answer
 - Where is the project of the Quaker Peace Centre taking place?
 - Who are the main groups living in this area?
 - What is the project all about?

- 2) Questions for gathering facts about key aspects that have not been mentioned yet (e.g. lack of trust in government institutions)
 - Which institutions are mentioned in the case study?
 - How do people feel about these institutions?
 - How did they feel about these during the Apartheid system?
 - What is the attitude of people in the townships towards these institutions today?

- 3) Questions for analysing abstract aspects that have been mentioned but too unspecific (e.g. religion and specifically partial correlation of religious and ethnic identities)
 - Which religious groups are mentioned?
 - What are the relations between these religious groups?
 - What do we know about the Muslims? Who are they, to which other groups do they often belong?

How to Lead Role Plays

by Peter Woodrow

[Training for Change](#)

Purpose of Roleplays

Roleplays are used to help examine real problems on the level of philosophy, emotional response, and physical response. Participants get a chance to analyse situations and try out different theories and tactics in a relatively safe setting. Roleplays also enable trainees to understand different people and their roles and to develop insights into the thoughts and feelings of "opponents." Through roleplays, participants can identify and anticipate possible problems and reveal fears and anxieties people have about an event or action. Roleplays develop group and individual confidence and competence.

Steps in a Roleplay

Select a situation: Either (a) use a scenario developed by the trainers, or (b) ask the participants to identify the problems they expect might occur or they fear will occur. If drawing scenarios from the group, one possible process is to ask participants to meet together in groups of three people for about five minutes to talk about the kinds of problem situations they think will come up.

"We are preparing for a rally next Sunday, so let's identify the difficulties we think might arise. Please group yourself in threes and talk about what might happen."

Call the participants back to the large group and ask someone from each group to call out situations "headline" style while you or a colleague write them up on newsprint. People might list (among other things):

- A drunk starts disturbing women
- A fight breaks out between two people
- The police tell us the rally has to break up
- Someone starts shouting/disrupting a speaker

Once you have a list of situations, you as trainer pick a situation to start with, usually a fairly simple scenario to get people warmed up and engaged. Save more complex or difficult problems until later in the session. Be sure to leave time to cover situations that were mentioned by several small groups.

Explain the situation: what groups/individuals are involved, what their roles are, what is the physical setting. If the scenario was drawn from the group, ask for the help of a participant who raised the situation to set the scene and players. Explain enough of background to make the situation clear, so roles will not be played solely from stereotypes.

Since a roleplay is used to learn how to handle a particular situation, it is usually best to define carefully either the situation or the role to the players, but not both. Leave room for creative response by the participants.

Cast roles: Ask for volunteers among participants. If no one comes forward, ask specific people to play roles. If possible, cast people in roles with which they do not identify strongly. Ask roleplayers to take fictitious names, whether they will be used or not. "Amy, you are going to play the role of

Jack, a peacekeeper. Tom, what name do you want to use for the heckler? OK, Joe it is."

Prepare the roleplayers: Allow a few minutes for people to get into their roles and to plan their strategy in the roleplay. Ask people to think about other aspects of the character they are playing (job, family, motivation...) to make the roles realistic. If the role is unfamiliar, the trainer can help. Limit the time for this, however, in order to keep things moving and make sure the roleplay is spontaneous. If the trainer wants to give special or secret instructions to a roleplayer, they can be given at this time:

(Quietly, to one person): "Malkia, you are supposedly an innocent bystander in this roleplay. However, when Jose starts yelling, I want you to go over and yell back at him and even begin to start a fight."

If groups of people must act together in the roleplay, give them time to develop their approach. In some cases it may be helpful to put one group in a separate room briefly.

Prepare the observers: Observation is as important as playing a role. Prepare observers by suggesting specific things they should watch for, such as the effects of different physical actions, words, gestures, tone, etc. Ask them not to say or do anything which might distract the roleplayers. If the roleplay causes emotional reactions in participants, ask them to share their feelings early in the debriefing. "For those of you who are observing, pay particular attention to what happens as a result of any physical contact. Are words effective? Which words and how they are said?"

Set the scene: You establish the scene, the physical layout and any other relevant details.

"OK, this is the street running this way. The speaker's platform is over here. The crowd is on this side. The speaker is already addressing the crowd."

Run the roleplay: Give a clear signal to begin the roleplay once the players are ready. Tell them from the start what signal you will use to stop the roleplay.

Cut the roleplay: Stop the roleplay when enough issues have been uncovered, or the action seems to come to an end, or when people want to stop. Keep the learning goals in mind when deciding. Stop the action if someone is about to get hurt, or the roleplay dissolves into laughter. If roleplayers didn't get "into" their roles, start again. If someone over-identifies with a role (indicated by showing great tension), stop and assist the person to step out of role.

Debrief: Debriefing allows people to examine what took place; it is essential for learning. *Set a tone of exploration rather than judgment*; draw the learnings from the participants rather than provide answers yourself.

Some trainers divide the evaluation into three sections:

- a) feelings, reactions, tensions;
- b) tactics, approaches, motivations/goals;
- c) general lessons or theoretical connections.

We recommend starting by asking the players how they felt in their roles. If practical, give each person a chance to speak.

"Malkia, how did it feel to be Barbara the heckler? What was going on in Barbara's mind? . . . Now Jose, how did you feel as Miguel the demonstrator who lost his cool?"

Emphasise *non-judgmental examination* of specific actions, not deciding what is the "right way." Always use the names of the characters, not the names of the participants during the debriefing.

"Let's look at what happened when Jack grabbed Joe's arm. What did you notice? How did Joe react?" Ask observers for their impressions after the players, then allow open discussion. Discourage negative evaluation of participants which tells them what they "should have done." Frame such suggestions as additional options (which can be used in a re-run of the roleplay, to explore how they might work). Emphasise that "mistakes" provide an excellent source for learning. Compliment people for acting boldly in difficult situations.

"Jack gave us a wonderful chance to look at the effects of different ways to intervene. How did he try to get Joe under control? "Right, first he took his arm by the elbow. How did Joe react? ... Then what did Jack try? He asked Joe how to get to the train station? What effect did that have? . . . Now let's think together what we might do in Jack's position. What are some options?"

As the discussion continues, draw out the learnings and summarise them. Be as specific as possible about potential alternative actions. Don't drag out the debriefing, but go on to a new roleplay or re-run the original scenario with different players trying some of the new options generated.

SECTION IV – FURTHER MATERIAL AND RESOURCES

Materials I

Patterns, Categories, Effects – Key Terms Used in Do No Harm Workshops

There are a few key words we use in the context of a Do No Harm workshop. Apart from the specific Do No Harm terminology introduced in the different sessions of the workshop (e.g. “Dividers”) there are some words which have a crucial meaning but are not specifically defined in the training material. We observed trainers using their own words for these which at times caused confusion among participants. Therefore, we propose to stick to a standard set of words.

Patterns

Across a wide range of different types of conflict situations many different organisations implementing different types of projects identified unintended negative effects of their work. The LCP project set out to investigate whether there are patterns that bring about such unintended negative effects. These were in fact identified. The two patterns were called Resource Transfers (RT) and Implicit Ethical Messages (IEM). Rather than using other words such as “mechanism” etc., we propose to stick to “patterns” when speaking about RT and IEM in general.

Categories

For analysing the two realities that constitute a context of conflict (“Dividers” and “Connectors”) in a systematic manner Do No Harm suggests a set of five categories each. The use of other terms (e.g. “dimensions” when speaking about the five categories in general) was observed as causing confusion as the material and particularly hand outs do not correspond.

Effects

The Do No Harm tool describes a set of five effects that are caused by Resource Transfer and seven effects caused by Implicit Ethical Messages. The use of “impact” for these effects has occasionally caused confusion as it may contrast the definition and use of “impact” in other planning, monitoring, evaluation or impact assessment tools.

Notes on Using the Framework and its Elements

The “Do No Harm” framework tool to analyse the effect of projects on the context of conflict emphasises the lessons learned by the Local Capacities for Peace Project.

The framework embodies three distinct ideas:

- “unpacking”
- identifying relationships
- analysing interactions

Unpacking

Unpacking Context

The framework prompts us to analyse the situation. In order to do that we first need to know the facts.

In the conflict situation, what are people doing? What are the things which divide people or

are sources of tension between them, and what are the things which connect them or potentially connect them?

You say something is a divider. How do you know? How does it divide people? Why is it important? What do you actually know about it?

You say something is a connector. How do you know? How does it connect people? Why is it important? What do you actually know about it?

What are people doing?

In order to assist you in your unpacking and to prompt you to think in depth, the Framework includes a series of categories. These categories were developed by practitioners for three purposes:

- they encourage brainstorming; if you consider these categories and what people are doing, you will not leave out something important;
- they help you to organise information and, perhaps, to identify relationships;
- they force disaggregation—if something fits in more than one category, you can unpack it.

[See also below: Disaggregate Complexity – or Using the Categories of DNH Context Analysis for Unpacking Complex Things]

Unpacking the Programme / Project

A programme consists of many decisions about details, answering questions about who will receive assistance, what kind of support will be appropriate, where it will be given, etc. Just as the d/ts and the cs have been unpacked in order to help you understand the conflict situation, you also need to unpack the project in order to understand the impact of the decisions on the conflict.

It is never a whole project or programme that brings about an unintended negative impact. It is a detail, one or several of the decisions that result in an unintended negative - or positive - effect on the conflict.

The questions in the Framework represent those usually asked (whether implicitly or explicitly) in an agency's project planning process. The questions in the Framework again serve the three purposes outlined above:

- encouraging brainstorming
- organisation of your information
- forcing disaggregation.

These questions should be asked and reasked many times until the project staff feel it is thoroughly unpacked. Trainers should not accept easy answers.

Identifying Relationships

Activities within the scope of projects or programmes always become part and parcel of the context in which they are implemented. Situations of conflict are always characterised by two “realities”. There are those things that divide people from each other and serve as sources of tension. There are also always elements which connect people and factors that enable people to handle problems and conflicts in constructive ways.

Project activities interact with these realities, which in the Do No Harm concept we have labeled “dividers/sources of tension” and “connectors or local capacities for peace (LCPs)”. Details of a project can exacerbate/ increase the dividers and tensions. Projects can lessen or weaken the connectors/LCPs. Assistance can likewise strengthen connectors and serve to lessen some of the dividers.

The fact that elements of projects or programmes interact with the context of conflict is important to consider. This simple and powerful message forces us to take responsibility and to ask ourselves, “What can we do? What are our options? How can we prevent negative interactions and reinforce positive ones?”

Analysing Interactions

The analysis of the project in the context of conflict requires identifying the relationships between the individual decisions of a project and the dividers/sources of tension and/or the connectors.

What is the interaction? Where do they interact? How do these things interact? What are the mechanisms by which these things affect each other?

An analytical process often does not serve up easy answers in a one-to-one correspondence. Often many elements are inter-related. Therefore, the Framework helps you to

- identify which are the most important
- identify the places in the process where you need more information
- identify the places where you need to do more unpacking.

Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages

Assistance is a transfer of resources, both material and non-material. Remember that some of the “material” resources are in fact immaterial, e.g. training. These are the direct mechanisms by which projects interact with the context in a situation of conflict.

In order to change the effects of a project or programme, we must understand:

- What is the effect?
- By which pattern is the project having that effect?
- Which decisions/ details of the project led to that effect?

Developing Alternative Programming Options

Experience has shown that there are always alternative ways of doing what our assistance is mandated to do. Knowing the patterns or mechanisms by which the various elements of our project or programme interact with the elements that constitute the context of conflict, causing either a negative or a positive effect, we can identify alternative ways of how to do what we are mandated to do, avoiding negative impact.

Developing alternative programming options involves three steps:

- generate as many options as possible—“quantity generates quality”! The more options you generate the more good options you will have!
- identify those options that can most likely be implemented
- test the options to verify that they will not at the same time have another negative impact

Disaggregate Complexity – or Using the Categories of DNH Context Analysis for Unpacking Complex Things

When asked to identify sources of tension / dividing factors or connectors / Local Capacities for Peace in a given situation, people will identify issues like religion, land, natural resources etc. Common language reinforces such perceptions as when people talk of „land conflict“, „religious conflict“ or „resource conflict“.

All of these – and many other factors – are complex things. In a rigorous DNH analysis they need to be further unpacked.

Let us look for example at “land” as a source of tension. If mentioned in a workshop the facilitator should first acknowledge the participant's observation but then dig deeper. S/he may trigger renewed thinking about the issue by simply asking: „What does land do in order to create division?“

This question will certainly irritate. The facilitator should be patient to allow participants to ponder the question. Soon, a participant will point to the fact that land itself does not do anything but people do something about land or people have a relationship to land. Following up on that observation the facilitator may ask what exactly people are doing in relation to land. Participants will respond e.g. that people cultivate land, they own land etc. This allows the facilitator to begin a systematic analysis. For example on “owning of land” s/he may ask: “What is necessary for people to own land?” Participants will offer several options (e.g. money, availability of land, someone willing to sell land etc. – all of which should be acknowledged) but eventually someone will mention a “concept of ownership” or an understanding within society of what “ownership” actually means (individual ownership, collective ownership, ownership of use of land rather than land etc.). The facilitator can now note:

System: an understanding in society of what ownership means. S/he may explain that such generally accepted understanding may be established by laws, constitutions or other legal frameworks (as in most European countries) or it may be encoded in traditional “systems of ownership”, notions of “heritage” etc. The point here is: no matter what form it takes in any given situation there is something that establishes a “common understanding” shared within society of what “ownership” means in respect to land.

The facilitator may move on to ask how such a common understanding is translated into day to day practice. Participants may offer various options again: e.g. registering ownership of land with a governmental authority (e.g. in Germany). Or having ownership approved by village committees, elders, having it demarcated on the ground with carved stones etc.

The facilitator may write on the board:

Institution: village committee, administrative authority, demarcation etc. While doing so s/he may note that these institutions safeguard that the common understanding of ownership of land is implemented in real life.

Step by step the facilitator may now lead participants to reflect how land shows up in all the categories of a Do No Harm context analysis. S/he may arrive at a table like this:

• System & • Institution	• Common understanding of ownership in respect to land; land-law; constitutional arrangements; ... • administrative authority; committees; demarcation; ...
• Attitudes & • Action	• Land as ancestral heritage; land as commercial commodity; land as an element of communal identity, • investing in land (e.g. labour to maintain fertility, ecological protection); using what grows on land (e.g. pasture); exploiting what is under the land (e.g. natural resources); ...
• Values & • Interests	• notion of ancestral heritage; essential requirement for survival; tilling the soil as a source of identity; ... • use land for pasture; use land for agricultural production; use land for capital investment; exploit natural resources under the land;
• (Different or Shared) Experiences	• experience of collective effort to maintain land (e.g. ecological protection); experience of shared collective labour during harvesting or planting seasons; ... • experience of collective struggle to protect land from external influences (e.g. corporate interests) • experience of enforced dislocation (because of natural calamity or of human interventions); experiences of resettlement,
• Symbols & • Occasions	• Fencing (e.g. in many parts of Germany); ... • harvesting festivals; communally organised labour for planting; ...

Taking participants through a rigorous analysis using the DNH categories will reveal that people often share many elements of a complex factor like “land” while some elements may be sources of tension or may be creating divisions within the society. Thereby, the actual source of tension will become much clearer.

With such a detailed analysis, the sources of tensions and local capacities for peace are unpacked and thus the planning and later assessing of the effects of a project will be easier. Also, options of what can be done to reduce a division or source of tension will become more specific and practical.

Applying the Framework

I. Gathering the facts

analyse the context of conflict:

- dividers, sources of tension, capacities for violence
- connectors, local capacities for peace
- unpack the project, list the details of the project

II. Analysing the facts

analyse the project's effects on the context of conflict through

- Resource Transfers
- Implicit Ethical Messages

III. Programming Alternatives

- Generate options for alternative ways of implementing the project
 - remember: quantity generates quality! The more options you have generated the higher the probability of finding a “good” option.
- test the options: verify they do not at the same time have other negative impacts
- choose options for redesign

(See also The “Conceptual Map” of Do No Harm in Section V, Handouts.)

Material II

Vignettes: Examples from the Field

Examples of Connectors

The man who ran a tea shop in the market on the outskirts of Sarajevo was interviewed. “This market continued throughout the war,” he said. “Oh yes, I’ll sit and sip tea with ‘them’ in the daytime, and take their money, but I may go out tonight to shoot them.”

I stood on the border of southern Tajikistan and Afghanistan and saw overhead an enormous and complex grid of electrical wires. All around me were large craters in the ground, created when shells fell during the recent fighting. I asked how they had rebuilt the electricity so quickly.

“The electricity was never destroyed,” they responded.

I laughed. “So, the aim was not so good,” I joked, thinking that the shells had simply failed to reach their true target.”

“Oh no,” they said, “we never intended to destroy the electricity. We agreed that we all needed it.”

Later, when I drove from Split along the road to Sarajevo, I saw a destroyed village—completely burned out—and overhead the wires for electricity. Not mentioning my Tajikistan experience, I asked the same question about how they had rebuilt it so soon. The answer I got was the same. “No, we never destroyed it; we agreed that we all needed the electricity.”

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the earliest effective ways that agencies supported re-connection among people separated by ethnicity within towns and cities was to support small orchestra’s, choirs, academic journals and youth clubs. Musicians, academics, young people were eager to resume “normal” activities and to re-engage in areas where they had special interests and talents. They were ready to re-form associations around these common efforts with people who only recently had been “the enemy.”

In Afghanistan, a young man on a bicycle hit a child. The young man was from one clan; the child from another. In the mood of antagonism and reprisal that permeated the countryside, fighters from the two sides gathered on roof tops, armed and ready to fight. People on the streets and in the market below quietly moved into the space between the two assembling groups. They stood and waited. The fighters did not want to kill their neighbours. The stand-off allowed enough time for someone to get the clan leaders together; they found another way to settle the dispute over the injured child.

In Somalia, a young man tells of a time when two clans began to fight. He and his friends who did not want to take part in this battle, who saw it as meaningless, simply “walked”—that is, they announced their “membership” in yet a third clan that was not at war with either of the others. The young man said they were able to make this shift because, over the years, there had been so many inter-marriages, people actually “belong” to a number of different clans. It was okay to change to avoid a foolish fight.

In Somalia, during the height of the war, a number of villages unilaterally decided they did not want to participate. It was not their battle. So, they defined their boundaries as an area without

war, a “pocket of peace.” If people came into these areas trying to recruit young men to fight, the community would expel them. In one case, we heard that the community arrested the war recruiters, put them on trial, and executed them for violating the local laws.

In Bosnia a few men sat together one night in the early days of the war. The conversation turned to the war, and they found they agreed that they could not support the ethnic division that their leaders preached. They started a “Citizens Forum” that night in the living room of one home, and called a public meeting to see if anyone else felt as they did. Over 2000 people came to that first meeting! The membership grew in just over a year to over 15,000 people.

In Sarajevo, a Muslim woman told the interviewers: “When the shelling started, my Serb neighbour and I would check on each other’s children. If she was away, I would take her child to the shelter with me. When I was gone, I knew she would take my son and daughter with her. We had been friends before. We couldn’t let the fighting end it.”

In Afghanistan, two factions were gathering in a village face-off. The mullah took out his bullhorn and ran into the street. He shouted that no one would come to the funerals of anyone who died in this battle and that they would not die as martyrs. Everyone knew what his admonition meant—namely, that those who died in this battle would not go to Paradise. The battle did not occur.

In Southern Sudan, as a European agency was about to launch a new programme in health training, the southern Movement split into two factions. The agency immediately assumed that in order to be effective, it should redesign its programme to include two health training centres, one in each of the factions’ regions.

Reflecting on this later, one of the agency staff members noted, “We rewarded the split! They got twice as many resources. And, because we know that health is the one sector where international agencies have consistently been allowed to operate across lines, I believe that we did not have to do this. I wonder what would have happened if we had continued with our original plan of one centre. I suspect we would have recruited from both sides and that this could have represented one place in the society where they could have legitimately met and worked together.”

He then went on to think about how to alter the impact of his agency’s assistance. He began to develop plans to redesign each of the two training centres. One, he thought, should focus on training public health nurses and the other on training rural paramedics. By offering two distinct training programmes, one in each location, he hoped to use his agency’s aid to help bring people from both sides together as trainees.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, convoy drivers whose job it was to deliver goods under dangerous circumstances report that they often kept in touch with drivers on “the other side.” They were able to talk via their radio systems and they developed a kind of “brotherhood” in which they shared information about road conditions, impending danger, etc.

When the war ended, some of these drivers sought out their counterparts from the other side. They wanted to meet face to face with these individuals who had become colleagues through the worst period of the war. Though their ethnicity might have made them enemies, their common experience—and the help they gave to each other—overcame divisions and created new connections.

In Beirut, during the heaviest fighting, all schools were closed and children spent hours in bomb shelters with their families. UNICEF was concerned both by the loss of schooling over many months and, also, by the psychological stress they knew these children were experiencing. One staff person got the idea of starting a children's educational magazine. Naming it "SAWA" which in Arabic means "together," she and her colleagues began to print and distribute a booklet of stories, math problems, geography and history to children all across Lebanon. They left the two centre pages of the magazine blank and invited children to use these to draw a picture or write a story or poem of their own to share with other children. They were soon inundated with many contributions which they printed in subsequent editions.

Through this publication which reached all children, as well as through summer camps where parents from all sides sent their children as an "escape" from the war, UNICEF both built on the common experience of all Lebanese families and provided a new connection through SAWA and the summer camps.

Prior to the war, there were local non-governmental organisations operating in Sarajevo. Included were Serb, Muslim, Catholic and Jewish agencies. While these had been started by different groups and served members of their own communities, they also met regularly and, often, any one of the agencies would offer services to anyone living in the part of the city where they operated rather than only according to ethnicity or religion.

When the war erupted, these agencies provided critical emergency assistance to war victims. International NGOs, wanting to remain "non-partisan" in relation to the conflict, quickly identified these NGOs as partners and recipients of their funds. However, to demonstrate their even-handedness, some external NGOs designated the funds that they channeled through each local agency as specifically targeted for the ethnicity identified with that agency--i.e. they gave to the Serb NGO for Serbs, to the Muslim NGO for Bosnians, to the Catholic NGO for Croatians.

Some of the local NGO leaders later commented that, while the external agencies did not create the divisions of the war, this way of targeting assistance did reinforce divisions. They wondered aloud: had the external NGOs given funds to the group of agencies so that they had to decide together how to allocate them, might this have reinforced and strengthened joint decision-making and a common concern for suffering?

Illustrating the Fact That There Are Always Programming Options to Avoid Doing Harm

Theft as one form of Deviation/ Misuse

“Not Worth the Effort”

In Somalia, the Red Cross distributed blankets to families. Theft was common as blankets were scarce and profits could be made. Agency staff began to cut each blanket in half. Families could easily sew their blankets back together for use. Resale value dropped.

In other situations, agencies have ceased delivery of high priced grains and substituted sorghum or other less valuable but equally nourishing products. The food sustains recipients' health but, because resale is not lucrative, there is no incentive for theft.

Making Theft Inconvenient

An aid worker who has supervised many deliveries of grain and cooking oil to war victims reports that, when shipments arrive, he routinely punches a hole with his knife in each bag of grain and removes the lids from the oil cans. Individual families can carry a bag of grain carefully, holding the hole closed to prevent spillage. They can stuff a bit of straw into the opening of an oil can so it does not leak out.

But, when thieves load cut bags into the back of their trucks, most of the grain is lost as the bags bounce around. Oil cans piled in a truck slosh and spill and, finally, begin to slip and slide. The weight of shifting oil cans has sometimes caused trucks to tip over so everything is lost!

Secrecy/Dispersal

In Cambodia, one agency needed to bring large amounts of cash to an outlying field site to pay local staff. When the cargo plane carrying bags of cash arrived at the airport, numerous small vehicles met it. One bag was loaded into the trunk of a passenger car and the driver drove away. Two bags were tossed in the back of a truck, and it took off. A jeep took two; a cart was loaded with one. Each of these carriers took a different route to the office where the comptroller paid staff salaries as the money arrived. It was too much work for thieves to locate and stop so many vehicles; if they got one or two, the losses to the project were minimal. Gains to the thieves were not worth the effort.

Dispersal in a Hurry

In Tajikistan, UNHCR imported housing materials for communities to rebuild war-damaged homes. These materials were in great demand. Armed gangs who roamed the countryside in the period of post-war insecurity stole anything of value. Field staff knew that theft usually occurred at night and that a few watchmen would be powerless against the gangs. They organised the massive and immediate distribution of the materials, on the day that they arrived by train, ensuring that they were in the hands of the recipient communities by nightfall. They hired sufficient staff and vehicles to make this possible. Once in the hands of communities, the building supplies were well protected. Dispersal of goods and putting them in the hands of those who would use them took away the ready opportunity for thieves to steal and heightened community ability to hold thieves accountable.

Identifying Thieves

In a West African country, one agency worked with women on public health issues. As part of this programme, they distributed inexpensive radios to village women so they could tune in to a weekly series of programmes designed to focus on rebuilding the civil society. Soon, all these radios were stolen. So, the agency staff thought again. They reissued radios--this time painted a bright pink. Any man seen with a pink radio was immediately accosted by others and challenged. No one could get away with stealing these radios.

Civilian Protectors

In Chechnya, aid convoys were robbed en route between communities. Drivers were always told not to pick up hitch-hikers. However, some began to realise that if they offered a ride to an elderly man of one or another of the local communities, and sat him prominently in the front seat of the truck, thefts stopped. This was because any action taken against a vehicle in which a respected elder of one group was riding would be considered a hostile act by his clan. Reprisals would follow. The theft of goods provided by humanitarian and development assistance would be associated with disruption of inter-tribal relations, and these were closely guarded and controlled by elder councils. The “costs” of theft thus became too high to make it worthwhile.

Glut the Market

In Afghanistan, a WFP staff person told of distributing seeds within the volatile circumstances of local, inter-group fighting. During the first year it was possible for one group to control the seeds but after that first year, because farmers will propagate, sell and trade seeds, seed value fell and everyone had access.

In other circumstances, agencies have imported enough goods to glut the market. The resale value to thieves becomes nil. A caution: these goods must not be in competition with locally produced goods or they will undermine local production and increase dependency on outside assistance. This strategy should only be used when goods cannot also be produced in the recipient site.

Publicity / Accountability

In Somalia, one agency planned and negotiated their programme in the market square on market days. Here everyone could hear and be a part of the discussions. Offering to provide funds to rebuild destroyed community buildings, this agency’s staff announced exactly how much money was available to each community. Crowds who gathered in the market interacted about what they needed, debated community priorities and, with much discussion, agreed on what should happen and how much it should cost. When a local carpenter or roofer would be asked to give an estimate for his work on a project, he often would see this as an opportunity to make profits from humanitarian assistance. Hearing his price, his neighbours would hoot and laugh. “No! That’s too high. You built another building just last month for a lot less.” Public scrutiny reduced opportunism and ensured fair valuation of work. It also ensured the completion and quality of the work. When time came to pay the workers, the agency again did so in full view of the entire community in the public market where original negotiations had been carried out.

Examples of How Project Activities Can Reduce Inter-group Tensions

In post-war Cambodia, when refugees returned from the Thai camps to villages where resources were already severely strained, everyone knew that tensions would be high between returnees and local people who had stayed in Cambodia during the war. As UNHCR initiated its programme of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) through which it provided funds to villages to facilitate the absorption of returnees, someone suggested that they add a component to address potential tensions between groups. As they provided funds for digging wells, clearing land or rebuilding community structures, they could give priority to applications from villages where returnees and “stayees” came forward together with a proposal that they had jointly developed.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, an NGO that delivered assistance to Gorazda had to pass through the Republic of Srypska to reach the distribution area. Each time a convoy drove this route, Serb villagers threw stones at the trucks. Agency staff understood the anger of the groups that were by-passed even though their need for outside humanitarian and development assistance was minimal. They went to meet leaders in the by-passed villages and negotiated to buy the goods that were needed in Gorazde from these villages if they could supply them. When convoys began carrying locally produced goods to the people on “the other side,” they met no resistance. The external agency was able to arrange trade between those who could supply goods and those who needed them that, because of war-induced divisions, they could not arrange for themselves. Everyone benefited.

In Lebanon when the war ended, both government and humanitarian and development assistance agencies were letting contracts to local engineering and construction firms to carry out massive rebuilding of war-damaged areas. However, these companies were very often owned and run by families aligned directly with one or another faction that had been at war. In the post-war period, every contract became a focus for inter-factional competition. Some people suggested a way to avoid this. Could the agencies stipulate that preference would go to contractors who demonstrated that, within their work force, they had hired people from different factional groups to work together?

In Tajikistan, after the war ended in Khatlon Province and Kulyabi and Garimi villages were returning to normal, international NGOs were eager to help them establish enterprises that could replace the jobs and income they lost when the cotton industry collapsed. Realising that the two groups had just gone through the damaging experience of civil war, some NGOs assumed that they would not be ready to work with each other in common enterprises. These NGOs developed strategies for helping each of the mono-ethnic villages become economically self-reliant.

Recognising that Garimis and Kulyabis had for many years worked side-by-side on the State Farms, one NGO designed its assistance programme to reemphasise this history of economic interaction and interdependence. In a Garimi village, they supported development of a wool-production enterprise and in a nearby Kulyabi village, they supported traditional rug-weaving. Though the two groups did not work in the same space, they readily agreed that the wool producers would supply raw materials for the rug producers. Each enterprise depended on the success of the other for its own success.

Examples of How Humanitarian and Development Assistance Can Worsen Inter-group Tensions**Targeting and the distribution effect**

When fleeing Hutu communities fled into eastern Zaire from Rwanda after their militias committed genocide against their Tutsi and moderate Hutu neighbours, they arrived in a starkly inhospitable landscape where survival was improbable. The international community responded with humanitarian assistance to avoid the catastrophe of cholera, hunger and death that surely would have ensued. Very little assistance went into Rwanda where those who had survived the genocide were also at risk because of war-induced damage, food shortages and psychological trauma.

The fact that international assistance was directed more toward those who had committed genocide and the communities who accompanied them in flight than toward the people who had suffered from the genocide continues to disturb Rwandans and assistance workers alike.

In subsequent months, agencies tried to correct this bias by focusing assistance inside Rwanda on “genocide survivors.” Some Rwandans have again challenged this targeting. They note that every label emphasises differences (and results in differential benefits from assistance) rather than commonness. They propose that assistance be “community-based,” available to everyone living in a given area where needs are shared among different groups.

The market effect

Effects of assistance projects on profits and wages can also reinforce inter-group tensions. Ownership of the assets that assistance needs is often differentially distributed among local groups. Thus, the profits to be gained from assistance are also unevenly distributed. When agencies hire local people who can speak the foreign language of the agency, these benefits can be biased because foreign language ability (and other skills needed by agencies) is often related to educational access that is, in turn, correlated to patterns of privilege and discrimination. Uneven benefits from assistance, if realised according to sub-group identities, can exacerbate and feed tensions between groups.

Examples of Alternative Strategies

In Liberia, one agency field director had to deal with a particularly unsavoury commander. Instead of avoiding him or demanding his compliance with humanitarian assistance terms, this field director made an appointment and took a quiet, explanatory tone, talking about why humanitarian assistance matters and his own and his agency's commitment to help suffering people. He sought "permission" to work in the area and it was granted. He asked for regular appointments with the commander "so we can keep you abreast of what we are doing," and the commander agreed. Over the weeks, as they spoke, this commander--once thought to be only a thug--began to ask questions about people's needs. "How do you know that malnutrition is a problem? How do you know what the people want?" As the staff explained their methods of working with people, this commander who had previously only had an interest in control through arms, began to accept responsibility for civilian welfare. He ultimately went to the villages with the agency's director to "see for himself" and he began to adopt better policies.

In Nicaragua, in the 1980s, agency staff were often under threat for supporting "subversive" activities of the "rebels" because they worked with poor rural people. Too often locally hired employees would be "disappeared" by the army as a method of intimidating people engaged in grass-roots work. When the Assistant Director of one agency was arrested in the market place one Saturday morning and never heard from again, the agency's expatriate Field Director was deeply saddened. His first tendency was to do what other agencies had done, namely to assume an even lower-profile in order to escape the notice of the authorities.

Upon reflection, however, he decided to try a strikingly different strategy. He developed what he called "a light and sound show" of his agency's work. He put together a slide show and speech which he presented "wherever someone would listen to me." He spoke to Kiwanis and Rotary Clubs and to church groups. Pursuing a strategy of transparency, he took his presentation to the regional army headquarters and spoke with the commanders in charge of "anti-rebel" activities in the area.

Over time, he found that even hardened fighters began to see the validity of his agency's work with peasants and, more telling, no member of his staff was ever threatened again.

In Tajikistan, the government in Dushanbe adopted post-war policies prejudicial to the area of Khatlon Province where much of the fighting had occurred. They defended these policies by citing information about the situation in the Province which the agencies working there knew was simply wrong. The Director of a lead agency approached the Ministers who met weekly and invited some of them to accompany him to Khatlon. One agreed, and when he saw for himself how misinformed the policies had been, he instigated significant changes which benefitted people in the hinterland.

An assistance worker recounted how hard he and his fellow staff worked in an emergency situation. He remembered the stress they felt from constant pressures of jobs to be done. When he returned home and had his film developed, however, he noted how many pictures depicted scenes where he and his colleagues were enjoying a large meal together, leaning on their cars drinking beer, lounging with food or drink under a tree. He was both amused and amazed. He concluded that the atmosphere of constant pressure was, in part, a mind set rather than a full reality. He declared that he would never again claim that there was "no time" to think, discuss,

plan and consider options.

The Taliban arrived in Herat and issued a ruling that women could no longer work in the public sphere. This affected all the Afghan women who had been hired by NGOs to work with other women in the society.

A former Mujahadeen who worked with one of the international NGOs that had an active programme in Herat was worried. He knew that because men cannot work directly with women, the Taliban ruling seriously threatened his agency's women's programmes. So, he decided to go visit the Taliban headquarters to discuss the issue.

"I went over one night," he reports, "and we sat and drank tea and talked for a long time. I explained why it is so important for our women staff to continue to work. But, when I finished, the Taliban commander said 'no.'"

He smiled as he recounted the story. "I went home discouraged but, then, I realised that I must not have explained the issues well enough. I know those guys are smart, and I know they care about their mothers and wives and daughters. So I went back again."

He reports that he "failed to explain it well enough" on four other occasions, but finally, when he tried the fifth time, the Taliban commander "understood and agreed."

Whose fault is it if agency staff do not get their ideas across to warriors? How many times should they try?

A young and inexperienced worker was heading off to Somalia when things were still quite insecure in many parts of the country. He telephoned his father to say goodbye and, in the conversation, asked if he had any advice. His father replied, "Just keep smiling."

This was, he says, "the most important advice he received." Many times, approaching a hostile-looking group of frightened soldiers at a road block, he remembered his father's words and assumed a posture of friendly openness. He said this not only made him feel better and more confident, but it also seemed to evoke calmer and sometimes friendly response. He used this advice again when his agency sent him to begin programmes in Rwanda while the genocide was still underway. "I actually found that people responded," he says. "They seemed surprised, and relieved, that I would act as if I trusted them."

In a feedback workshop of the LCP project in Sarajevo, one aid worker suddenly looked up with a rueful smile.

"Every time I am relaxing with my local staff," she said, "I ask them to tell me about their war experiences. The more horrible the story, the more riveted is my attention. I commiserate and, over our beer, together we re-live the horrors of the war.

She continued, "What if I asked them instead to tell me about their relationships with the 'other side' before the war? What if we spent more time talking about people they like and trust from the other side? What if we dealt with how they would like their future to be?

"I just realised that am reinforcing their negative experiences and attitudes by my questions! I seem more interested in how bad things are than in how to improve them. What kind of example am I setting?"

Material III

“Indications” for Assessing Aid's Impacts on Conflict

by Mary B. Anderson

[January 1999](#)

In the Implementation Phase of its work, the Local Capacities for Peace Project (LCPP) collaborated with a number of international NGOs that were undertaking a new, or had an ongoing, programme in an area where there was also some level of intergroup conflict. The two-part purpose of this collaboration was to

- 1) apply and integrate the lessons learned through the project in the actual implementation of aid programmes and
- 2) demonstrate that these lessons are both useful and usable and that, when used, they make a positive difference in the impacts of aid vis-à-vis the conflict.

In this collaboration, we were concerned to discover whether the effort to integrate the lessons of LCP-P has a positive effect. Therefore, we needed to identify clear and consistent ways to understand aid's impacts on conflict.

We first thought of developing a list of “indicators” of impacts. However, we quickly changed our approach to adopt, instead, the terminology of “indications” of impact. There were two reasons for this. First, because “indicators” is a term commonly used to refer to scientific precision, we knew that, in the context of aid in conflict, we did not want to mislead our colleagues into believing in—or even seeking—such “proof” of the single, identifiable source of causation. Second we found that, while it is extremely challenging to imagine how to trace cause and effect of aid and conflict in a theoretical framework, when we are actually in a given field location, the ways that aid and conflict interact can be fairly clearly observed. It was the latter reality that we want to highlight and observe.

As Mary Anderson's **Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War** (Lynne Rienner, 1999) notes:

For workers in humanitarian or development assistance, it is important to recognize both the limits and the power of their roles. This is especially important in (conflict settings).

Some things happen in conflict settings that bear no relation to aid and on which aid have no effect. Even if aid workers applied all the lessons of past experience and carried out “perfect” aid, wars would still happen...

(T)here are also things that happen in conflict settings to which aid is connected and on which it has an effect. These events would happen whether aid existed or not, but because aid is in the context where they occur, it has an impact on them...

Finally... (there are) events that aid, itself, causes to happen.

As we increase our understanding of the indications that LCPP lessons are helping (or not helping), it is critical that we remember to focus on the second and third types of events and, particularly, on the third type where aid has its greatest impact.

Relying on the Categories of Negative Impacts of Aid found through LCPP, we are able to identify the following indications of whether aid is having a negative (worsening) impact on conflict. The following questions constitute the

Indications of Negative Impacts

[A “yes” answer indicates a negative impact]

- Are aid goods stolen, especially by those connected directly to a warring side?
- What are the market impacts of aid in the given area?
Specifically:
 - Are prices of goods connected to the war economy rising?
 - Are incentives for engaging in the war economy rising?
 - Are prices of goods connected to the peacetime economy falling?
 - Are incentives for engaging in peacetime economic activities falling?
- Is aid provided in ways that benefit one (some) sub-group(s) over others? Does the aid agency employ people more from one group than others? Do material goods go more to one group than others?
- Is aid providing a sufficiently significant amount of material to meet civilian needs that:
 - More local goods are freed up to be used in warfare/by armies?
 - Local leaders take little or no responsibility for civilian welfare? [What are the manifestations of this?]
- Is aid being given in ways that “legitimize” war-related individuals (giving them more power, prestige or access to international attention or wealth)? Is aid being given in ways that legitimize the actions of war (for e.g. reinforcing patterns of population movements that warriors are causing; linking to divisions in the society thus reinforcing them)? Is aid being given in ways that legitimize war-supporting attitudes (for e.g. rewarding those who are most violent; being given separately to all groups in assumption that they cannot work together)?
- Does the aid agency rely on arms to protect its goods and/or workers?
- Does the aid agency refuse to cooperate or share information and planning functions with other aid agencies, local government or local NGOs? Does it openly criticize the ways that others provide aid and encourage local people to avoid working with other agencies?
- Do field staff separate themselves from the local people with whom they are working and do they frequently use aid goods, or the power they derive from them, for their personal benefit or pleasure?
- Does the aid agency apportion its institutional benefits (salaries or per diem scales; equipment such as cars, phones, offices; expectations of time commitments to the job; rewards for work done; vacation, R & R, evacuation plans) in ways that favour one identifiable group of workers more than others?
- Do the aid staff express discouragement and powerlessness in relation to their staff superiors, home offices or donors? Do they express disrespect for these people but often cite them as the reason why something is “impossible”?
- Are aid staff frightened and tense? Do they express hatred, mistrust, or suspicion for local people (any of the local people)? Do they frequently engage their local staff counterparts in

conversation about violence, war experiences, the terrible things they have experienced (thus reinforcing the sense that these are the things that matter)? Does the agency promote or in other ways exceptionally reward staff members who have served in more violent places/situations?

- Does the aid agency's publicity and/or fund-raising approach demonize one side of the war? Does it treat one group as always “victimized” by the other?

In addition to deciding if an aid agency's programme deserves a “yes” answer to the above questions, people involved in projects must also assess the degree to which any of these actions, attitudes or situations actually matters in the given context. The question to ask in this regard is:

Does it directly relate to events that are effected by or caused by aid?

Note: *If the answers to these questions are consistently “no” and, furthermore, rather than doing the things described in the questions, the agency and its staff are actively pursuing alternative approaches, it is important also to assess the significance of this in relation to the conflict. Is the alternative approach recognized and commented upon by community leaders or large numbers of local people with appreciation? Are incidences of violence between groups or of lawlessness among warriors dropping? Can any of this be attributed to a change in climate to which the aid agency's approaches have contributed?*

Again, following what LCPP has learned about connectors and local capacities for peace, the following represent the questions that reflect the

Indications of Positive Impacts of Aid on Conflict

(i.e. lessening tensions and/or supporting local capacities for peace):

- Has the aid agency actively sought to identify things in the conflict area that cross the boundaries and connect people on different sides? Has it designed its programme to relate to these connectors?
- Is the aid delivered in ways that reinforce a local sense of inclusiveness and intergroup fairness? Are programmes designed to bring people together? Are they designed so that for any group to gain, all groups must gain?
- Is the aid delivered in ways that reinforce, rather than undermining, attitudes of acceptance, understanding and empathy between groups?
- Is the aid delivered in ways that provide opportunities for people to act and speak in non-war ways? Does the agency provide opportunities for its local staff to cross lines and work with people from the “other” side?
- Does the aid respect and reinforce local leaders as they take on responsibility for civilian governance? Does it provide rewards for individuals, groups and communities that take inter-group or peace-reinforcing initiatives?
- Do aid agency staff reinforce the attitudes of their friends and counterparts as they remember, or reassert, sympathy and respect for other groups?

Again, in addition to answering these questions with a “yes,” those involved in projects must try to

assess the significance of these actions in relation to the conflict, or its mitigation. The Local Capacities for Peace Project, as a whole, continues to be engaged in refining ways to make this assessment in different settings and circumstances.



Donors and Do No Harm

[Issue Paper, March 2012](#)

Donor organizations are a major driving force for Do No Harm. They help spread the tool by offering training. They help sustain DNH use in organizations by establishing requirements and mandating reporting against DNH. Donors are responsible for much of the current DNH use throughout the world. However, there are limitations to their influence. In the Reflective Case Studies, we have seen that offering training and creating requirements is not enough to sustain DNH use in most cases. More support of varying types is necessary to sustain DNH use, which donors are often not equipped to give. Typically, donor support for a tool means ensuring that their partners report on its use. Donors provide funding to introduce a tool, but not funding for follow-up, continuing education or changing the way organizations work. In addition, we have seen that donor interest in promoting any tool rises and falls over time. During periods where the interest in DNH is low, or the agenda has shifted, many practitioners lose their capacity for DNH.

Throughout this paper, we use the term “donor” to indicate an organization which funds another. We use this term because it is the language that people use when describing their relationships with funders, be they the aid delivery structure of a government or an INGO. One person in Sri Lanka described the relationship this way, “Governments and INGOs want to be able to say they have ‘partners.’ Smaller organizations want to be funded. When you look at a larger organization you see a donor, when you look at a smaller one, you see a partner.”

The relationship between donors and their partners has complex dynamics. It can be a top-down, donor-beneficiary relationship, or a mutual learning partnership. People are careful to point out that organizations bear some responsibility for the nature of this relationship. NGOs can push their donors to do more than provide funds. One person said, “Some people are happy with a donor-implementer relationship, and some are trying to get more of a partnership. The partners are getting more and asking more of their donors.”

1. A Strength of Donors: Introducing Do No Harm

Donors have tremendous influence on their beneficiaries. They generally wield this influence by establishing requirements for the use of certain tools or the application of themes. From the DNH Reflective Cases, we have seen donors introduce DNH to their partners in a couple of different ways:

A. Making it a requirement

Most donors approach DNH or the idea of conflict sensitivity in general as a programmatic requirement for their partners in the terms of their funding agreements. Donor requirements for DNH vary. Some donors require a DNH analysis as part of the proposal, others require staff to undergo training prior to the start of the project. Sometimes donors only require that staff include DNH in their final reports. These requirements are often accompanied by offers of training.

Many donors have taken on and adapted DNH into their own policies and training materials. CARE

Nepal staff and partners, for example, were exposed to Safe and Effective Development in Conflict (SEDC), an adaptation of DNH, because it was a requirement of the project donor, DFID. SDC has adapted DNH into their Conflict Sensitive Programme (CPSM) Management Training. They offer CPSM training to their country staff as well as key partners.

In Nepal, the British Council required their field offices to hold a weekly meeting to discuss the ongoing conflict. British Council staff were stationed throughout the country and at the end of each meeting, they sent a report to the Kathmandu office. Kathmandu would compile the regional analyses and distribute them. As a result, the British Council was able to monitor subtle changes in the conflict in one region that could have an impact on others. This analysis and understanding allowed them to be much more responsive to changes in the conflict than many other organizations operating in Nepal.

B. Making it available

In other cases, rather than mandate that partners use a particular tool or methodology, donors will make a variety of tools and services available to their partners. This was the strategy of EED in Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. “EED offers its partners training and follow-up to generate local ownership of the tools and to foster ‘indigenous knowledge sharing.’ EED has not deliberately pulled out DNH as something to fund separate from the project.”

To make the tool available to their partners in Sudan and Ethiopia, EED established an organizational home for DNH in Kenya, Local Capacities for Peace Project in the Horn of Africa (LCP-P). This organization was established with the intent of making DNH training and support available for all EED partners in the Horn of Africa. In addition to training, LCP-P brought partners together for regular consultations and offered other DNH support services. EED also supports various Local Support Services (LSS) that provide training (monitoring and evaluation, participatory methodologies) and technical support (help with report writing, understanding financial documentation practices) to their partners. The LSS organizations are supported by EED and partners have access to their training at low or no cost.

2. A Weakness of Donors: Sustaining DNH Use

Practitioners don’t keep DNH because of donors. They can get it because donors push for it, fund it or require it and they can lose it because of changes to donor agendas or removal of funding, but evidence from the Reflective Cases shows that they sustain DNH because of internal factors. Many people sustain DNH because they find it useful, that is, they see a difference in their impacts. Others keep it because their organization offers a great deal of direct support or incentive to do so. Donors are not ideally placed to offer this type of intensive support to practitioners.

Donor expectations provide a substantial motivation for learning and using new tools up to a point. International aid organizations hold themselves accountable to their donors. They apply to donors for funding and report on the use of donors’ funds based on their initial proposals. Organizations learn DNH sufficiently to be able to apply the terminology in their funding proposals because they know that donors are looking for it. This has been referred to as “the ticking box effect”; proposals note that organizations will use DNH in their programming, but in practice it is left behind. In Sri Lanka, one NGO worker said, “the framework is used by some, not in the process of creating a

program, but for ensuring the buzzwords are used in the proposals. In ‘checking it away’ the value of the framework is lost.” Because some people consider DNH to be donor-driven, they decline to use it and instead get their proposals funded because they mention it. Donors rarely monitor for the use of DNH beyond the funding phase, and so they have no means, beyond organizations’ annual reports, of knowing if DNH is actually being put to use.

How donors define DNH is often different from the definition applied by practitioners in the field. Some donors define using DNH as understanding and reducing risk for field staff. These definitions trickle down to the field level. Rather than applying the tool to the program to determine the effect of the program on the local context, organizations use DNH to gauge the level of risk to their staff due to conflict in their context. One practitioner said, “In seeking to lessen and avoid risk for organizations and staff they are losing sight of the community.”

The concept of “mainstreaming” a tool or concept has a great deal of traction in the NGO and donor community. Theoretically, a tool is introduced, and then it is mainstreamed. Once mainstreamed, it is part of organizational practice and policy. In practice, this often means that donors and organizations stop paying attention to the tool. Once an organization demonstrates a level of competency and knowledge about a tool, donors stop pushing so hard for its use. In many places, organizations reached a certain level of “DNH saturation” and considered that the tool had been mainstreamed. The external pressures and supports to learn and use DNH are then lifted. As a result, over time, staff cease using the tool and their interest and motivation for maintaining it also drops off.

When people say, “mainstreaming,” what they generally mean is saturation: everyone knows the tool and can use it. Saturation is not self-sustaining. It is like a sponge. Even a fully saturated sponge will eventually dry out unless replenished.

3. The Reality of the Aid System: Things change and DNH can get lost

A. Changes of Agenda

In several cases, where donor interests changed, or funding for DNH fell away, the cases show a marked decrease in DNH use among their partner organizations. In many locations, a donor ended funding for specific DNH efforts and momentum for DNH among their partners dropped off. In Rwanda, NGO staff said, “The spirit of DNH is drowning in the available funding structure. It’s not up to us, it’s the fault of the funders and we can’t change their requirements.” In particular, people noted that most funding streams available today in Rwanda are for HIV/AIDS or orphans and vulnerable children. Often these priorities lead to outcomes that are not conflict sensitive.

“Victims of AIDS in Rwanda have a lot of money coming in, and are going to cause a problem. We have two homes supported by our church, rented by the church for AIDS victims. If you go to visit these homes, you will see that the people in them are quite sick, physically weak, they are definitely victims. But the homes themselves are better equipped than most of the houses in the village...we don’t know what people are saying on the outside, perhaps they might even be attacked.”

Some organizations respond to shifting donor agendas by negotiating with donors to change their programs based on evidence from the context. This strategy has been successful in many places, including Uganda. A small NGO working in the slums of Kampala has shown a willingness to forego

funding if a donor suggests a project that they think will not have a positive impact on the community. Rather than refuse funding outright, the organization strives to educate their donors (and potential donors) to make sure a program or project will have its intended impact. Unfortunately, most organizations do not feel empowered enough to negotiate with donors or refuse funding. Instead, they either comply with donor requirements or work around them.

Many people said, “There is a lack of coordination among the donors themselves.” The donor agencies are not discussing or harmonizing their agendas with each other, leaving implementers with several agendas and requirements to juggle in their programming. In Sri Lanka one implementer said, “Once organizations finish a project, they change donors or they get funds from different sectors of the same donor. Each has different requirements and this is a challenge for implementers.” Another said, “There is no space in the proposal format to say, ‘this is our way for doing X’ so when you do budgeting, it is according to their strategy and their budget lines.”

B. Changes in the context

In times of humanitarian crisis, donors funnel money into an area, and there is a push to spend that money as quickly as possible. Do No Harm can get lost when organizations are receiving money and feel they cannot turn it down. This was noted by several people interviewed in various case studies. When organizations move from development work to relief work, DNH is often left behind due to time constraints on staff and the pressure to spend large amounts of money very quickly. Donor and organization standards shift during these times of humanitarian crisis. Rather than effectiveness, value is placed on spending and speed. The faster organizations work, the less likely they are to perform good analysis, revisit that analysis and take the time to recognize and make corrections when unintended negative impacts occur.

Many people also noted that when a disaster occurs, like the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, a large number of organizations come to do relief work in an area. Performing an analysis on such a crowded context is overwhelming. One donor representative working in Sri Lanka at this time said, “People were getting off of planes with suitcases full of money for the relief effort. They did not know the context and they did not do DNH. But the money was needed and no one was turning it down.” This large outpouring of funds also happens near the end of donors’ fiscal years. The pressure to spend outweighs attention to program details and applying conflict sensitivity. One DNH practitioner said, “Donors are under pressure to disperse funds and put pressure on implementing organizations. They need to give more time for listening and disbursement of funds, rather than adding pressure.”

In the Sri Lanka context, the government is putting pressure on donor agencies and NGOs to leave the country. As the context has shifted, the donor agencies have adapted, and have helped their partners to adapt as well, “There is a lot of government pressure on donors about what they can do or can’t do. They are good at creatively getting around these restrictions by reframing programs. They are not completely withdrawing, they are adapting. They are using more local staff in key positions to help them grow their knowledge of the context. But they are not making sure that Sri Lankan implementing organizations are able to take over after they leave. They could do more to build those capacities.”



Do No Harm and Peacebuilding: Five Lessons

By Nicole Goddard

[October 2009](#)¹

Recently, in Afghanistan, a new road was planned in an area where two groups were in conflict. These two groups had longstanding arguments with each other, and the arguments kept erupting into violence whenever the proposal for the new road was discussed. An NGO took the groups through DNH, and eventually the groups began to focus on the sources of their arguments and the other dynamics of their conflict. They began to see that there were warlords who were benefiting from the prolonged and exacerbated conflict and they began to resist those influences. Currently, the disputes between the two groups appear to be resolved.

Also, that road was built.

This story illustrates one of the ways DNH has been used as a tool for building bridges between communities and addressing the conflicts that exist among them.

The Do No Harm Project began in the mid-1990's, exploring the question, "how can aid be given in ways that, rather than exacerbating or prolonging a conflict, help people to disengage from fighting and develop systems for settling the problems in their societies?" We collected the experiences of workers in the humanitarian and development fields. We worked with people in multiple countries in different contexts doing different types of work. We collected their stories and we began to see patterns emerge that eventually led to the development of the Do No Harm Framework, the Do No Harm Book, and a series of training modules. In the Implementation and Dissemination phases of the Project, we shared the lessons we had learned with practitioners, and worked with them to apply Do No Harm to their humanitarian and development projects.

But we were careful to assure people that we were not attempting to change their mission or mandate. During that time, there was a great deal of concern about "mission creep." Organizations were wary of any tool or approach that looked like it might change their agenda. So, in those trainings, we emphasized repeatedly, emphatically, and forcefully, that the tool was developed by examining the experiences of humanitarian aid and development workers and so it was NOT a tool for peacebuilding. We told people that peacebuilding requires a different set of skills. We told them that peacebuilding often requires a political solution, which DNH cannot offer. We told people all of these things.

And then they used DNH for peacebuilding anyway.

And they used it well.

Over the life of the Do No Harm project we have been thinking about how people use the tool and what parts of it are useful. We have heard stories of people working in the same country, in the

¹ A version of this paper was given as a speech at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota, Colombia, September 17, 2009 as part of the conference, "Acción Sin Daño y Construcción de Paz".

same organization who had quite different experiences with DNH. One person would tell us that the tool was useful and had changed the way they were working, and another, equally smart and capable colleague did not feel that the tool had value for their work. People asked us to dig more deeply into this problem to find out why. So, in 2006, we started a new series of case studies to examine how people were learning, thinking about, and using DNH; which parts of the tool they find useful, and why; and to explore the challenges that prevent people from using DNH. We call these the Reflective Case Studies. The evidence from these cases has led us to re-examine our efforts to move the focus of the project away from peacebuilding work. Simply, we have seen people use DNH to do effective work in peacebuilding at the local level. The fact that this work is done on a local level seems important because, as the DNH Project has learned, local knowledge and understanding of a context is vital. As we gather more evidence about where DNH has worked for peacebuilding, and where it has not, we will come closer to understanding the boundaries of the term local. The examples that we have seen include face-to-face contact between the conflicting groups and involve issues that are resource-based or interpersonal.

When practitioners use DNH for effective peacebuilding work, we have seen that they do five things:

1. They assume that their context is dynamic
2. They examine their context through a dividers and connectors lens
3. They analyze dividers and connectors daily
4. They look hard for opportunities to apply DNH
5. And, finally, they do not create connectors; rather they build on existing connectors in their context.

1. Assume that the context is dynamic

Individuals who use DNH in peacebuilding work assume that the context in which they are working is dynamic. They are aware that the context is evolving and changing all the time. They assume that dividers and connectors will change in importance and relevance as their project develops or due to outside factors.

In Nepal, the civil war ebbed and flowed through the countryside. Organizations in that context needed to pay attention to the interplay of the dynamics of the context. Four dynamics that we saw people tracking were Maoist insurgent/King's government issues, caste issues, economic grievances, and ethnic conflicts. At any time, one of these dynamics could be the key driver of a local conflict. However, organizations and aid workers needed to pay attention not only to what the current key driver of conflict was, but how the other dynamics of the conflict interacted around that driving force. For example, people noted that when the Maoist insurgents increased their forces in any particular area, conflicts with the King's government's forces were likely to increase. However after the forces dispersed, caste related conflicts often arose in their wake. Or during harvest times there were economic concerns about immigrants (usually Nepalese!) from India crossing the border to look for work, which led to conflicts with local workers and these conflicts could take precedence over the other factors. Aid workers also found that ethnic issues were present in many places and could feed into the other three dynamics.

Organizations working in Nepal found that they needed to be constantly monitoring their context for changes. As troops moved in and out of villages, other, previously dormant or low level,

conflicts could flare up. In order to be responsive to these changes, they needed to track them as they happened.

2. Examine the context through a Dividers and Connectors lens

In order to do effective peacebuilding work using DNH, people have told us they need a thorough understanding of the dividers and connectors in the context. They need to know which dividers are the strongest and most dangerous and also which connectors are strong enough to bring people together and overcome the dividers in the context.

In rural Kenya, there is an area where different pastoral tribes graze and water their cattle. Some of the most desirable grazing land in the area was completely inaccessible to any of the tribes because each claimed that it was theirs. If a tribe ventured onto that piece of land, other tribes raided their cattle and there were some violent conflicts. An NGO working in the area began their work by approaching the community leaders in each tribe separately, and talking to them about the conflicts. They described the other tribes as traditional enemies and cattle raiding as restocking their herds. The NGO introduced the community leaders, and later others in the communities, to the DNH framework. The groups began to talk about the conflict in terms of the access to resources rather than traditional warfare. Through this process, the community leaders came to the conclusion that in order to solve the conflict and gain access to the resource for their own community, they would need to discuss the resources with the other tribes. The NGO facilitated meetings among the community leaders of the area tribes over the next few weeks. Within a month, all the tribes had access to the area that had previously been too dangerous to enter.

This NGO examined the dividers and connectors in the context and used DNH with the communities to create a space for their own analysis of the conflict. Once the communities had determined that they were fighting over access to land and water and not a traditional disagreement between certain enemies, a conflict that had once seemed inevitable became something they could solve. They began to magnify what was connecting them and minimize what was keeping them at odds.

3. Analyze Dividers and Connectors Daily

Because people assume that the context in which they work is dynamic and because they are attuned to the dividers and connectors in that context, they are always monitoring for changes in the dividers and connectors in the context. They know that things are always changing and in order to be able to adapt their project or program to that change, they must be aware of it as it is happening.

In Uganda, an organization holds a staff meeting each morning to talk about upcoming projects or the results they have seen from their projects. Important changes in the context are noted. The staff also constantly ask one another, “Are you doing harm?” Although there is a note of joking about the question, it reminds them of Dividers and Connectors and to look closely at possible negative impacts of their projects. They do not do a formal DNH analysis of every project every day, but through the daily conversations and stories about their work, they remind each other to constantly think about their impact on Dividers and Connectors.

4. Look hard for opportunities to apply DNH

People who use DNH for peacebuilding are always looking for opportunities to apply the tool. For people working in contexts of conflict, the dividers are often glaringly clear. One local staff member of an NGO told us, “Today I work on what will get my family killed tomorrow.” He emphasized that

in his context, he directs his project everyday toward addressing the dividers he sees as the most dangerous.

People are often less clear and certain about the connectors in these contexts. They can overlook the small, day-to-day ways that people come together and bridge their divisions. But we have seen that the people who apply DNH to peacebuilding work well seek out the connectors and hold a magnifying glass to them. In fact, people have used exactly these words when describing their activities.

A Kenyan colleague told us, “We look for the connectors in the context and try to get people to magnify on that. The DNH tool in itself works for community organization and building communities’ capacity to manage their own conflicts.” This person found space in her budget to run DNH workshops by using funds set aside for intercommunity meetings and used the DNH tool to highlight existing connectors.

5. Do not create Connectors; work on existing Connectors

Finally, in CDA’s experience, those who set out to create a connector do not meet with success. New connectors do arise in contexts of conflict, but they are accidental; an example of the dynamic nature of any context. But in trying to create a connector between two groups where one did not exist before, we run the risk of increasing tensions, rather than decreasing them. Peace work is at its weakest when it ignores what is already working to bring people together and tries to substitute for that with a new or externally determined connector.

After the war in Kosovo, peacebuilding organizations working in the context tried to promote a multi-ethnic society among Serbs and Albanians. Many agencies designed multi-ethnic economic projects for people from both sides of the conflict. The hope was that people would work together on these projects, and that cooperation would lead to a Kosovo identity, rather than an ethnic Serb or ethnic Albanian identity. Many of these projects did not succeed.

In one farming co-op, multi-ethnic groups raised funds to purchase shared farming equipment. In the end, the groups split the money between the Albanians and Serbs and purchased the tools they each needed. In a project to re-establish garbage collection, an aid agency attempted to employ both Serbs and Albanians. When the project became economically sustainable, the NGO left. After the NGO left, the Albanian workers dismissed the Serb garbage collectors.

In Kosovo, people talked about living side-by-side, rather than with the other group. The idea of multi-ethnic workplaces and activities was not something they had been practicing prior to the war, and so it never had been something that connected them. People told us that they participated in these projects to get access to international assistance, rather than to increase multi-ethnic space in their community.

Peacebuilding and the Future of Do No Harm

Much of CDA’s early resistance to use of the tool for peacebuilding came from being cognizant of our limitations, and being skeptical about pushing beyond them. Since the tool had not been developed by peace practitioners, we did not want to assume that DNH could substitute for the skill sets involved in peacebuilding or for political solutions to a conflict. But we also have seen the peacebuilding work that people have done with DNH. We have heard people say that it works for them, and people are continuing to explore the tool’s usefulness in peace work.

There is no formulaic approach to using any tool. A tool cannot substitute for knowledge or

thinking, but it is something a thinking person uses to do better work. We, at CDA are anxious to know about your successes and failures with DNH. And of course, we look forward to hearing how you have used DNH in surprising and interesting ways that we probably told you were impossible.



Peacebuilding and DNH


[DNH Guidance Note, September 2011](#)

I. Introduction

Do No Harm was originally focused on the experience of development and emergency relief workers in contexts of conflict. The DNH Framework was developed as a conflict-sensitivity tool, not a peacebuilding tool. For years, the DNH Project explicitly emphasized DNH as a conflict-sensitivity tool and that DNH was not meant as a tool for direct conflict resolution. However, people will always use tools in their own ways to accomplish their needs.

DNH users went ahead and applied DNH towards peacebuilding anyway...and with success!

Programs of any sort that actively, or even aggressively, seek to reduce dividers and promote connectors can become peacebuilding programs in effect. At its most active application, therefore, DNH overlaps with peacebuilding.



Key Issue regarding Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding requires a thorough analysis of driving factors and a robust strategy that addresses these factors directly. It is important to note that there is a difference between dividers/connectors and driving factors of conflict/peace. Supporting connectors and reducing dividers is not necessarily the same as dealing with the driving factors. In other words, not all connectors and dividers are made equal—some will be more relevant for peacebuilding because they will be more connected to drivers of conflict and peace. The more directly and actively programs work to reduce dividers and strengthen and broaden connectors, the more the program shades into peacebuilding. But in order to be effective peacebuilding work, the focus should be connected to key drivers.

Key Issues regarding Peacebuilding and DNH

First, all programs—of any type or focus—must be conflict sensitive, including peacebuilding programs. Peacebuilding programs can and do violate conflict sensitivity principles! Keep the following guidelines in mind when applying DNH to your peacebuilding program.

- Peacebuilding efforts themselves must be conflict-sensitive. Do not assume your approach is conflict-sensitive. Do a DNH analysis of the peacebuilding programme.
- Dividers and Connectors Analysis is a good way to start analyzing a context.

- If peace is your goal, Connectors are important and must be supported. But not all connectors are key for peace writ large; some connectors relate to and can influence key driving factors of conflict and peace more than others.
- People are not Dividers or Connectors. Their actions and behavior affect Dividers and Connectors (example: A politician is not a divider, but he or she can increase existing divisions by favouring one group over another).

For more information, see “DNH Guidance Note: Using Dividers and Connectors”.²

II. Applying DNH to Peacebuilding Efforts

1. Assume that the context is dynamic.
2. Examine the context through a dividers and connectors lens.
3. Analyze dividers and connectors regularly. We have seen daily analysis used to good effect. Analysis should be done at least weekly in informal ways.
4. Look hard for opportunities to apply DNH.
5. Do not try to create connectors! Instead, build on existing connectors in the context.

For more information on these five points, read “DNH and Peacebuilding: Five Lessons.”³

III. Using DNH in Peacebuilding Programming

DNH has been used by peacebuilders in the following ways:

- As an initial conflict-analysis tool
- For conflict-mapping and identifying stakeholders
- As an early warning system by tracking how Dividers are trending
- For identifying areas of shared interest and concern
- To transform mindsets, bringing people to a place where they form and improve relationships
- with “the other”
- As a tool for focusing constructive dialogue around shared problems
- To help motivate people to work on peacebuilding themselves
- To assist organizations with their strategic positioning in relation to conflicting parties, in order to establish credibility and relationships (which can support a subsequent expansion into peacebuilding)

Four Misconceptions and Assumptions about Peacebuilding and Conflict-Sensitivity

The following beliefs or assumptions are simply not true:

1. Conflict-sensitive humanitarian assistance will help bring peace.
2. Peacebuilding equals conflict-sensitive development.

² DNH Guidance Note: Using Dividers and Connectors” (May 2010)
http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/issue/dnh_dividers_and_connectors_Pdf.pdf

³ “DNH and Peacebuilding: Five Lessons” (Oct 2009)
http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/issue/dnh_and_peacebuilding_five_lessons_Pdf.pdf

3. Development will promote conflict prevention.
4. Peacebuilding is conflict sensitive by definition.

These assumptions are not confirmed by evidence from the field. Although specific programs or projects may well succeed, their success is always based on better analysis and better practice, not their assumptions.

The distinction between conflict sensitive practice and peacebuilding matters, because the lack of clarity and prevailing confusion are now weakening many programs. People are uncertain about why their peace efforts are failing. All too often, one reason is that they are working on false assumptions about conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding or both.

For more information, read “A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding”.⁴

Further Cautions

- DNH applied in a peacebuilding context does not usually address underlying causes of conflict, but it has proven effective in identifying them.
- DNH has not been used as a stand-alone peacebuilding program. DNH has the potential to support or reinforce other tools, models, and techniques used in the peacebuilding field; it is best used in conjunction with tools specifically designed for peacebuilding.⁵
- Repeated exposure to DNH is needed. This is especially important for peacebuilding applications!
- DNH does not offer a framework of how to discuss issues that may arise. People may not be comfortable discussing the conflicts around them immediately. An organization may need to do groundwork to increase peoples’ confidence and capacity in discussing conflict issues before using DNH to help analyze a context.

Key Questions

If you are using DNH as a peacebuilding tool, ask yourself these questions:

1. Are you working in conflict or working on conflict?
2. How often are you analyzing the context?
3. Have you identified existing Connectors?
4. If you are supporting Connectors, are you also reinforcing the current “rules-of-the-game”/conflict status quo?
5. Have you identified Connectors that both deepen and broaden the quality of interaction between people?
6. How can a Connector you have identified become a force or key driving factor for peace?

⁴ “A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding,” Diana Chigas and Peter Woodrow, 2009
http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/article/RPP_Differentiating_Conflict_Sensitivity_and_Peacebuilding.pdf

⁵ See the Reflecting on Peace Practice book, Confronting War (2003), and RPP training manual (2010) for an in depth explanation of the RPP peacebuilding approach. Both are available on the CDA website <http://www.cdainc.com> away from one another and instead to confront the shared problem together and with a new and shared perspective.

What kind of support does it need to blossom into this role?

7. Have you identified key driving factors of the conflict? How are they driving Dividers?
8. Are you specifically addressing a key driving factor or factors?
9. Does addressing a particular Divider have an effect on a key driving factor of the conflict? (This is not to say that you shouldn't work on that Divider! Dividers are dangerous and may promote violence. It may be, however, that working on the Divider is not ultimately related to peace.)

Possible Techniques

1. One way of thinking about conflict is as a problem shared by the parties in conflict. Engaging them in analyzing their joint problem using DNH has the potential to refocus their attention away from one another and instead to confront the shared problem together and with a new and shared perspective.
2. Use DNH to identify stakeholders. Who is in conflict? Then use DNH to identify behavior between those groups that contributes to conflict and generate options/alternatives to that behavior.
3. Use DNH to identify Connectors. If peace is your goal, then Connectors must be supported and they cannot be undermined. If you fail to identify them, you will very likely have a negative impact on them.
4. Use DNH with communities. DNH can help develop local ownership of a problem and local ownership of its solutions.

“When local actors take their own initiatives to resist violence or address conflict, that constitutes a contribution to Peace Writ Large, as it reflects local ownership and initiative for peace. In this way, the use of Do No Harm conflict sensitivity frameworks can have greater impacts on Peace Writ Large than their use by international agencies or outsiders.” —Diana Chigas and Peter Woodrow, “A Distinction with a Difference: Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding”.

Definition of “peacebuilding” in this guidance note

The term “peacebuilding” has been broadly used by many groups. In the context of this guidance note, we use peacebuilding to describe interventions taken specifically to mitigate conflicts between individuals and groups. Other frequently used words with a similar meaning include: conflict resolution, conflict management, conflict transformation, and peacemaking. These types of interventions can take a variety of forms (including mediation, arbitration, negotiation, transformative dialogues, facilitated conversations, and directed efforts to address underlying causes). They can occur at several levels ranging from the interpersonal all the way to the international. Recognizing the diversity and nuances of the field, this guidance note will refer to the work within this sphere simply as “peacebuilding.”

Three Key Lessons and their Implications for Training

[Do No Harm Project Occasional Paper, March 2008](#)

1) People use Dividers and Connectors. Few people use more of the Framework than that.

- People are making good programming decisions based on a Dividers and Connectors (D/C) analysis .
- Few people ever write their analysis down. In conversation they can trace why they made the choices they made. Those conversations reveal they identify Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages as patterns they are trying to fix/avoid/reinforce. They don't always use the same language we use, but the patterns they identify are the same.

Implications for training: Develop a heavy focus on D/C analysis. Use several of the case studies (e.g. Tadjikistan for evaluation and Southern Sudan for planning) to get people in the habit of using the D/C lens.

2) There seem to be two types of people in this world: tool users and non-tool users.

- Tool users will use any tool or framework they can find, often tearing it apart and using whatever piece is most appropriate at the moment.
- Non-tool users will never use any tool willingly. Non-tool users say they want one tool which does everything. Non-tool users say that there are already too many tools – so how do you expect us to add this one. Non-tool users will do or say anything to avoid having to use a tool.

Implications for training: Announce this up front as a piece of learning from the project. If someone complains in a non-tool user fashion, shrug and say that our experience is that people who use tools will use DNH. Offer support and positive feedback to the tool users.

3) Local staff are far more likely to use DNH than expatriates.

- Why? Because local staff feel comfortable prioritizing from their context analysis, while expatriate staff/ outsiders feel very uncomfortable doing so. A Kenyan man said to me, "Today I work on what is going to get my family killed next month." Expatriates are rarely so focused.
- However, this means DNH analyses tend to be micro and not connected to other trends in the country or region. Local staff have suggested that they want expatriates to be able to tie micro and macro analyses together. Expatriates rarely understand that this is expected of them.

Implications for training: Bring up the differences between local people and expatriates/ outsiders in the training in order to warn expatriates of the difficulty they will encounter in their own minds and to warn local staff that they can't look to expatriates to take the lead on programming adaptations.

General Principles for Adapting Do no harm Training for Different Audiences

by Nicole Goddard

[November 2013](#)

1. *Identify the “so what?” for your audience.*

When introducing DNH to a different audience, trainers should be able to specifically articulate why using the DNH tool will help their participants. How will being conflict sensitive make them more effective, make their work easier, better or faster?

In some cases, this means making a financial case for DNH (often linked to effectiveness). When working with governments it can be matter of discussing the needs or desires of their constituents. With journalists, it can mean appealing to their sense of balanced news coverage. In many cases, making the argument for DNH means identifying the costs of *not* using DNH in addition to the benefit of applying it. Examples are helpful to make your case!

2. *Speak Their Language*

DNH was developed with humanitarian and development practitioners, and the language used in the tool, while clear and free of jargon, speaks to their background. As DNH training is offered to broader ranges of audiences, it becomes necessary to adapt our language accordingly, or apply some commonly accepted language within the field of practice you are offering training.

For example, politicians may not see the importance of a “negative impact on Connectors” as clearly as they understand the “political costs of conflict.” It is important to frame both the concepts of DNH, and the process in terms that are comfortable and familiar to your audience.

This also means identifying existing and accepted tools in the field and relating DNH to those. This can help contextualize the tool, and it gives it a place.

3. *Train people, not organizations, not fields*

We have seen with DNH that training can happen at an organizational level, but uptake happens at an individual level. Some tools and concepts resonate with individuals and they pick them up and apply them. People who consider DNH to be useful will use it, despite the fact that it was not developed specifically for their field.

As facilitators offer workshops to outside audiences this is important to keep in mind. Some people will be discouraged from using DNH because they don't see its applicability. Others will get it. They will use it.

4. *Understand the Constraints*

Different fields work under a different systems with different structures than aid organizations. They have different constraints on their ability to apply tools. They have different responsibilities.

It is vital that facilitators understand the context in which practitioners will be applying a tool so that they do not ask people to do more than they are able. (What goes in the Mandate/HQ/Fundraising Box?)

5. *Involve participants in the analysis*

Facilitators need to do all they can to make DNH relevant when adapting it for other audiences. In

some cases, the traditional case study training methodology may need to be adapted or discarded. Use examples or cases from the field in which participants are working to ground the material for them.

6. *See the training as an intervention, with clear goals*

Trainers should know what they expect to achieve with a DNH training. They should articulate their goals at the beginning of a workshop. This is especially true of an adapted DNH workshop. Participants should understand what they are expected to achieve and how they will go about meeting those expectations.

Articulating the trainers' goals for the training can also offer an opportunity for participants to challenge those expectations, or supplement them with their own. Building transparency around the workshop and its expected outcomes can build trust in a process that may initially appear experimental.

7. *Disaggregate your Audience*

In all fields, people see their work in terms of a role within an organization or process. When that role has a direct impact on a context of conflict, people can see the applicability of DNH quite easily. Other times, they see themselves or their role as removed from the context, and therefore they may not see their immediate impacts as clearly.

Facilitators should know the participants in the room and their roles in order to tailor the training to those roles. If you are training human resources persons, discussions about hiring would be very important, more so than discussions of the market effects of an intervention. Make sure to use examples or cases that are relevant for the specific members of the audience.

Being Engaged in Situations of Conflict – Learning from Experience

by Wolfgang Heinrich

July 2018

Faced with the fact that humanitarian and development assistance was increasingly becoming part of conflict dynamics a group of international relief and development organisations in 1994 commissioned Collaborative for Development Action, Inc. (CDA) to study in a systematic way how assistance projects interact with the context of violent inter-group conflict. How can one provide assistance in the context of violent inter-group conflict without exacerbating it? If assistance becomes a part of the context of violent conflict, how does this happen? Are there any patterns across various situations, by which these negative impacts occur? If yes, is it possible to use the knowledge of such patterns in future programming? The organisations involved at that time determined that this could best be found out by studying different types of assistance interventions planned and implemented by different types of organisations in different contexts of violent inter-group conflict.

CDA organised and facilitated a “collaborative learning process” which - over a period of six years - engaged several hundred practitioners of humanitarian and development assistance. 15 field studies were conducted. The findings from these case studies were presented to over 500 practitioners in a series of feedback workshops for critical review. Through this process such patterns were indeed discovered. The patterns provided the basis for the development of a practical tool for project planning - the *“Framework for Considering the Impact of Aid on Conflict”*. This tool allows agencies to discover potentially unintended negative effects of project activities on the context of conflict and, if such unintended negative effects are discovered, to develop better options. The tool was tested by 12 relief and development assistance agencies and found to be an effective but also a practical tool. Popularising and presenting the tool to agencies began in 2001. Today, 17 years later, Do No Harm has become a widely accepted approach among donors and implementing agencies in peacebuilding, human rights, development and humanitarian assistance. A big number of agencies have adapted the DNH tool and integrated it into their project management cycle system.

The Challenge

Since the beginning of humanitarian assistance in situations of violent conflict aid workers and organisations have been acutely aware of the fact that aid interacts with the context of conflict in ways that are difficult to predict. Very often this may exacerbate tensions and prolong violence. Many evaluations of humanitarian operations provide evidence of this fact. Over the years it has become apparent that any form of engagement in a context of violent conflict becomes a part of that context itself. This is simply unavoidable. The negative effects are not intended, but that does not lessen the need to avoid them. Rather, it challenges organisations to be aware that these effects occur and they need to avoid or minimise them – to “do no harm”. Experience also shows that it is possible to become engaged in ways that can help reduce tensions, mitigate violence, and provide the people affected by conflict with the space, skill, resolve and opportunity to disengage from violence and to build peace.

Seven Lessons Learned

The Local Capacities for Peace Project generated seven lessons which were translated into a planning tool. The use of the Do No Harm approach and tool confirmed these lessons but added more detail.

Lesson # 1

When international actors engage in the context of a violent conflict, the activities become part of that context of conflict. Although organisations tend to be impartial in relation to the parties in a conflict, the actual effects of their activities are never neutral regarding whether conflict worsens or abates. In settings of violent conflict, experience has shown that project interventions can – and often do – reinforce, exacerbate and prolong violent conflict. However, experience has also shown that project interventions can also help to reduce intergroup divisions and support people's capacities to find peaceful options for solving problems.

Lesson # 2

Conflicts are characterised by two „realities“:

- Dividers/Tensions: Conflicts are always characterised by contradictions, divisions and tensions. This is, in fact, what we believe conflict to be. Conflict is not always violent. But there is a possibility of conflict escalating into violent confrontation. This is what we should be concerned about when planning an intervention of any kind.
- Connectors or Local Capacities for Peace: More surprising for most people and most important for agencies, conflicts are also characterised by a number of things that connect people even though they are divided about an issue. This is especially true of conflicts that occur within societies, where people recently lived and worked (and worshipped) side-by-side; went to school together and, in some cases, intermarried.

Lesson # 3

When projects are implemented in the context of (violent) conflict, they inevitably affect both “realities” – the Dividers/Tensions and the Connectors/Local Capacities for Peace that exist in the context in various ways. What is delivered through a project and how it is being delivered either feeds into and worsens intergroup tensions and divisions – or it may reduce them. Similarly, project implementation may ignore or bypass existing connectors and local peace capacities and, thus, weaken and undermine them – or it may support them and thus reinforce the community’s capability to handle conflict in nonviolent ways.

Lesson #4

Resources transferred by agencies through their projects into areas where violent conflict is going on affect conflict in five predictable patterns. Practical use of Do No Harm since 2001 has confirmed these five patterns.

Lesson #5

At the same time project implementation also delivers “messages” as well as resources. How resources are provided, how staff interact with local people, how protection is arranged and the like – all of these project details convey messages that may either

reinforce the modes of violent conflict or reduce them. All of these messages affect four dimensions of inter-group relationships: Respect, Accountability, Fairness and Transparency.

Lesson # 6

It is never an entire project that causes certain positive or negative effects. It is the details of a programme or project that cause the effects.

Lesson # 7

There are always options! It has been found that there are always options to redesign those details of a project that have been found to cause unintended negative effects. Or – in the process of planning and designing a project – a rigorous context analysis and detailed scrutiny of the intended project may show that certain details may probably cause some negative effect and they can be redesigned before going into implementation.

Putting Lessons from Experience back to Work: Pilot Implementation Projects

Donors and agencies involved in the LCP Project agreed that the lessons learned from the case studies and workshops are good at helping them to understand how unintended negative effects came about in past projects. However, the question remained about how to use the lessons in ongoing projects in areas of violent conflict.

Therefore, CDA initiated a series of “Pilot Implementation Projects”. CDA partnered with twelve operational NGOs that had active programmes in twelve different conflict zones in the world. CDA provided a liaison person to work with the field staff of these agencies on a regular basis over an extended period of time (up to three years in total) to “try out” the LCP Project approach and planning tool. Liaisons visited the project sites about every three to four months. They trained field staff (local and expatriate) in the LCP Project ideas, worked with them to analyse their own projects and the contexts in which they were implemented and helped them to trace the impacts of their programmes on these.

This experience has produced a number of practical ideas about how to adopt, adapt and use LCP Project in real time and real space. In September 2000, CDA compiled these field-based lessons into a “user’s manual”. (Mary B. Anderson: “Options for Aid in Conflict. Lessons from Field Experience”, Cambridge, 2000)

Where are we today?

Today, it is widely accepted that interventions through development projects or humanitarian assistance always also have unintended effects. Beyond the field of humanitarian assistance and development work where Do No Harm was initially developed local and international organisations engaged in peace work, conflict transformation or human rights work have taken up and adapted Do No Harm. They have found Do No Harm useful to anticipate and handle unintended effects of their interventions. Some governments even declare that their policies need to adhere to “the principle of Do No Harm”.

While there is wide spread recognition of Do No Harm as a principle and approach this does not always translate into changed practice. Some trainers observe that the “uptake” of Do No Harm often remains shallow. Organisations pick up the language and sometimes certain elements of the

Do No Harm Framework. A much smaller number of organisations has adapted Do No Harm to the extent that it changed the organisation and the operational practice.

This observation leads to the conclusion that changes in how Do No Harm is communicated are necessary. In the early years of spreading Do No Harm, the primary focus was bringing home the message that project activities do have unintended negative effects. Participants in the early years were primarily interested in understanding where Do No Harm comes from, what the empirical evidence is and why it should be considered. This is no longer needed. Trainers observe that participants coming to Do No Harm workshops today are primarily interested in “how do I actually do it?”.

This shift in motivation is an opportunity to move the communication about Do No Harm closer to the level of practical implementation. The opportunity is, however, also linked with a challenge. Do No Harm workshops tend to present Do No Harm as a stand-alone tool. Trainers believe that once people have understood “how DNH is used” they will find ways to integrate DNH into the existing procedures and guidelines of their organisation. Experience has shown that this does not happen in most cases. Future trainings should explore options of presenting Do No Harm as a part of a “package” of tools which are useful for doing sound programming that is sensitive of conflict in the social and geographic space where the projects are implemented. Some trainers are experimenting with trainings that introduce DNH as one element of a project cycle management system (PCM).

Since Do No Harm was published some other collaborative learning processes have taken place. Many of them produced learnings and tools which are useful complements to Do No Harm. One of these processes is the “Reflecting on Peace Practice”-process (RPP). Particularly organisations engaged in peace work and conflict transformation have begun to combine RPP and DNH. Some organisations engaged in development work noticed that some tools from RPP fill a gap that DNH and other tools do not adequately address. Future training should more systematically also integrate elements of learning processes as they complement and reinforce the intentions of DNH: improving the quality of engagement by maximising intended and unintended positive effects on conflict and avoiding unintended negative effects.

Bibliography

- Anderson, Mary B. (1999) *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Anderson, Mary B. (ed.) (2000) *Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons From Field Experience*, Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action, Inc.

SECTION V – CASE STUDIES AND HANDOUTS

Case Studies for Introduction Workshops

The following pages contain four case studies for facilitating an introductory workshop on the Do No Harm-approach. The case studies are formatted in such a way that they can be copied and handed out to participants.

Case Study “Food For Work for Rebuilding War-Damaged Homes in Tajikistan”¹

(Save the Children Federation)



Source: Universities of Texas Libraries

1. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, a struggle for leadership broke out in the former Soviet Republic of Tajikistan between communist factions and a coalition of anti-communist and Islamicist opposition groups. The result was an intense and bloody civil war that in early 1991 spread from the capital, Dushanbe, into rural areas and lasted until December of 1992. In the villages, the political content of the conflict was blurred so that it came to resemble an ethnic conflict between Kulyabi Tajiks, who supported the communist faction, and Garmi Tajiks, who were associated with the opposition. Kulyabis and Garmis are Tajik sub-groups that share the same religion, customs and language, a dialect of Farsi.
2. The worst of the fighting was concentrated in Khatlon Province, located in southwestern Tajikistan and bordering on Afghanistan. The area had been settled during the 1930's and 1940's when the Soviet government had forcibly relocated tens of thousands of Garmis and Kulyabis to the area to become workers in the newly created cotton-growing state farms. Typically, entire villages were relocated and, as a result, the region became a patchwork of mono-ethnic villages. However, over the years some villages merged and, by the outbreak of the civil war, about a quarter of the villages in the region were ethnically mixed. In the cities and towns, there was a high degree of inter-group marriage. Demonstrations of strong ethnic identification were rare in the daily lives of the people.
3. During the war, villages became targets of looting and burning by both sides. In late 1992, with

¹ This case study was compiled by Mary B. Anderson. It is based on one of the original studies conducted by the Local Capacities for Peace Project in 1994/95. Save the Children Federation permitted this case study to be used for teaching purposes in the context of Do No Harm workshops.



the help of Russian troops still stationed in the area, the Kulyabi forces defeated the Garhi. Though damage had been moderate during the war, the victory was followed by a rampage of the Kulyabi militias during which Garhi houses and villages were systematically destroyed. Many men were killed, over 20,000 homes were severely damaged or destroyed, and many families fled for safety. In many Garhi villages, only the mosque was left standing.

4. Though open warfare ended in late 1992, the armed opposition remains active in northern Afghanistan and continues to stage cross-border raids from time to time. In addition, they control some mountainous sections of Tajikistan. Twenty-five thousand Russian troops remain in the country, helping keep open warfare from breaking out again. Even so, an atmosphere of relative lawlessness continues as bands of armed thugs (sometimes inter-ethnic in their composition) continue to loot villages and steal humanitarian relief supplies.
5. Tajikistan was the poorest of the Soviet Republics. By decision of central Soviet authority, the economy was concentrated in cotton production and related enterprises (such as cotton milling, cotton seed production and garment making). The single-sector specialisation meant that Tajikistan, like other Soviet Republics, depended heavily on trade for most goods. Most basic foodstuffs have been imported since the 1930's.
6. Cotton production fell throughout the 1980s. The war greatly worsened an already bad economic situation. Destruction of factories, equipment and the extensive network of irrigation canals essential for cotton production, coupled with an out-migration of many non-Tajik skilled technicians and managers, left the country's economy severely disrupted. The breakdown in trade left Tajikistan facing serious food shortages.
7. The cotton farming in Khatlon was organised in large state farms that held most of the province's best arable land and employed the majority of the working population. Each state farm included many villages without regard for their ethnic composition. Thus, Kulyabi and Garhi had worked side-by-side, men in positions of management and on canal maintenance and women in planting, cultivation and harvesting. Villages also shared schools, clinics and all the other social services of the Soviet system. In spite of occasional tensions and competition for leadership positions within the state farms, relations between groups were generally harmonious. As the war came to an end, the fields lay fallow awaiting the planting of a cotton crop on which virtually everyone in Khatlon Province depended for survival. The vast network of irrigation canals was disrupted, undermining any potential cotton crop and water access in villages as well.
8. Each household in Khatlon continues to own a small private plot on which they have always grown vegetables for household consumption and local sale.
9. In some cases, local people of Khatlon took "reconciliation initiatives" in the period of repatriation. For example, a woman officer of one district government knew her former Garhi neighbours were returning. She "prepared food for three days" and invited these returnees and her Kulyabi neighbours to dinner beneath her garden arbour. Facing each other across her table, they ate together in what she hoped was a reconciling way. In another village, when Garhi families returned, Kulyabi residents "went out to meet them with bread and salt," a traditional symbolic welcoming. Many people believed that "the common people don't want war, but policy people make it."
10. Many noted that women have a special role to play in overcoming animosity. As one woman



said, "The nature of women is different. She can forget and forgive but man is a little bit animal. His blood is hot." Others outlined things women could do including: "training their children better not to hate" (Kulyabi woman); "teaching my children and grandchildren not to seek reprisals, not to keep remembering and not to 'play' war with 'them'" (Garmi woman); "working together on common projects with 'them'" (Kulyabi woman); "getting my husband who was a school teacher to meet with 'their' teachers to talk about how teachers from both groups can teach better attitudes in school" (Garmi woman); and "women must lead us" (Kulyabi man).

11. In some villages, elder women and men formed committees to help settle disputes over housing when a Garmi family would return to find that a Kulyabi family had moved into their former home. However, many people also put responsibility for peace-making somewhere else. They shrugged and said: "time is the best healer" or "it will never happen again because people don't want war" or "we have learned our lesson" or "they have learned their lesson."
12. By fall 1994, Save the Children Federation (SCF) had a large and active programme underway in several districts of Khatlon Province. The programme provided food payments from Food for Work (FFW) to village-based brigades of local people in payment for their labour on the reconstruction of war-damaged homes. The project was successful in supporting the rebuilding of many homes and this, in turn, encouraged the rapid repatriation of people who had fled during the war. SCF staff felt that repatriation was an important first step in reconciliation, but they also wanted to find other opportunities to use their programme to promote inter-group linkages and reconciliation.
13. At the beginning of the repatriation process, Save the Children Federation (SCF) identified two main problems in post-war Tajikistan--a shortage of food and a large number of damaged or destroyed homes. Although food security was less than optimal in Kulyabi villages, malnutrition was mainly found in the destroyed villages.
14. SCF's response was to set up village-based brigades whom they paid with Food for Work to rebuild and repair houses. Priority was given to those villages with the most extensive damage and all destroyed houses in a targeted village were eligible for reconstruction. All village residents--both men and women--who wished to work were eligible to join a brigade. SCF surveyed housing to set priorities for repair and entered into "contracts" with brigades to do the work. The brigades built houses in the traditional way using local mud to make bricks for walls, and SCF provided roofing materials (donated by UNHCR which supplied these as part of their mandated programme to repatriate refugees). Food earned by one person working in a brigade was sufficient to meet 80% of an average family's caloric requirements through the winter of 1994-95.
15. By the fall of 1994, the FFW programme was well established in several districts of Khatlon Province. With over 80 locally hired staff, the programme had been able to organise 15,000 people, mostly returning refugees, to build 12,000 houses. To ensure that they did not hire staff with ethnic prejudices, SCF instituted an interviewing arrangement whereby staff of several different ethnicities interviewed each prospective candidate. It was assumed that any ethnic slurs or biases would be noted by at least one of the interviewers. SCF was satisfied that they were enabling the faster and safer repatriation of refugees and IDPs to the area and that this was a prerequisite for reconciliation.



Case Study “Mediation Training in South Africa”¹

(Quaker Peace Centre)



Source: University of Texas Libraries

1. In April 1994 the first free and fair elections in South Africa took place. After the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in February 1990 and years of hard negotiations the end of the Apartheid system had come. However, the legacy of Apartheid leaves its mark on the South African society up until today.
2. The Apartheid system was based on racial segregation. South Africans were divided into four groups: Whites, Blacks, Indians (who had been brought into the country in the 18th century as cheap labourers) and so-called Coloureds (which include everybody with a mixed background).
3. The Whites form only about 13 % of the South African population while more than 75 % belong to the oppressed black majority. Roughly 3 % are considered as Indians and 9 % as Coloureds. The vast majority of South Africans belong to one of the many Christian congregations while there is a Muslim minority mainly among the Coloured and Indian population.
4. The diversity of the so-called „rainbow nation“ is further expressed in the recognition of 11 official languages. Besides English (the dominant language that was introduced by the British colonialists) and Afrikaans (which is the mother tongue of the descendants of the Dutch

¹ This case study was compiled by Jochen Neumann who was a programme associate at the Quaker Peace Centre (QPC) in 1999/2000 and conducted an internal evaluation. QPC graciously permitted this case study to be used in Do No Harm workshops. For purposes of training this case study only captures a small part of the work done by QPC and also of the programme. It reflects on the state of the programme at that point in time. More details about the work can be found in a research report of the author that has been published by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in May 2001 (www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papneum.htm).



settlers as well as of many Coloureds in the province around Cape Town) one can distinguish nine African languages (and supposedly ethnic groups).

5. Racial segregation dominated almost every aspect of public and private life. For example, up until 1994 Blacks were denied the right to vote and their children had to attend segregated schools of minor quality. Thus, the level of education of Non-Whites was accordingly low and there is still a high level of illiteracy among them. Racial segregation went as far as reserving beaches and benches in parks only for Whites.
6. In addition, there were residential areas designated for the disadvantaged population groups and as a consequence it was more or less prohibited for Blacks to reside in urban areas. Blacks had to live in so-called “homelands”, far away from the urban and industrialised centres of the country, and often on soil of minor quality. Nevertheless, many were heading for the cities so that illegal settlements were established. Still today, the majority of South Africans live in tin shacks in these so-called townships without proper services like electricity, water and sanitation.
7. The extreme socio-economic disparities are even more obvious since well-developed white residential areas are often in the immediate neighbourhood of townships for the poor majority. In 1994 the unemployment rate of Blacks was estimated at more than 40 % while only 7 % of white South Africans were unemployed. By now, the new government has introduced programmes to empower and promote the underprivileged groups of the population. However, often Non-Whites are still lacking the adequate skills for the few available job opportunities.
8. In the 1980's the resistance against the Apartheid regime was not only manifested in the armed struggle of the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC) in exile and the so-called “self-defense units” (SDU) in the townships. The opposition was also formed by a broad civil society movement that engaged nonviolent means and included some white initiatives like the women of Black Sash.
9. In the townships parallel administration structures were established since the institutions of the Apartheid system (e.g. police, judiciary and schools) had lost the trust of the oppressed. Committees for self-administration were elected on street and area level who organised not only the resistance but also many aspects of daily life. The opposition of these community activists and ordinary citizens was conducted, for example, through boycotts, mass demonstrations and the conscious defiance of Apartheid laws that were considered as injustice.
10. Still today, violence is incorporated in structures of the Apartheid system that have not been overcome yet. In the Apartheid era direct violence was committed through torture and political killings by the police and other state security forces, the armed resistance as well as internal power struggles amongst the oppressed population groups. The white Apartheid regime tried not only to divide the Blacks into ethnic groups like Zulus or Xhosa, but also to create animosity between their political representatives, the Inkatha movement/party and the ANC. Furthermore, from the mid-1980's the Indians and Coloureds were tempted with political reforms that granted them the right to vote for a separate chamber of parliament which, however, had only little authority.
11. The conflicts in the townships range from political power struggles among the activists in the



informal structures of self-administration and among the party politicians in the officially elected town councils as well as conflicts between these parallel structures.

12. Development projects of the government or the business sector offer the opportunity to dedicate financial resources to the upliftment of disadvantaged people. However, such infrastructure or housing projects might also feed latent conflicts if the people cannot get involved or if it is not transparent who will benefit from it in which way.
13. The people are very concerned about the deep-rooted conflicts, the high crime rate and daily violence.



Information about the project

14. The Quaker Peace Centre (QPC) in Cape Town was formally established in 1988 by members of the religious society of friends, the Quakers. Even before they had been dedicated to the cause of the oppressed and had informally supported initiatives and self-help projects in the townships surrounding Cape Town. A key area of work of this non-governmental organisation is the constructive resolution of conflicts in the townships.
15. The vision of QPC for a just South African society is based on the model of nonviolent and constructive resolution of conflicts, on mutual tolerance and respect as well as the recognition of diversity and cultural differences as a rich heritage and God-given gift.
16. The “Mediation Training” is one of the programmes of QPC. Here community activists are to become „community mediators“ through a five-month training course which takes place twice a year since 1996.
17. The street committees that still exist in the townships today propose community activists for participation in these trainings. A requirement for participation in the course is such a recommendation by the respective community structure, active engagement in the community and the status of unemployment. QPC conducts a written and oral application process in which the proposed candidates are tested against these criteria. In addition QPC is aiming for a gender balance.
18. For each training course about 25 participants are accepted with three trainers being responsible for the course. QPC tries to ensure that not only single community activists from various townships take part but rather a small group of participants from a township. On average each course consists of participants from around six different townships.
19. The trainers themselves come from disadvantaged communities. They are also trained and active as community mediators. The programme director is female, the other two staff members are male. Not all of them are Quakers, but all three have a Christian background. The training is conducted in English. However, the staff usually also speaks Afrikaans as well as at least one African language, their mother tongue.
20. The training of the community mediators is based on three pillars. Firstly, in one-day workshops that take place fortnightly knowledge and skills are conveyed. Secondly, the course has a practical component in which the trainees work as mediators in the townships. Thirdly, the participants are supported through supervision by the staff members. Thus, the participants apply the knowledge and skills in their own practical work as community mediators. Supervision sessions with one of the trainers are scheduled on a weekly basis and are held in the respective townships.
21. The participants receive a small stipend for attending the course that is a small, but welcome contribution to the family income. Upon completion of the training course a certificate is issued. After the course many participants are actively seeking a job. In case they find employment only little time is left for their voluntary work in the townships.
22. The community mediators are called upon by their fellow township residents mainly in neighbourhood conflicts, theft on a smaller as well as larger scale, but also in cases of physical violence like beatings, murder, rape and child abuse.



Supplement to the Case Study „Mediation Training in South Africa“

The Quaker Peace Centre (QPC) redesigned their programmes and activities in a very systematic and comprehensive way.

A) Redesign of the project on “Mediation Training”

- They stopped to pay a stipend to participants of the mediation training course. Participants only received reimbursement for their travel expenses.
- They reached out to other townships in which Coloureds of Muslim religion lived. And one of the first trained mediators from such a background was hired as new staff member and trainer.
- They changed the selection criteria in the way that also some employed people could participate. In fact, they selected now staff of key institutions (like police and social services).
- The training and the community mediators were linked with official structures (like town council and police) which lead to a close cooperation with local police stations in some townships. Here a referral system was jointly agreed so that all cases in which body fluids were involved (like rape and murder) were referred to police by the community mediators, and vice versa. In some townships the community mediators were even allowed to use a room in the local police station for their mediation services.
- The alumni of the mediation training courses established, with the support of QPC, an association of community mediators. This legal body allowed them to apply for tenders (for example for voter education campaigns) which led to funds being raised for their work for the community. Their representatives also held advocacy meetings with the Ministry of Justice to demand an official recognition of community mediation in the justice system. And they came to an agreement with the ministry that trained mediators could function as lay assessors in local courts.

B) Redesign of the programme

- The unit which was responsible for “Mediation Training” was more systematically linked with another QPC unit which was engaged in direct interventions in community conflicts, forming a joint programme called “Integrated Response to Community Conflict”.

C) Redesign of the organisational structure

- QPC established an advisory board for the whole organisation and its activities which included representatives from all faith communities including the Imam.



Case Study “Social Integration of Former Child Soldiers in Mozambique”¹

(Rebuilding Hope)



Source: University of Texas Libraries

¹ This case study was developed by Peter Steudtner and is based on research into the conflicts between traditional internal mechanisms of integration of former child soldiers and the “modern” external integration by the NGO Rebuilding Hope. More details about his research can be found in Peter Steudtner (2001): Die soziale Eingliederung von Kindersoldaten: Konzepte und Erfahrungen aus Mosambik (The Social Integration of Child soldiers: Concepts and Experiences from Mozambique), Berghof Report No. 6, Berlin, <http://image.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Reports/br6d.pdf>. (German language only; abstract in English available.)



Child soldier (definition by UNICEF): a person under the age of 18, who in whatever function (messenger, cook, soldier...) is part of a regular or irregular army or armed group. Including functions for girls like sexual abuse or forced marriage to soldiers/armed personal.

Information about the overall context

1. After 500 years of colonial rule over Mozambique, the liberation war against the Portuguese took more than 10 years (1964-1975). Portuguese remained the official language and competes with the traditional Mozambican languages.
2. Shortly after the liberation a brutal civil war started and lasted more than 17 years. More than 1 million people died, approximately 600.000 of them were children. 1.5 million people fled to neighbouring countries, around 4 million were internally displaced. Nearly the complete infrastructure and industrial complexes were destroyed.
3. The civil war ended in 1992 with the national Peace accord between the two fighting parties FRELIMO („government“) and RENAMO („rebels“). It was the result of long negotiations under the facilitation of church based groups, international mediators and with the use of financial incentives. Subsequent initiatives for the demobilisation and rehabilitation of fighters from the different groups were entirely oriented towards adult soldiers.
4. From the mid-1980s onwards more and more child soldiers were recruited in Mozambique. All parties recruited child soldiers although by different means („voluntary“, forced, kidnapped, false promises...). Boys and girls were recruited and had to serve different tasks - especially sexual abuse for girls.
5. According to research, all child soldiers suffered from very different psychological and social impacts of having been a soldier. These were mostly linked to the atrocities that were committed against child soldiers (being captured, injured, sexually abused) or to the atrocities they were forced to commit themselves. Additionally during the demobilisation and rehabilitation, the non-recognition of their services was traumatising for the child soldiers.
6. When coming back to their villages almost all child soldiers passed through rites of reintegration, which took place within the communities. These ceremonies were the same as for other adults and children who spent some time away from their village / families (e.g. refugees or migrant workers). Most of them were conducted by traditional healers, elders or leaders of churches.
7. Some of the former child soldiers made their way into family reunification programmes or street children programmes of INGOs or NGOs.
8. Until the end of 1998 the existence of child soldiers in Mozambique was completely negated in official politics. There was also no official demobilisation process for former child soldiers or recognition of their activities during war. Although there were lists for a large amount of the recruited children (at least from Government side) these documents are not accessible until today. Estimates claim that there have been between 2.300 and 10.000 child soldiers during the civil war.



Information about the local context

9. The Ilha Josina Machel is a vulnerable but very fertile region some 130 km north of the capital Maputo. It is an island situated between the arms of two rivers and is regularly inundated. It is a largely traditionally structured rural area of 7 bigger villages spread out on the island. Because it was so fertile, farmers used to produce a lot of grain and maize for the whole region. During the war it was completely destroyed by government and rebel forces, which fought for the island for pure survival. Especially at the end of the war, food was very scarce in Mozambique.
10. The number of child soldiers who were recruited by both factions was large and nearly all families were affected. Additionally, nearly all children on the island were victims or witnesses of the waging war.
11. The psychosocial effects on child soldiers were manifold. They suffered from sleep and behavioural disorders (introvertedness / aggressiveness). They showed inadequate behaviour in relation to their age group or socio-cultural issues, and other behaviour which can be related to psycho-traumatic problems (loss of trust, fear of revenge, etc.). Child soldiers also lagged behind in their education. Especially for girls the experiences of rape / sexual abuse had a negative impact on them.
12. But child soldiers also had positive experiences of their own power of community amongst themselves.
13. Ceremonies of the traditional healers, elders and churches worked and impacted on the following levels:
 - Individual physical level: medical substances were given to treat the physical problems, with the goal of a complete economic integration of former child soldiers (e.g. being ready for getting married etc.)
 - Individual psycho-spiritual level: prayers, cleansings and sacrificial offering were conducted to ease the psycho-traumatic problems. Through active forgetting (like an anachronistic break with the past) the sharing of experiences of war was limited in order to avoid tensions and feelings of revenge in the community.
 - Family level: cleansings were conducted including other members of the family to relieve the former child soldiers from feelings of guilt but also to take away the fears of the family and community of the aggressive and threatening behavior of the children. The aim was to get rid of the „bad spirits“ which the children brought with them from the war.
 - Community level: Often a taboo was declared in a cleansing ceremony, not to speak any more about the personal experiences from war times in order to preserve peace in the community.



Information about the project

14. At the end of 1994, two years after the end of the civil war, a „project for the social integration of child soldiers“ was established by the Maputo-based NGO Rebuilding Hope. The overall objective was on the one hand prevention and on the other dealing with already existing problems and conflicts. Thus, psychological and social challenges of former child soldiers were to be coped with before they would lead to problems or conflicts in the community. Already existing behavioral and emotional problems of child soldiers as well as open conflicts within their families and communities were tackled by respective treatment and coping strategies.
15. The mandate of the NGO focused on psychosocial work especially in rural or semi-urban areas, and included the following key areas of work: health, psychological impact of the war, community development.
16. The intervention of the project took place on three levels: 1) psychosocial and psychotherapeutical work with the youngsters, 2) activities for the families and communities as well as 3) with schools and general educational activities. Additionally the NGO implemented a lobby and advocacy campaign to raise awareness amongst the general public for the formal recognition of child soldiers.
17. Activistas – older local volunteers – were engaged for important support functions for the former child soldiers. They knew the community and the former child soldiers very well. The Activistas not only implemented all psychosocial activities but also were responsible for communicating the wishes and ideas of the youngsters, their families and of the communities towards the NGO.
18. The rehabilitation project aimed at empowering the former child soldiers to cope with traumatic experiences and to win back their feeling of identity, their self-esteem and trust. They expected that the child soldiers would learn to better control their aggressions.
19. The project trained 20 Activistas, teachers and other professional staff for giving professional psychosocial help to the child soldiers and their families, especially in doing home visits. Additionally professional psychologists conducted psychotherapy sessions (first individually, at a later stage as group sessions) on an irregular basis with the former child soldiers.
20. Essential for the programme was the work of the so called self-help-groups which were facilitated by the Activistas. These groups were implementing income generating activities like agricultural farming and fishing. Additionally the Activistas gave them alphabetisation classes. For these activities agricultural and fishing material was provided by the project including a tractor, nets and small fishing boats.
21. Within the duration of the project from 1994 to 1999 more than 150 former child soldiers between the age of 14 and 25 years were directly involved in the self-help-groups and in the therapy sessions with Mozambican psychologists from the capital Maputo.
22. The project included a component of training the local teachers and other activists in arts education / arts therapy.
23. As a community support the local school rooms were partially rehabilitated by the NGO.
24. The following paid staff from Maputo was working for this project:
 - 3 psychologists trained by the Pedagogical University in Maputo
 - 2 arts educators / therapists
 - 1 Logistic



- 2 Drivers

25. The following paid local staff from Ilha Josina Machel was working for this project:

- 4 guards
- 2 cooks / house keepers
- 2 tractor drivers
- 1 secretary

26. The 20 Activistas received a monthly small stipend acknowledging their engagement.

27. The NGO constructed buildings for the residence of the Maputo staff as well as training rooms and alphabetisation class rooms.

28. The NGO is dependent on project financing and donations from NGOs from Europe and the USA as well as from international donors like UNICEF.



Additional information about the project (Optional)

29. From 1997 to 1999 the Maputo-based NGO Rebuilding Hope cooperated with a German NGO within the framework of the so-called Civil Peace Service (CPS). The CPS is a programme funded by the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development which enables German NGOs to send consultants on constructive conflict transformation abroad.
30. The German NGO placed a German CPS consultant for some three years at the Mozambican NGO. He was a 30 year old psychologist who knew Portuguese well.
31. His tasks were mainly conducting a study on traditional forms of the integration of the former child soldiers in the project area, the training of community workers in trauma counselling and supporting the organisation in designing the public campaign for the formal recognition of child soldiers in Mozambique.
32. His salary as a German consultant was higher than the one of the overall director of the NGO. The CPS cooperation also covered the costs of the whole project for some three years.





Case Study Kampong Svay Area Development Programme, in Svay Rieng Province ¹



National Context

1. Cambodia, or Kampuchea, has a rich history that includes the Khmer Empire which ruled much of Southeast Asia from the 9th to the 13th century. In the 12th Century the Khmer Kingdom built Angkor Wat, which remains the world's largest religious building and is Cambodia's most prized national symbol. However, beginning in the 1860's, Cambodia was colonised by the French for 90 years, occupied by the Japanese during World War II, used by the North Vietnamese for guerrilla bases during the Vietnam war, and bombed repeatedly in a secret campaign by the USA.
2. Since the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime that killed over two million people from 1975-1979, Cambodia has suffered eleven years of foreign communist occupation by Vietnam, civil war, political occupation by the United Nations, violent democratic elections, numerous coup attempts, and finally, ongoing reconstruction of Cambodian society in the midst of significant communal violence.

¹ This case study was written by Bill Forbes. Bill Lowrey revised and tested the case study and the facilitation notes. We thank World Vision for granting the permission to use the case study for teaching the concept and use of Do No Harm. The people, locations, and actions in this case study are fictional. However, the case study is based on real situations and programmes that WVC has observed during Conflict and Violence Assessments in 2004.



3. Cambodia is still one of the poorest countries in the world, with most social indicators among the worst in Asia. Almost all educated people were killed during the Khmer Rouge genocide and the schools were destroyed. Only about one fourth of those who lived during that period have a primary education. Today, no more than one third of the students are able to go to secondary school although the literacy level has reached approximately 80% in the urban settings. However, in the midst of these challenges, Cambodia is in the process of building its economy, its schools and a multi-party democracy under a constitutional monarchy, with significant progress in recent years.
4. While outright war has ceased since late 1999 (except for sporadic coup attempts), acts or threats of violence and power abuse, as well as rampant corruption, are a common factor in Cambodian politics at all levels. General disrespect of law and the weak judicial system has crippled the development of a strong civil society.
5. During a one-year political deadlock in the formation of a new government after recent elections, the police violently suppressed all forms of demonstration in Phnom Penh. The elections resulted in a continuing majority rule by the Cambodian People's Party (73 seats), who formed a coalition with FUNCINPEC Party (26 seats). The opposition party (Sam Rainsy Party) has 24 seats in the National Assembly, but was illegally denied any seats in parliamentary commissions.
6. At the community level, World Vision research in seven districts in 2004 shows that many community members live in fear and mistrust. This unrest is caused by many factors, including power abuse by local authorities, political party tension and corruption, land conflicts and land grabbing by the powerful, and resentment of foreign influence and illegal immigrants.

Background

7. Kampong Svay District is located in Svay Rieng Province, on the Vietnam border. It has a population of 55,000 people, and is divided into 8 communes, which are then further divided into 84 villages. The population of Kampong Svay district is estimated to be 84% ethnic Khmer (Cambodian majority), 11% ethnic Vietnamese, and 5% ethnic Chinese. The three major political parties are active in the district, although there is very little local violence between them.
8. During the campaigning period of the recent national elections, one Sam Rainsy Party activist was murdered on a Saturday night in Phnom Village, but police immediately stated this was a case of jealousy over a romantic love affair. The most significant challenges facing this district (as identified in the ADP Design process) are food insecurity due to repeated droughts and floods, limited income generating opportunities, health problems--especially for children, low quality education, and poor infrastructure (irrigation, roads, etc).
9. As part of the government system, there are Village Chiefs who were appointed many years ago by the ruling party — the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), and Commune Chiefs who were elected in 2003. The Village Chief submits proposals to the Commune Chief for government programmes and services in their village, and so the Village and Commune Chiefs normally maintain close personal relationships in which they help each other. In the past, when there



were difficult conflicts between families, they used to go to elders to help resolve them in a fair and wise way. Now, however, most people go directly to the Village Chief when they have disputes that they cannot resolve themselves.

10. As long as the Village and Commune Chiefs do not make the district or provincial government authorities angry, and as long as there are no local security problems, the Village and Commune Chiefs are quite free to do what they want. This structure has meant that there is considerable variation in the leadership styles, responsibilities and actions at the local level—some Village and Commune Chiefs are accountable and effective local leaders, but many use their positions to secure power, practice favouritism in the community, and build up personal resources.
11. The personal wealth of village chiefs is commonly evident by the chief having one of the largest homes in the villages.

Po Village

12. World Vision Cambodia works on transformational development through long-term, community-based projects called Area Development Programmes (ADPs). The mission of the organisation is “All Cambodians live in peace, justice and prosperity.” Kampong Svay ADP began in 2001, and is supported by funds from World Vision United Kingdom. ADPs independently design, monitor and evaluate their projects in consultation with the community and other stakeholders.
13. Kampong Svay ADP focuses its work on four communes in Kampong Svay District. Po Village is one of 40 target villages in Kampong Svay ADP. Most of the people in Po Village are Buddhist, but there are 2 groups of Christians that meet in homes. So far there are no apparent open conflicts between the Christians and the Buddhists. When the World Vision staff asked about this, the local people said, “We are all poor neighbours, and we can respect each other. And we help each other during harvest season.” In the recent national elections, the community voted 89% for CPP, 7% for Sam Rainsy Party, and 4% for FUNCINPEC Party.
14. The Village Chief is usually a fairly calm man, and tries to keep things calm in his village. He is not normally violent, but is known to be very biased to his relatives and friends. The families known to support FUNCINPEC or Sam Rainsy Party claim they do not get their fair share of government resources, and that the Village and Commune Chiefs keep most of the government funds for themselves, and then share them more with CPP families.
15. Some of the Sam Rainsy and FUNCINPEC families recently complained about this in the village, and in response some of their neighbours shared things with them and told them their suffering was really hard. People agree that corruption by the powerful causes trouble in the village, and jealousy and competition between families.
16. There are quite a few families moving into and out of this village, since it is near the border. Some of the older adults who lived through the war and occupation still harbour some resentment toward the Vietnamese. Most of the younger people wish to forget about those earlier times of national suffering and prefer not to talk about their painful history. In the past year, 12 very poor families have lost their land to local authorities through illegal land



grabbing. 7 families lost their land to the Village Chief, and 5 to the Commune Chief. Most of these families had moved to the community in the past two years, and the chiefs claimed it was illegal for them to claim the land since they did not have official land titles. Most of these families left for Phnom Penh, with no plans of how to survive. Other villagers are afraid that the Village Chief will take their land next, and rumours are spreading that he is making people pay 20\$ for land titles, which is much higher than the official rate.

17. The villagers are very happy that World Vision chose to work in their village. All of the villagers are tired of war and poverty, and enthusiastic to see change and development in their village.

World Vision Cambodia's Programme: The Village Development Committee

18. Kampong Svay ADP plans and implements all of its activities in Po Village through the Village Development Committee (VDC). The reason WVC works through the VDC is that this is a democratically elected group (chosen by the local people), and therefore they say the VDC is independent from politics. Also, the VDC structure and role is formally recognised by the Ministry of Rural Development.
19. In addition, World Vision is committed to local capacity building for sustainable development, and so it tries to build the capacity of the VDC to lead the development process in the future. Finally, working through VDCs allows World Vision staff to cover a large geographical area, although it means their time in villages is limited. The Kampong Svay ADP staff are college graduates from the capital city of Cambodia - Phnom Penh, and don't normally stay overnight in the village.
20. The ADP tries to be very transparent and democratic in the selection process for the VDC. Each VDC is made up of 5 members, which are intended to serve a three-year term.
21. The following process was used in 2003 to elect the current VDC members:
 - ADP Staff drafted the following criteria for VDC Membership, after consulting with community members
 - Committed to the community
 - Able to read and write
 - Never been in prison
 - Not biased
 - Person who villagers respect and love, and is friendly
 - At least 2 of the 5 must be women
22. The ADP Manager then gave the criteria to the Village Chief, and asked him to make a list of at least 15 Candidates who fit the criteria. The Manager reminded the Village Chief to not be biased, that the community members would choose the VDC members by public election, and that these people would be in place for at least three years. The manager suggested that the Chief talk openly with villagers about this as well, seeing whom they would like to nominate. The Village Chief agreed, and the next week the ADP Manager heard the Village Chief had actually asked some villagers who they thought would be good candidates.



23. After the Village Chief submitted the list to the ADP Manager, the staff made posters listing the candidates' names, and announcing the election. These posters were put up throughout the village. They also wrote at the bottom "If you would like to add your name as a candidate, or nominate someone else to be a candidate, please just inform the Village Chief and he will add your name to the list." The Village Chief lived in the village, so it would be easy for people to inform him, and then he could inform the ADP Manager.
24. Before election day, the ADP Staff and Village Chief informed people throughout the village of the date and time and put up reminder posters. They reminded the families with relatives far away in the rice fields to call their relatives to the meeting.
25. The election was held at the home of the Village Chief, and was very open. The lists were printed on the walls. Everyone got two votes—one for a man and one for a woman. People were given 1 pink sheet of paper and 1 white sheet of paper. They then wrote a woman candidate's name on the pink one and a man's on the white one, and then walked to the front of the room to put the names in a ballot box. The Village Chief, 2 community members, and 2 WVC staff were present at the ballot box to make sure everyone voted according to the instructions.
26. The votes were then counted together that night in the ADP office by the Village Chief, 2 volunteers from the village, the ADP Manager and one other ADP staff, to make sure of transparency.
27. In the last election, the results were that a majority of the VDC supported the CPP, or Cambodian People's Party (4 out of 5). The WVC staff thought this was not a surprise or a problem, since most of the village also supports the CPP.
28. The ADP went on to design its activities and plans with the VDC, and the Village Chief acted as the formal advisor of the VDC, as required by the Ministry of Rural Development. Also, the Village Chief and VDC leader had to approve the documents for all activity expenses (such as contracts for construction companies, etc). In order to maintain neutrality and transparency, the VDCs conducted open village meetings once per month at the VDC homes, not at the Village Chief's home.



Additional information about the project (Optional)**Kampong Svay ADP Programme Components****Education programme design**

Kampong Svay ADP is exploring the option of implementing an education programme with an annual budget of \$50,000. The proposed goals and objectives follow:

- 1) To provide a safe, convenient and comfortable building by 2009 to children and at the same time awaken the interest of at least 40% of the 267 children to enhance their creativity, skills and capabilities as they prepare for the future.
- 2) To provide a venue for multi-purpose school and community activities that would transform 20% of these children's towards spiritual, social, cultural and economic awareness by 2009 for them to be more responsible citizens of the community with a vision for the future.

Based on the survey conducted by the community leaders during the second quarter of 1999, there are skills among families such as food processing, embroidery, furniture and cabinet making, home decor and souvenir items making which can be harnessed and be developed as alternative sources income. Families, making the children feel emotionally secure because both parents are present, can do these at home.

One of the problems stated was the pressing need of the community for a safe and decent building where children can have a venue for holistic learning and development. At present, school children are holding Industrial and Home Economics classes in a condemned/dilapidated old building. The building is no longer healthy and safe for these children especially during rainy seasons more so in times of earthquakes.

Several joint resolutions have already been passed to concerned government agencies but to no avail. Since community development programmes are centred in the present and future lives of children, the Industrial and Home Economics building is really a need. This undertaking supports the overall direction of the ADP to pursue total care and development of children. Responding to their educational needs means development of skills and capabilities, creativity and industry. It is a turning point in preparing them to be more productive members and leaders of the community.

The community is praying for a safe, secured and convenient building where children will hold classes. The building will also serve and can be of use during times of calamities to house children and women in need of a place to live in emergency situations.

Drought mitigation programme (ongoing)

According to the Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture of FAO, Cambodia had its worst drought in recent years, affecting 14 out of 24 provinces and municipalities¹. Availability of water, an essential life source for farmers, has dropped to critically low levels. In particular, Kampong Svay Province has been severely hit by the water shortage crisis. In many areas, people are forced to save drinking water for household use, shortchanging personal hygiene needs and providing less water for animals.

Cambodia relies on agriculture as a primary source of income; 85 percent of its population lives in rural areas. Drought poses a serious threat to rural livelihoods and recurrent droughts increase the



level of risk faced by communities year after year. According to the National Committee for Disaster Management (NCDM), since 2002 drought has affected over 2 million people in the country². In the worst hit areas, all irrigation has been banned, further threatening future crops. Rice production has been affected in all provinces; over half a million people are facing food shortages (GEWIS/FAO, 2005). Those worst affected are poorer farmers who own very small farms far from streams, where irrigation is expensive and difficult. Many people who lost their harvest to the drought are coping with its aftermath in ways that send them deeper into poverty and deprivation - men migrating to towns to find work, increased borrowing, selling off assets such as farmland and livestock, taking children out of school, and eating less (GIEWS/FAO, 2005).

Many people, including approximately 14,300 women, are facing increasing difficulties in obtaining water for home consumption due to a significant reduction in availability and accessibility of safe water sources, as shown by the drought assessment done by WV staff in February 2006. Some people have to walk many kilometres to find water for daily use, and they lack the materials to store adequate quantities of water for longer-term use. Most of the water collectors are women and children, since men are engaged in income-earning activities.

In response to the drought, the ADP has been implementing a \$200,000 (total budget over 3 years; one year into the project) and drought mitigation project with the following components:

Objective 1: Capacity of target community to prepare for and respond to drought strengthened

- Expected Result 1.1 Knowledge and skills on HVCA (Hazard-Vulnerability & Capacity Assessment) of the relevant institutions at district and commune levels and communities improved;
- Expected Result 1.2 Preparedness capacity and coordination of the relevant institutions at district and commune levels improved; and
- Expected Result 1.3: Community-based drought preparedness & mitigation plans at commune and village levels prepared.

Objective 2: Small-scale drought mitigation measures promoted

- Expected Result 2.1: Increased access to water for domestic usage and agriculture production/livestock & animal husbandry;
- Expected Result 2.2: Appropriate drought-resistant seeds, breeds and production technologies promoted; and
- Expected Result 2.3: Sources of income diversified.



Case Studies for Application Exercises

The following pages contain two case studies for facilitating an application exercise. The case studies are formatted in such a way that they can be copied and handed out to participants.

Case Study “Assisting Displaced People From Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan”¹



Source: University of Texas Libraries

1. Sudan has been the site of an intense civil war for over forty years. Though the entire country has been affected by the conflict, open fighting has been concentrated in the South.
2. The war in Sudan has been characterised as a conflict between the Muslim North and the Christian and animist South, with the government in the North attempting to impose its culture and system on the people in the South. However, recent shifts in the alliances of fighters from one side to the other call this characterisation into question. In addition, divisions among fighters in the South have often led to battles with resultant inter-ethnic tensions between Southern groups.
3. There are many tribal/ethnic groups in Southern Sudan. Although there have always been some inter-group disputes, relations among them have varied from cordial (involving frequent inter-marriage and agreements among chiefs) to tense (characterised by cattle raids and intermittent fighting). The years of war have put additional strains on traditional patterns, sometimes forcing new alliances and sometimes erupting into new clashes. All areas of the South have suffered economically.
4. In May 1998, between 800 and 2000 Dinka people from various parts of Bahr el Ghazal walked south to Nadiangere in Yambio County in search of food. Due to fighting and two years of drought, Bahr el Ghazal was experiencing a pre-famine situation while food security in Yambio was relatively stable. Throughout 1998, international humanitarian assistance had focused on the Bahr el Ghazal region but had not been sufficient so there had been some hunger-related deaths.
5. The migration of Dinka into Yambio was very unusual. The Dinka are a Nilotic tribe whereas the vast majority of people in Yambio are Zande (a Bantu tribe). Three or four other smaller tribes constitute the rest of the population of Yambio.

¹ This case study was compiled by Wolfgang Jamann, programme coordinator of World Vision Germany in Sudan in the end of the 1990ies.



6. The Dinka are agro-pastoralists and the Zande are agriculturalists. Because Yambio country is infested with tsetse fly, the Dinka cannot bring their cattle into the area.
7. The Dinka and Zande also differ culturally. For example, the Dinka have a strong sharing tradition that allows anyone who needs something to take it. When someone arrives hungry in a Dinka household, he or she may always eat from the family pot of food. When they migrated, Dinka often continued their sharing tradition, taking things that they needed even though other groups did not accept this tradition.
8. Dinka and Zande traditionally engaged in trade, exchanging Dinka meat for Zande grain or for cash. Some other contacts between the groups were violent. The last visit of the Dinka into Yambio had occurred in 1987/88 and was accompanied by raids and fighting.
9. Some of the Dinka cited reasons other than the famine conditions for their migration, including: 1) that though food was available in Bahr el Ghazal, its distribution was poorly organised; 2) that the food that was available was being sold by authorities; or 3) that authorities had given instructions that they should move south.
10. Some members of the local Zande community did not believe the migrants' explanations for their arrival and suspected, instead, that they were Dinka soldiers in disguise, or they were criminals or some other kind of outcasts. Some Zande were anxious, also, because they believed that the Dinka were capable of witchcraft, especially for rainmaking. This challenged their strong Christian beliefs. One local resident suspected that the Dinka had begun to eat their own children during the long walk to Yambio.
11. In spite of everything, the Dinka who arrived in Yambio in dire need were received by the local peoples with hospitality. They shared food, space, shelter and cooking facilities with the new arrivals. They explained this saying, "They are human beings who need to survive just like us."
12. One local chief remembered his own ancestor's displacement that had brought them to Yambio years ago. There was a general sense among the Yambio groups that they shared the Dinka's uncertainty, food insecurity and displacement as a result of the war (though at a different level).
13. Some local people hired Dinka men and women to do agricultural work, paying them either with food or money. When they worked together, both men and women seemed to connect easily across groups. However, Dinka chiefs made no direct attempt to interact with local chiefs. Dinkas who were Christians attended Sunday services in local churches despite the language barrier between the groups.
14. The influx of Dinka into Yambio County put a strain on food security and on potable water in the region. The displaced Dinka also lacked most essential household items, seeds and tools.
15. Though they sympathised with the Dinkas' plight, local people and their authorities did not want them to settle in their area.
16. NGOs made a rapid assessment of the situation in Yambio. They found 25 moderately or severely malnourished Dinka children in need of supplementary feeding and medical assistance and identified food assistance as being urgently needed by the whole Dinka group.
17. Although the NGOs felt that it would be best for the Dinka to return to their homes, they refused to do so even when promised assistance at their place of origin.
18. The NGOs were unsure how long to continue to provide assistance to the displaced Dinkas in



Yambio County. The local community was advising them to supply seeds and tools to Dinkas as well as food so that they could reestablish their own food security. If they planted crops, it would take two months until the Dinka could realise their first harvest. The local community also wanted to receive non-food aid if such was distributed to the displaced Dinka.

19. Faced with the desire of local people that the Dinka should leave and with the Dinka refusal to return to Barh el Ghazal, NGOs considered relocating the Dinkas to Menze, a scarcely populated area 18 km to the north of Nadiangere. The people of Menze objected to this, but their chief seemed willing to welcome the Dinka.
20. As the NGOs were considering their options, word came of another influx of displaced Dinka moving from Bahr el Ghazal into the Menze area.



Case Study “Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Sri Lanka”¹



Source: University of Texas Libraries

Information about the overall context

1. About 20 million people with varied ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds who mostly draw their origins from South India are living on the island of Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese (74%) are predominantly of Buddhist faith. The Tamils form the biggest minority with 17%. They are divided into so called Sri Lankan Tamils (11%) and Indian Tamils (6%). Most Tamils are Hindus, but many are Muslim or Christian. There are as many Sinhalese as Tamils among the Christian population (7%) in Sri Lanka.
2. Some 8% of Sri Lanka's population, called “Moors” (still reflecting European colonial language), are predominantly followers of Sunni Islam²². They are descendants of immigrants from Arab countries, Indian Muslims, Malayan minorities or (converted) local Muslims. Compared to many among the other peoples of Sri Lanka who have traditionally tended to be monolingual, Moors are much more at home with Sinhala, Tamil and sometimes moreover with English. Finally, smaller ethnic groups such as the “Burghers” (of mixed European descent) and the indigenous Veddah are rapidly declining.
3. Most Tamils and Muslims are living in the northern and eastern regions, but there are also sizeable Tamil and Muslim communities in Western and Central Province, Colombo and other southern urban areas. The Sinhalese predominantly live in the southern regions and central

¹ This case study was compiled by Karen Johne in consultation with the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA). It was designed specifically for application workshops.

² The majority of people in Sri Lanka are using the term “Muslim” as a religious as well as an ethnic term to describe the Moors.



highlands of the island, although there is also a large Sinhalese minority in the East.

4. Before colonisation, regional dynasties ruled different parts of the island, e.g. a Tamil-based dynasty in Jaffna or a Sinhalese one in Kandy. The coastal areas of the island were first controlled by the Portuguese and later by the Dutch. When the island was ceded to the British in 1796, the whole island was united under a single administration for the first time.
5. During World War I, the first national movements arose. Their failure has been attributed to disputes between Sinhalese and Tamils. In 1948, Ceylon became independent with a government dominated by the Sinhalese elite. A clause, demanded by the Tamil side to protect minorities' rights, did not find its way into the constitution.
6. After winning the general elections with its programme of Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism, the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) passed the "Sinhala Only" Act in 1956, which proclaimed Sinhalese the official language of Ceylon. Conflict researchers trace this back to the experience of the Sinhalese during the colonial age, in which the Tamils received advantages within the British colonial administration under its principle of "divide and rule".
7. Sinhalese nationalism goes back to the British period, when it was part of a broader anti-colonial movement, accentuated by Buddhist revivalism. It grew stronger with independence as a unifying force within a society strongly divided along caste, class and political lines. When Ceylon became the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in 1972, a constitution was passed under the increasing influence of the Buddhist monks (Sangha) in state affairs, which established Buddhism as the de facto state religion.
8. Tamil demands for non-discrimination and equal status for their language and culture increased. After a nonviolent struggle for their rights, these demands were radicalised and transformed over the years into demands for independence and self-government in the areas where the Tamils are the dominant community. The killing of 13 soldiers by the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam³³) in 1983 and the following massive anti-Tamil pogroms which claimed over 3,000 lives are seen as the beginning of the civil war and also as the beginning of large-scale displacement. Thousands of Muslims, Sinhalese and Tamils came as refugees to India, Europe and other countries of asylum, but most were displaced within the country.
9. The armed conflict for power-sharing between the government and the LTTE has been perceived as the dominant feature of the civil war in Sri Lanka. However, there are other conflict lines as well. One of them is linked to long time state discrimination and marginalisation of Muslims, which has led to new discourses of ethnic identity and homeland concealing intra-Muslim divisions. Moreover, the Muslim community was particularly affected by the civil war, because many Muslims live in the Northern and Eastern Province, in the crossfire between the government army and guerrilla warfare.
10. Since the early 1990ies Muslims have been targets of ethnic cleansing, forced displacement and massacres particularly practiced by the LTTE. The Tigers gained control over the Tamil-dominated areas in the north and east of Sri Lanka, expelling a large proportion of the Muslim population of Jaffna in 1990, although both communities shared the same culture and language. After warnings were issued to their communities, Muslims in other Tiger-held areas

³³ The areas in the north and the east of Sri Lanka are traditionally called "Tamil Eelam" by the Tamils. Likewise, Tamil separatists are using the name as a synonym to the state which they aspire to create in these areas.



also fled.

11. The LTTE forcibly evicted 75,000 Muslims from the Northern Province. Most of them now reside in the western Puttalam District, resulting in significant demographic changes and social challenges. The overall population of Puttalam District increased about 10%. An IDP survey conducted in April 2002 by the Ministry of Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Refugees and the UNHCR recorded a total number of 68,156 IDPs, 93.3% of them are Muslims.
12. Peace negotiations in 1985, 1989 and 1994 failed. New hopes for peace arose when a ceasefire agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) was signed in 2002 by the government and the LTTE under the mediation of Norway⁴⁴. The international community pledged aid for rehabilitation and reconstruction and around 800,000 IDPs received assistance from the government. But the ceasefire agreement did not contributed to end the displacement of people for several reasons, e.g. on-going ethnic violence against Muslims in the Eastern Province, Jaffna peninsula contaminated by land mines, restrictions on fishing, land occupied by armed forces or other IDPs. Furthermore, a “shadow war” between LTTE and paramilitaries escalated after the LTTE’s eastern commander defected to the army in 2004. At the end of 2004, the Indian Ocean tsunami heavily affected the northern, eastern and southern coast when about 30,000 people were killed.
13. About half of the Sri Lankan population lives under the absolute poverty line with an average income of less than 2 US\$ per day. In 2001, Sri Lanka faced bankruptcy, with debt reaching 101% of GDP. One reason was the boost of the defence budget from 48 billion rupees in 1999 to 80 billion in 2000. Some 85% of Sri Lanka’s industries are located in the Western Province, mostly around Colombo. Apart from industry related to the processing of natural resources, some garment factories have been established. Services are the biggest sector of GDP, agriculture takes second place. However, most businesses are small-scale and primarily aim at daily services for the local population.

⁴⁴ The Muslim leaders have never been a party to any of the negotiations between Tamil and Sinhalese leaders to represent their concerns in a formal way, although, one third of Muslims live in the conflict-affected areas.



Information about the local context

14. The ethnic composition of the Puttalam area is 73.3% Sinhalese, 18.6% Muslims, and 6.3% Tamils. Puttalam has always been a multi-ethnic district. There are historical reports of a Tamil community living in Udappu, a traditional Tamil fishing and shrimp farming village since 1430. There has been a 100% increase of the Muslim population since 1990 because of the migration of IDPs from Mullathivu and Mannar.
15. Puttalam is still one of the poorest districts in the country. One reason for this is corruption at the local government level. An estimated 25-30% of the people in the district live in thatched houses.
16. The main livelihoods of the area are paddy cultivation, livestock, fishing and small-scale enterprises. Other sources of income include remittances from women of the community working in the Middle East.
17. The soil is good for agriculture in many areas but the lack of water prevents large scale cultivation from taking place. Currently there are 16 irrigation projects being carried out to improve conditions for paddy cultivation. The clay in the Arachchikattu area has the potential to be used for brick-making. This requires a government permit, but these permits are hard to come by and not always made available; the reason cited for this is “environmental problems”.
18. There are a few development institutions/organisations working in the Puttalam area.
19. IDPs were forced to move out of their homes in the North and East of Sri Lanka due to the conflict and many have resettled in Puttalam. An estimated 40-50% of the IDPs do not want to return to their original homes. There are 42 IDP settlements. The four areas where the camps are located are Mundalama, Vanathavillua, Kalpitiya, and Puttalam town. One of the main problems faced by the IDPs is that their former homes and land are being occupied by others, preventing them from returning, in addition to the insecure situation prevailing in those areas.
20. Local institutions are caught up in a difficult situation. They are forced to provide basic infrastructure such as shelters, water and sanitation facilities for IDPs on humanitarian grounds. They do this despite the perception that when things are provided it would be harder to convince the IDPs to return to their original homes.
21. The presence of IDPs poses some other socio-economic challenges, e.g. IDPs undercut the wage-labour market by working for lower rates than the locals.
22. Displaced people have started to buy land (approx. 8-10 perches or 200-250 square metre) and started building homes with the assistance they receive from the government. Some areas have developed as a result with shops, schools, bus and railway stations, and Mosques being built in the resettlement areas. One example is Nagavillu – because of the new settlements and the increase in population due to the influx of IDPs, the Nagavillu area is more developed than older areas such as Palavi Junction.
23. There are still original inhabitants who live in rural areas and don't even have access to roads. They subsist by collecting and selling firewood. This income is not always sufficient for their needs. It is also not a very steady source of income. They risk injury and death from snakebite while collecting firewood. Their lives are very difficult. In contrast the new settlers are living



close to the main road where they have easy access to many services: “They can get a bus any time of the night”.

24. In 2002, the peace negotiations on the national level also had an impact on the area. The MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) created the opportunity for some IDPs to return to their homes, but they were not able to because their homes were occupied by encroachers. Some don't want to return at all because they are settled well in Puttalam. Some leave one family member behind and go back to their former homes, but they always seem to return with money or anything they can salvage from the space/land.
25. As a result there is a lot of tension between the IDPs and the 'host communities' – the original inhabitants of the district. Many disputes begin as personal confrontations but they quickly escalate.
26. Examples of inter-communal conflicts that have arisen include disputes between rival three-wheeler stands and even the payment for bottles of soft drink. These conflicts often have an ethnic dimension and some people exploit them for their own ends. Politicians are often seen to become involved in these situations and tend to take advantage of them for political point scoring.
27. It is quite difficult to resolve some of these inter-communal conflicts. However, a number of institutions get involved in local level dispute resolution. In particular, the local government (District Secretariat), Pradeshiya Sabha (Sinhala for 'Regional Council') members, police as well as civil society actors like NGOs and CBOs get involved as mediators.
28. In one case a community based water project was established for the IDPs and the locals protested against it. Later, a 'peace committee' was involved in resolving the dispute at the local level.
29. Peace committees have been formed to deal with many such conflicts. They involve organisations and institutions like CHA (Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies), VCF (Vanni Cultural Foundation), the Grand Mosque in Puttalam town and other respected community leaders.
30. Most of the international NGOs have pulled out from this area concentrating instead on tsunami affected areas. However, CARE International and World Vision are still working in a few selected areas.
31. All the donors are focusing on the IDPs and not enough attention is paid to the local population. Some of the original households are poorer than the IDPs.




Handouts

On the following pages a range of handouts are offered and ready for printing. Some are rather standard in an introductory workshop, some are optional:

- The Do No Harm Framework
- The “Conceptual Map” of Do No Harm
- Do No Harm and Project Cycle Management
- The Seven Lessons of the Do No Harm-Approach
- The Seven Steps of the Do No Harm-Approach
- Effects through Resource Transfers
- Effects through Implicit Ethical Messages: The R-A-F-T-Principle
- Effects through Implicit Ethical Messages: List of Messages
- Role Plays on Implicit Ethical Messages
- The Timeline of the LCP Project and Beyond


The Do No Harm Framework


THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT



The “Conceptual Map” of Do No Harm

By Stephen Jackson, 2000



Do No Harm and Project Cycle Management

The Seven Lessons of the Do No Harm-Approach

- Lesson # 1 Project activities in a situation of violent conflict become part and parcel of that conflict.
- Lesson # 2 The context of conflict is always characterised by two types of factors / two realities:
- Dividers and Sources of Tension
 - Connectors and Local Capacities for Peace.
- Lesson # 3 Project activities interact with both types of factors / both realities in a positive or in a negative way.
- Lesson # 4 Transfer of Resources through projects constitutes one way by which projects affect conflict.
- Lesson # 5 Implicit Ethical Messages are another set of mechanisms through which projects interact with conflict.
- Lesson # 6 It is the details of a project which determine the project's effects on conflict.
- Lesson # 7 Experience has shown that there are always options!



The Seven Steps of the Do No Harm-Approach

- STEP 1 Understanding the context of conflict
- identify the appropriate “arena” – the geographic and social space which is relevant to your project or programme
 - identify which inter-group conflicts have caused violence or are dangerous and may escalate into violence?
 - how does the project relate to that context of conflict?
- STEP 2 analyse (identify and unpack) dividers and sources of tension
- STEP 3 analyse (identify and unpack) connectors and LCPs
- STEP 4 analyse - identify and unpack - the project
analyse the details of the project. Remember: it is never an entire project that goes wrong. It is the details that determine effects.
- STEP 5 analyse the project’s effects on the context of conflict through Resource Transfers (RTs) and Implicit Ethical Messages (IEMs)
- how do the programme’s RTs and IEMs affect dividers and sources of tension?
 - how do the programme’s RTs and IEMs affect connectors and LCPs?
- STEP 6 Generate programming options
- IF an element of the project/ programme has a negative effect on dividers – strengthening / reinforcing dividers, feeding into sources of tension
- or
- IF an element of the project/ programme has a negative effect on connectors weakening / undermining connectors and LCPs
- THEN generate as many options as possible for that detail so you can do what you intend to do in such a way as to weaken dividers and strengthen connectors
- STEP 7 Test options and redesign programme
- Test the options generated using your / your colleagues experience:
- What is the probable / potential effect on dividers / sources of tension?
- What is the probable / potential effect on connectors / LCPs?
-  Use the best / optimal options to redesign project



Effects through Resource Transfers

There are five patterns by which resources feed into, prolong and worsen conflict.

These include:

Distribution Effects

In the course of a project, decisions have to be made on the question who is supposed to be supplied with resources. It is of utmost importance to take into consideration that the selection of beneficiaries does not exacerbate conflicts. If groups that benefit from the project exactly (or even partially) overlap with the divisions represented in the conflict, the distribution of resources can reinforce and exacerbate conflict. If more than one party to the conflict benefits, or if these conflicting parties are even brought together by the way resources are distributed, a positive effect on the context of conflict can be expected.

Market Effects

The introduction of resources to a local context will affect prices, wages and profits on the local market. These effects can either reinforce the war economy (enriching activities and people that are war-related) or the peace economy (reinforcing “normal” civilian production, consumption and exchange).

Substitution Effects

Resources that are transferred through a project can potentially substitute and replace local resources and their sources. If a project assumes responsibility for the supply of basic goods and/or services for the population it can have the effect that local authorities who should be responsible are not taking over this role – potentially using their resources for other purposes like waging war. However, it can also have a positive effect to transfer knowledge, skills and/or awareness about malpractice (e.g. in the health sector or in dealing with conflicts) that leads to more positive behaviour.

Diversion Effects

Through theft, corruption or mismanagement resource can get into the wrong hands. If a project's resources are diverted this can feed the conflict, literally feed the dividers. For example, food provisions may be stolen by members of the warring parties to support the war effort either directly (as when food is stolen to feed fighters), or indirectly (as when food is stolen and sold in order to raise money to buy weapons).

Legitimisation Effects

The transfer of resources can benefit the receiving groups not only in a material way but also in increasing or decreasing their reputation or legitimacy. It can support either those people and actions that pursue war, or those that pursue and maintain peace. For example, a local actor that cooperates with and/or receives resources from a project will witness an effect on their perception by the local population. Non-cooperation with local actors equally can have an effect on their legitimacy. If the standing of the local actor is weakened or strengthened depends on the reputation of the project and/or the organisation implementing it.



Effects through Implicit Ethical Messages: The R-A-F-T-Principle



All activities we do also carry messages. Most of the time, we are not consciously aware of these messages. This is why they have been called “implicit” messages. Experience has shown that most of the “implicit messages” affect four dimensions of relationships: Respect, Accountability, Fairness and Transparency.

While we may not be aware of the messages we send as we do things, people we interact with very often notice them. We know that “implicit messages” affect the dynamics of violence and conflict. Therefore, the Do No Harm approach emphasises that we must be aware of and consciously consider the effects of “implicit messages”.

Respect

Respectful interactions with local people often are collaborative, trusting, calm and sensitive to local people and their concerns. Disrespectful interactions often show that we are suspicious of the people we interact with, they communicate indifference, belligerence or dismissiveness. Respectful interactions are two-way communications, open to and encouraging feedback. Disrespectful interactions are one-way communications, giving information or instructions without showing willingness to pay attention to comments or feedback.

Accountability

Institutionalised accountability is focused upward, to headquarters and organisational hierarchies, or donors. Here, however, accountability refers to local people and responsiveness to local concerns. Organisations and staff display accountability for their actions and decisions by taking action when things don’t work as expected, rather than blaming mistakes on others or ignoring problems. If staff refuse to accept responsibility for their errors or do not take action when action is required, local people will lose trust in the organisation as a whole to respond to their needs.

Fairness

Patterns of behaviour that are fair recognise the value of input of all members of a community and are responsive to the expressed needs and goals of the community they work in. Fairness is displayed when we do not only listen to those with voice, power and influence but pay attention also to the silent, weak and marginalised people. It is important to be sensitive for definitions of fair treatment, access and distribution in the local community.



Transparency

Being clear and open about an intervention and its aims, inviting local people to participate in the process, to give their feedback and to share their concerns communicates the value of transparency. This reinforces positive patterns of behaviour. However, being vague about our intentions and plans, shielding from criticism from outsiders leads to perceptions that an organisation does not respect or trust local people, is not willing to be held accountable for their actions.

Some examples - behaviour and messages

Behaviour sending negative message		Behaviour sending positive message
competitive behaviour behaviour displays suspicion, anger aggressive tone, posture behaviour displays lack of interest, indifference behaviour displays fear telling people, instructing, not listening ...	RESPECT	behaviour invites cooperation and collaboration encouraging behaviour displays trust relaxed and calm active listening, displaying interest in other people behaviour displays sensitivity
claiming not to be responsible, blaming others behaviour displays sense of impunity, rules are for others ...	ACCOUNTABILITY	claiming responsibility and taking positive Action adhering to rules and standards ...
treating people differently, discriminating ignoring rule unfair treatment refusing to explain ...	FAIRNESS	following rules being inclusive explaining own perceptions
keeping decision making closed hiding, withholding important information ...	TRANSPARENCY	Inviting feedback and criticism sharing information explaining decisions and making processes transparent

Effects through Implicit Ethical Messages: List of Messages

Arms and Power

When agencies hire armed guards to protect their goods from theft or their workers from harm, the implicit ethical message perceived by those in the context is that it is legitimate for arms to determine who gets access to food and medical supplies and that security and safety derive from weapons.

Disrespect, Mistrust, Competition among Agencies

When agencies refuse to cooperate with each other, and even worse “bad-mouth” each other (saying things such as “we don’t work the way they work; we are better and they get it wrong”), the message received by those in the area is that it is unnecessary to cooperate with anyone with whom one does not agree. Further, you don’t have to respect or work with people you don’t like.

Project Staff and Impunity

When project staff use the goods and support systems provided as assistance to people who suffer for their own pleasures and purposes (as when they take the vehicle to the mountains for a weekend holiday even though petrol is scarce), the message is that if one has control over resources, it is permissible to use them for personal benefit without being accountable to anyone else who may have a claim on these resources.

Different Values for Different Lives

When agency policies allow for evacuation of expatriate staff if danger occurs but not for care of local staff, or even worse, when plans call for removal of vehicles, radios and expatriates while local staff, food and other supplies are left behind, the message is that some lives (and even some goods) are more valuable than other lives.

Powerlessness

When field-based agency staff disclaim responsibility for the effects of their programmes, saying things such as “You can’t hold me accountable for what happens here; it is my headquarters, or the donor, or these terrible warlords who make my work have negative effects,” the message received is that individuals in complex circumstances cannot have much power and, thus, they do not have to take responsibility for what they do or how they do it. And, of course, this is what is also heard from people involved in civil wars - i.e. “I can’t help what I do; someone else makes me do it.”

Belligerence, Tension, Suspicion

When project workers are nervous about conflict and worried for their own safety to such an extent that they approach every situation with suspicions and belligerence, believing for example that these soldiers at the checkpoint “only understand power” and “can’t be trusted to be human,” their interactions with people in war zones very often reinforce the modes and moods of warfare. The message received is that power is, indeed, the broker of human interactions and it is normal to approach everyone with suspicion and belligerence.

Demonisation and Victimisation (through publicity)

Finally, when NGO headquarters in their publicity use pictures that emphasise the



gruesomeness of warfare and the victimisation of parties, they can reinforce the demonisation of one side in a war and, thus, reinforce the sense that all people on that side are evil while everyone on another side is an innocent sufferer. This is seldom the case and undermines the humanitarian principle. This, too, can reinforce the modes and moods of warfare rather than helping the public, or the agency's own staff, find an even-handed way to respond to those on all sides who seek and want peace.

Cultural Characteristics

Foreign experts are coming from a different culture whose characteristics will show up in the daily project work. Certain cultural habits and values will be modelled by external staff members and possibly become implicitly standard.

Standard of Living

Foreign staff can often be distinguished from local staff and population by their style and standard of living. They often live in comparatively big and luxurious houses that could be perceived as a contradiction to the overall goals of a project and approach of an organisation.



Roles Plays on Implicit Ethical Messages

In order to keep participant's attention and focus trainers will want to change the methodology of presentation. Most elements of the Do No Harm training require some input at some stage. Trainers have in the past experimented with many ideas and discovered that the session on Implicit Ethical Messages lends itself for roleplays. (On more detailed instructions on how to use role plays see below in Section III.)

The following pages contain several kinds of role plays for illustrating Implicit Ethical Messages:

- Role plays on some of the original IEMs with only descriptions of the setting. Most can be played by the trainers. If participants shall play them they must be given some time to prepare the dialogue themselves.¹
- Two role plays on “demonisation and victimisation (through publicity)” and “cultural characteristics” with a detailed script.²

¹ These role plays have been collected by LCP South Asia Network.

² These role plays have been inspired by those from the Horn of Africa and adapted for the Indonesia Project of Peace Brigades International, a human rights organisation which focusses on protective accompaniment of human rights defenders by teams of international volunteers.

Role Play “Arms and Power”

Roles (4): 2 armed guards,
 2 (or more) internally displaced persons (IDPs)

Setting:

There is a warehouse in a village where an NGO has stored food items. Two armed guards have been posted to guard the warehouse. A group of IDPs approaches the warehouse in search of food and water. However, as there is no staff to receive the IDPs the guards try to keep the IDPs at a distance. The situation becomes tense.

**Role Play “Disrespect, Mistrust, Competition among Agencies”**

Roles (4): 2 (or more) persons affected by a natural calamity (flood, mud-slide or other),
 2 staff of two different NGOs

Setting:

2 persons have been affected by a natural calamity and are waiting for help by the road side. One person comes and enquires about their situation. S/he explains that s/he is a staff of DDCN which is an organisations specialised for helping in such situations. S/he promises to inform the organisation and moves on.

Shortly later a second person comes explaining s/he is from CPL organisation. S/he says that CPL already has plans for building much better homes than DCCN and will begin building soon. S/he moves out. The two villagers are confused.



Role Play “Project Staff and Impunity”

Roles (2): 1 head of organisation,
 1 staff member

Setting:

The director sits comfortably, takes the phone and instructs someone to go and look for the driver. The driver knocks on the door and comes in, stands in a devout position. The director looks up and orders the driver to refuel the project's 4WD, have it cleaned and to load some sacks of grain, one canister of oil and a sack of lentils. Then he should park the car at the director's residence. The driver takes notes carefully, acknowledges each instruction with “Yes, sir!” and moves out quietly.

**Role Play “Different Values for Different Lives”**

Roles (2): 1 project manager,
 1 security officer at the organisation's head quarters

Setting:

The project manager sits at his desk. The phone rings. The organisation's security officer is calling from New York. The project manager is happy to receive the call as the situation has deteriorated and he would like some advice. He begins to explain but is interrupted by the security officer. He says that the UN has issued a warning and that the project officer must immediately begin with preparing for an evacuation according to the organisation's security guide lines. He instructs the project officer to pay particular attention to the safety of expatriate staff, communication equipment and vehicles. The project manager intervenes and request permission to also evacuate local staff and family members. The security officer warns him to stick closely to the security guidelines which have been established by the organisation's governing body.



Role Play “Powerlessness”

Roles (2): 1 director,
 1 project staff

Setting:

The director sits at his desk browsing some papers. The project staff bursts into the office. In an exited mode he informs the director that a mud-slide has come down and has destroyed a number of houses in the village. Many people are now without shelter, food and water. He explains that heavy rains are expected soon and urgent action is required. He also explains that there are still materials for shelter and food items in the warehouse which were donated for victims of an earthquake some weeks ago but which could not yet be reached due to road destruction. He requests permission to use those materials for immediate assistance in the village.

The director is very sympathetic and listens very carefully. Hearing the staff person's suggestion he steps back. In complicated sentences he explains that the items in the warehouse were donated for a specific purpose. But he promises to write an email to the donor to request permission to use the items for a different purpose now. The staff person urges on but the director instructs him not to do anything until the donor's permission has been granted.



Role Play “Belligerence, Tension, Suspicion”

Roles (2): 1 expatriate NGO staff
 1 policeman

Setting:

The policeman stops the NGO person and requests him to get out of the vehicle. The expatriate refuses to do so and shouts at the policeman: “Don't you see the sticker of our organisation on the car? I have to go to our project site immediately. I have no time to lose!” The argument is heating up.



Role Play: Cultural Characteristics

Setting: Public bus in Jakarta, Indonesia

Roles (4): 2 international human rights observers (female (A) and male (B)),
2 local residents (Muslims, male (C) and female (D))

Equipment (if available): four chairs set up as rows in a bus,
traditional clothing for local residents, including head scarf

Scenario

C and D: (sitting in the middle of the bus in one row next to each other; female by the window, male on the aisle)
(local residents)

A: (entering the bus with her male colleague and taking a seat in the row in front of the two local residents)
(female HR observer) *Hello, selamat pagi!*

B: (following his colleague)
(male HR observer) *Salamat pagi!*

C: (looking at the male human rights observer)
(male local resident) *Salamat pagi! How are you, my friend?*

B: (Only looking over his shoulder)
Good, thank you.

A: (turning around to face the two locals)
Yeah, good. Howzit?

C: (addressing the male human rights observer)
Good, thank you. Where are you from?

A: (addressing the female local resident)
I am from Germany and he is from Switzerland. But we live here in Jakarta.

C: (Curious and still trying to address the male)
Are you married?

A: (amused)
No, we are human rights observer.



C: (a little bit confused)

Ah, and where do you live here?

A: (more serious)

We are currently 6 international human rights observers of an organisation called Peace Brigades International and we all live together in a house not far from here.

C: (disturbed, commanding his wife to come and leave the bus immediately)

Ikutlah!

C and D: (getting up in a hurry, heading for the exit)



Role Play: Demonisation and Victimisation (through Publicity)

Setting: Camp of internally displaced people in the Province of Aceh after the Tsunami

Roles (5): a photographer (A), an aid worker (B), three children

Equipment (if available): toys, a camera

Scenario:

Children: (sitting on the floor, smiling and playing cheerfully with the toys)

A: (exhausted)

(photographer) *Finally, I hope it was worth the trip. Our readers really need some good photos of the affected children.*

B: (pointing towards the group of children)

(aid worker) *Here we are. These are our children. We are so happy with their slow but steady recovery.*

A: (staring at the children)

These are your children? Are you serious?

B: (surprised)

Why?

A: (shaking his head and shouting angrily)

I am not interested in this kind of children. Do you really think you can get people to donate money with such pictures?

They are well-nourished and well-clothed, and even smiling. That is ridiculous!

B: (defensive)


But these are the children that went through our programme.

A: (rough)

These children are useless. I need poor children. Some where you can see at first glance that they had been swept away by the flood and lost their parents. Children who look like victims! Go and look for appropriate children!



The Timeline of the LCP Project and Beyond



The DNH Workbook (revised 2001)

NOTE: The authors of this revised version have not used the Workbook in any of their trainings. Therefore, they cannot comment on its usefulness. As it was part of the original version of this manual and as other trainers may find it useful, we include it here.

Identifying Dividers / Sources of Tensions and Connectors / Local Capacities for Peace

	Dividers / Sources of Tension	Connectors / LCPs
Systems & Institutions		
Attitudes & Actions		
(different / shared) Values & Interests		
(different / common) Experiences		
Symbols & Occasions		



Unpacking Your Aid Programme

<u>Mandate</u> <u>Fundraising</u> <u>HQ Organisation</u>
<u>Why?</u>
<u>Where?</u>
<u>What?</u>
<u>When?</u>
<u>By Whom?</u>
<u>With Whom?</u>
<u>How?</u>

Understanding Aid's Impact on Conflict through Resource Transfers

There are five different mechanisms of how *resource transfers* (RT) affect aid's impact on conflict.

Analyse (unpack) your aid programme and identify its impacts on Dividers / Sources of Tension and Connectors / LCPs along each of the five RT mechanisms; for example: How do the resources or services you deliver affect markets? What prices rise? What prices fall?

Resource Transfers <i>Question: how does aid's transfer of resources impact on dividers or connectors via these mechanisms?</i>	Dividers / Sources of Tension	Connectors / LCPs
Theft		
Markets		
Distribution		
Substitution		
Legitimisation		



Understanding Aid's Impact on Conflict through Implicit Ethical Messages

There are seven types of *Implicit Ethical Messages* (IEMs) involved in the giving of aid. Analyse (unpack) your aid programme and identify the IEMs and their impact on Dividers / Sources of Tensions and Connectors / LCPs.

Implicit Ethical Messages <i>Question: where and how does the implicit ethical message of ... show up and how does it impact on dividers and connectors?</i>	Dividers / Sources of Tension	Connectors/LCPs
Arms and Power		
Disrespect, Mistrust, Competition		
Impunity		
Different Values for different lives		
Powerlessness		
Belligerence, Tension, Suspicion		
Publicity/Funding		

Generating and Testing Programming Options I:**Weakening Dividers / Sources of Tensions**

- Reminder:
- If an aid programme increases Dividers or feeds into Sources of Tension, or if it weakens Connectors / LCPs, list all possible options for achieving the objective of the aid project.
 - Assess the impact of each programming option on Tensions/Dividers and Connectors/LCPs.

Question: *How can you design the aid programme in such a way as to reduce the Dividers / Sources of Tension?*

Dividers / Sources of Tension (as identified on previous page)	Programming Options	Likely Impacts on Dividers / Sources of Tensions	Likely Impacts on Connectors / Local Capacities for Peace
<i>Here, list those dividers / sources of tension which you have identified as those with which your project may be interacting</i>	<i>Identify alternative ways of doing what you intend to do but avoiding negative impacts</i> #1. #2. #3. ...	<i>Assess (test) the likely impact of an option generated on dividers / sources of tension</i>	<i>Assess (test) the likely impact of an option generated on connectors / LCPs</i>

Generating and Testing Programming Options II:**Strengthening Connectors / LCPs**

Question: *How can you design the aid programme in such a way as to strengthen Connectors / LCPs?*

Connectors / LCPs (as identified on previous page)	Programming Options	Likely Impacts on Connectors / LCPs	Likely Impacts on Dividers / Sources of Tension
<i>Here, list those connectors / LCPs which you have identified as those with which your project may be interacting</i>	<i>Identify alternative ways of doing what you intend to do but avoiding negative impacts</i> #1. #2. #3. ...	<i>Assess (test) the likely impact of an option generated on connectors / LCPs</i>	<i>Assess (test) the likely impact of an option generated on dividers / sources of tension</i>

Useful Links

We have collected a few links to websites that offer resources and materials that may be useful for conducting workshops and trainings on Do No Harm, “conflict sensitive” programming or dealing with violent inter-group conflict.

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

<http://www.cdacollaborative.org>

CDA is a non-profit organization based in Cambridge, Massachusetts (USA). We are committed to improving the effectiveness of international actors who provide humanitarian assistance, engage in peace practice, and are involved in supporting sustainable development.

A Website for Conflict-Sensitive Programming

<http://www.donoharm.info>

This website may appear boring! But this is intended. The objective of www.donoharm.info is to provide information on conflict-sensitive programming to people in some of the most remote regions of the world. That is why accessibility has been the most important aspect in the design of the individual pages. There are no photos and there is no animation, so that downloading times remain short even where connections are poor. Consequently, this website is not beautiful but simple.

Conflict Sensitivity Consortium

<http://www.conflictsensitivity.org>

The project "The Practice of Conflict Sensitivity - Concept to Impact" is intended to strengthen the practice of conflict sensitivity throughout and beyond a broad consortium of humanitarian, peace-building and multi-mandate development NGOs. The project is being funded by DFID, the UK Department for International Development, and is being carried out by a Consortium of NGOs across four countries: Kenya, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and the UK. It started in 2008 and is intended to run until March 2012.

Swisspeace / Centre for Peacebuilding

<http://koff.swisspeace.ch/>

The KOFF platform is a meeting point between governmental and non-governmental peacebuilding actors to promote dialogue, capacities and knowledge and to strengthen synergies and coherence of Swiss peacebuilding approaches through strategic linkages between the different tracks and actors. The diversity of KOFF members provides the basis and legitimacy for its work.

KOFF applies a practice-oriented approach and integrates impulses from ongoing policy debates into the development of new tools and approaches to improve impact and results and better serve the practical needs voiced from the field.

The Centre for Training and Networking in Nonviolent Action – KURVE Wustrow was founded in 1980 with the aim of turning concerns about violent conflict, environmental degradation and social injustice into conscious nonviolent action.

KURVE Wustrow conducts a wide range of trainings on civil, nonviolent conflict transformation and related topics like Do No Harm at home and abroad.

Specifically on the Do No Harm-Approach these trainings are on offer:

- **Practitioner Training: Project Management for Peace Work**
a five-day training which includes a one-day introductory workshop on the Do No Harm-Approach.
- **Do No Harm-Applicator Training**
a five-day training which not only includes an introduction but also the application of the Do No Harm-Approach for a real project.
- **Do No Harm-Training of Trainers**
a nine-day training in which participants first take part in an introductory workshop on the Do No Harm-Approach, then practice the facilitation of such a workshop and finally conduct a real introductory workshop themselves.

For more info: www.kurviewustrow.org